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COMMENTARIES

ON

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK THE FOURTH.

Of Public Wrongs.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF CRIMES, AND THEIR PUNISHMENT.

We are now arrived at the fourth and last branch of these commentaries, which treats of public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors. For we may remember that, in the beginning of the preceding book, (a) wrongs were divided into two species: the one private, and the other public. (1) Private wrongs, which are frequently termed civil injuries, were the subject of that entire book: we are now therefore, lastly, to proceed to the consideration of public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors; (2) with the means of their prevention and punishment. In the pursuit of which subject I shall consider, in the first place, the general nature of crimes and punishments; secondly, the

persons capable of committing crimes; thirdly, their several degrees of *2] guilt as principals, or accessaries; *fourthly, the several species of

crimes, with the punishment annexed to each by the laws of England; fifthly, the means of preventing their perpetration; and, sixthly, the method of inflicting those punishments which the law has annexed to each several crime and misdemeanor.

First, as to the general nature of crimes, and their punishment; the discussion and admeasurement of which forms in every country the code of criminal law; or, as it is more usually denominated with us in England, the doctrine of the pleas of the crown; (3) so called because the king, in whom centres the majesty of the whole community, is supposed by the law to be the person injured by every infraction of the public rights belonging to that community, and is therefore in all cases the proper prosecutor for every public offence. (b) (4)

(a) Book iii. ch. 1.

(b) See book i. p. 268.

(1) State v. Rickey, 4 Halsted (N. J.) 293, 305 (1827). (2) The Queen v. The Mayor, etc. of Fredericton, 3 New Brunswick, 139, 149 (1879). (3) Bowyer's Commentaries on the Constitutional Law of England, 340.

(4) A criminal action is an action at law, and is within the jurisdiction of a court having common-law powers. Territory v. Flowers, 2 Montana, 531, 534 (1877).

The knowledge of this branch of jurisprudence, which teaches the nature, extent, and degrees of every crime, and adjusts to it its adequate and necessary penalty, is of the utmost importance to every individual in the state. For (as a very great master of the crown-law(c) has observed upon a similar occasion) no rank or elevation in life, no uprightness of heart, no prudence or circumspection of conduct, should tempt a man to conclude that he may not at some time or other be deeply interested in these researches. The infirmities of the best among us, the vices and ungovernable passions of others, the instability of all human affairs, and the numberless unforeseen events which the compass of a day may bring forth, will teach us (upon a moment's reflection) that to know with precision what the laws of our country have forbidden, and the deplorable consequences to which a wilful disobedience may expose us, is a matter of universal concern.

In proportion to the importance of the criminal law ought also to be the care and attention of the legislature in properly forming and enforcing it. It

should be founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform, *3] *and universal; and always conformable to the dictates of truth and

justice, the feelings of humanity, and the indelible rights of mankind: though it sometimes (provided there be no transgression of these external boundaries) may be modified, narrowed, or enlarged, according to the local or occasional necessities of the state which it is meant to govern. And yet, either from a want of attention to these principles in the first concoction of the laws, and adopting in their stead the impetuous dictates of avarice, ambition, and revenge; from retaining the discordant political regulations, which successive conquerors or factions have established in the various revolutions of government; from giving a lasting efficacy to sanctions that were intended to be temporary, and made (as lord Bacon expresses it) merely upon the spur of the occasion; or from, lastly, too hastily employing such means as are greatly disproportionate to their end, in order to check the progress of some very prevalent offence: from some, or from all, of these causes, it hath happened that the criminal law is in every country of Europe more rude and imperfect than the civil. I shall not here enter into any minute inquiries concerning the local constitutions of other nations; the inhumanity and mistaken policy of which have been sufficiently pointed out by ingenious writers of their own. (d) But even with us in England, where our crown law is with justice supposed to be more nearly advanced to perfection; where crimes are more accurately defined, and penalties less uncertain and arbitrary; *4] where all our accusations are public, and our *trials in the face of the world; where torture is unknown, and every delinquent is judged by such of his equals against whom he can form no exception nor even a personal dislike; even here we shall occasionally find room to remark some particulars that seem to want revision and amendment. These have chiefly arisen from too scrupulous an adherence to some rules of the ancient common law, when the reasons have ceased upon which those rules were founded; from not repealing such of the old penal laws as are either obsolete or absurd; and from too little care and attention in framing and passing new ones. The enacting of penalties, to which a whole nation should be subject, ought not to be left as a matter of indifference to the passions or interests of a few, who upon temporary motives may prefer or support such a bill; but be calmly and maturely considered by persons who know what provisions the laws have already made to remedy the mischief complained of, who can from experience foresee the probable consequences of those which are now proposed, and who will judge without passion or prejudice how adequate they are to the evil. It is never usual in the house of peers even to read a private bill, (d) Baron Montesquieu, marquis Beccaria, etc.

(c) Sir Michael Foster, pref. to rep.

which may affect the property of an individual, without first referring it to some of the learned judges and hearing their report thereon. (e) And surely equal precaution is necessary when laws are to be established which may affect the property, the liberty, and perhaps even the lives of thousands. Had such a reference taken place, it is impossible that in the eighteenth century it could ever have been made a capital crime to break down (however maliciously) the mound of a fish-pond, whereby any fish shall escape; or to cut down a cherry-tree in an orchard. (f) Were even a committee appointed but once in a hundred years to revise the criminal law, it could not have continued to this hour a felony, without benefit of clergy, to be seen for one month in the company of persons who call themselves, or are called, Egyptians.(g)

It is true that these outrageous penalties, being seldom or never inflicted, are hardly known to be law by the public; *but that rather [*5 aggravates the mischief, by laying a snare for the unwary. Yet they cannot but occur to the observation of any one who hath undertaken the task of examining the great outlines of the English law, and tracing them up to their principles; and it is the duty of such a one to hint them with decency to those whose abilities and stations enable them to apply the remedy.(5) Having therefore premised this apology for some of the ensuing remarks, which might otherwise seem to savor of arrogance, I proceed now to consider (in the first place) the general nature of crimes.

I. A crime or misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it.(6) This general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors, which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms; though, in common usage, the word "crimes" is made to denote such offences as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults, and omissions of less consequence, are comprised under the gentler names of "misdemeanors" only. (7)

(e) See book ii. page 335.

(f) Stat. 9 Geo. I. c. 22. 31 Geo. II. c. 42.

(g) Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 20.

(5) This hint was taken, though very tardily, and the English criminal law has been shorn of much of its harshness and barbarity.

(6) This definition must be understood to comprehend only civil crimes; that is, violations of the municipal law. Bowyer's Commentaries on the Constitutional Law of England, 340. A crime may be generally defined as the commission or omission of an act which the law forbids or commands on the ground of public policy, and under pain of a punishment to be imposed by the state in a proceeding in its own name. Clark's Criminal Law, I. Bishop's New Criminal Law, 8th ed. vol. I, 14. Withers v. The State ex rel., Posey, 36 Ala. 252, 261 (1860). Smith v. Smith, 2 Sneed, 473, 477 and 478 (1855). In re Bergin, 31 Wis. 383, 386 (1872). The State v. Williams, 7 Robinson, 252, 272 (1844). Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123, 124 (1874). City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, 589 (1878). State v. Bishop, 7 Conn. 181, 185 (1828). McKinney's Justice, 4th ed. vol. I, 391. Boyes v. Smithy, 2 Cape of Good Hope (Roscoe) 119 (1871). A violation of a public statute forbidding the sale of liquors without a license is a crime. State v. Collins, 1 McCord, 355, 357 (1821). “Public indecency " is a criminal offence at common law. Queen v. Marais, 6 Juta, Cape of Good Hope Reports, 367, 370 (1890).

(7) Crime includes both felonies and misdemeanors; but in popular usage frequently means only felonies. Binns' Justice, 10th ed. 71. In the law of England and of most, if not all, the states of the Union the word misdemeanor is used in contradistinction to felony. Felony generally means a grave crime punishable by death or a long term of imprisonment. Misdemeanors comprise all crimes of a grade less than felony, and the term is applied to all offences for which the law has not provided a particular name; but not including a multitude of unclassified offences of which inferior magistrates, such as justices of the peace, police magistrates, and the like, have exclusive jurisdiction. See Barbour's Criminal Law, vol. 1, 383 (1883). Bassett's Criminal Pleading, 2d ed. p. 5. Archbold's Criminal Practice, 8th ed. vol. 1, 2. v. Conant, I Broderip, Bingham, 548, 575 (1820). Co., Peck's Tennessee Reports, 334, 357 (1824). (1832). Barbour's Criminal Law, vol. 1, 1 (1883).

Carpenter v. Nixon, 5 Hill, 260. Butt
Sevier v. The Justices of Washington
Matter of Clark, 9 Wendell, 212, 222
Holton v. The State, 2 Fla. 476, 506

The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private wrongs, or civil injuries, are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights. and duties due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.(8) As, if I detain a field from another man, to which the law has given him a right, this is a civil injury, and not a crime; for here only the right of an individual is concerned, and it is immaterial to the public which of us is in possession of the land: but treason, murder, and robbery are properly ranked among crimes; since, besides the injury done to individuals, they strike at the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity. (9)

In all cases the crime includes an injury: every public offence is also a private wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it

(1849). The State v. Williams, 7 Robinson, 252, 272 (1844). Illis v. Knight, 3 Texas, 312, 314 (1848). State v. Phelps, 9 Md. 21, 27 (1856). Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Denison, 24 Howard, 66, 99 (1860). State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 511 (1869). Patten v. The People, 18 Mich. 314, 321 (1869). State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Lazarus, 39 La. Ann. 142, 186 (1887). A court which has jurisdiction in "all criminal cases" is not confined to "crimes" to the exclusion of misdemeanors. State v. Savannah, Charlton's Reports, 235, 237 (1809).

(8) Every injury to the public is such also to each individual. Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. I, 127. A wrong which injures another as an individual only, and affects the other members of the community so slightly that the public good does not require the state to notice it, is only a private wrong or a tort. Clark's Criminal Law, 5 (1894). Cooley on Torts, 2d ed. 95. The appointment to office being one of the prerogatives of the supreme authority of the state, any usurpation of it is a public, and not a private wrong. Cleary v. Deliesseline, 1 McCord, 35, 36 (1821).

(9) The distinction between public crimes and private injuries seems entirely to be created by positive laws, and is referable only to civil institutions. Every violation of a moral law or natural obligation is an injury for which the offender ought to make retribution to the individuals who immediately suffer from it; and it is also a crime for which he ought to be punished to that extent which would deter both him and others from a repetition of the offence. In positive laws those acts are denominated injuries for which the legislature has provided only retribution or a compensation in damages; but when, from experience, it is discovered that this is not sufficient to restrain within moderate bounds certain classes of injuries, it then becomes necessary for the legislative power to raise them into crimes and to endeavor to repress them by the terror of punishment, or the sword of the public magistrate. The word "crime" has no technical meaning in the law of England. It seems, when it has a reference to positive law, to comprehend those acts which subject the offender to punishment. When the words high crimes and misdemeanors are used in prosecutions by impeachment, the words high crimes have no definite signification, but are used merely to give greater solemnity to the charge. When the word crime is used with a reference to moral law, it implies every deviation from moral rectitude. Hence we say it is a crime to refuse the payment of a just debt; it is a crime wilfully to do an injury to another's person or property without making him a satisfaction. To destroy another's property wilfully, without making the owner a compensation, is in all cases a worse crime in reason than theft; because the individual deprived of his property suffers precisely the same injury, and the public loses the benefit of that property, which contributes to the support of no one; and he who does the injury has not the temptation of him who steals to supply his wants. In the case of those actions which are only civil injuries, and to which no legal punishment is annexed, the law has supposed that retribution will be sufficient to deter the commission of them. But the wilful and malicious destruction of another's property by fire in many cases is punished with death; so also is the malicious killing and maiming of another's cattle: yet these detestable and diabolical acts were not crimes by the common law of England; but experience discovered the necessity of rendering them subject to public and severe punishment. Yet to set fire to a field of ripe standing corn is still only a private injury, though this is an act which strikes at the very being of society, but the legislature have not yet found it necessary to repress it by the terror of penal laws.-CHRISTIAN.

State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Lazarus, 39 La. (Ann.) 142, 186 (1887). State v. Beckman, 3 Dutcher, 124, 127 (1858). Archbold's Criminal Practice, 8th ed. (Pomeroy) vol. 1, p. 3.

likewise affects the community. (10) *Thus, treason in imagining the [*6 king's death involves in it conspiracy against an individual, which is also a civil injury; but, as this species of treason, in its consequences, principally tends to the dissolution of government, and the destruction thereby of the order and peace of society, this denominates it a crime of the highest magnitude. Murder is an injury to the life of an individual; but the law of society considers principally the loss which the state sustains by being deprived of a member, and the pernicious example thereby set for others to do the like. Robbery may be considered in the same view: it is an injury to private property; but, were that all, a civil satisfaction in damages might atone for it; the public mischief is the thing for the prevention of which our laws have made it a capital offence. In these gross and atrocious injuries the private wrong is swallowed up in the public: we seldom hear any mention made of satisfaction to the individual, the satisfaction to the community being so very great. And, indeed, as the public crime is not otherwise avenged than by forfeiture of life and property, it is impossible afterwards to make any reparation for the private wrong, which can only be had from the body or goods of the aggressor.(11) But there are crimes of an inferior nature, in which the public punishment is not so severe but it affords room for a private compensation also; and herein the distinction of crimes from civil injuries is very apparent. For instance: in the case of battery, or beating another, the aggressor may be indicted for this at the suit of the king, for disturbing the public peace, and be punished criminally by fine and imprisonment; and the party beaten may also have his private remedy by action of trespass for the injury which he in particular sustains, and recover a civil satisfaction in damages. (12) So, also, in case of a public nuisance, as digging a ditch across a highway: this is punishable by indictment as a common offence to the whole kingdom and all his majesty's subjects; but if any individual sustains any special *damage thereby, as laming his horse, breaking [*7 his carriage, or the like, the offender may be compelled to make ample satisfaction, as well for the private injury as for the public wrong.

Upon the whole, we may observe that, in taking cognizance of all wrongs or unlawful acts, the law has a double view, viz.: not only to redress the party injured by either restoring to him his right, if possible, or by giving him an equivalent, the manner of doing which was the object of our inquiries in the preceding book of these commentaries, but also to secure to the public the benefit of society, by preventing or punishing every breach and violation

(10) Dill v. The People, 19 Colo. 469, p. 478 (1894).

(11) The civil right to sue for the injury the party has received in a case of felony is not in general merged or destroyed, but only suspended until he has performed his duty to society by an endeavor to bring the offender to justice: and after the party on whom suspicion was fixed has been convicted or acquitted, without collusion, the prosecutor may support an action for the same cause as that on which the criminal prosecution was founded. Styles, 346. 12 East, 409. Rep. T. Hardw. 350. 17 Ves. 329. No action can be brought, or bill in equity filed, in relation to a felony, until the offender has been duly tried for the offence, (id. ibid..) or that every exertion has been made to bring him to justice.-CHITTY. The rule of the common law, that it must appear that the person committing a wrongful act has been prosecuted criminally to conviction, before a civil suit can be maintained for the injury does not prevail generally in the United States. Lofton v. Vogles, 17 Ind. 105, 107 (1861). But in England and a few of the United States, if a felony has been committed, the criminal prosecution must be first instituted. Clark's Criminal Law, 7 (1894). See Waterman on Trespass, vol. 1, pp. 36, 37 (1875). Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 351 et seq. (1854).

(12) Where an act is both a tort and a crime the wrongdoer is liable both to a civil action by the person he has particularly injured and to a criminal proceeding by the state. The two proceedings are distinct, and neither is a bar to the other. In cases of misdemeanor the civil action may be brought before the institution of the criminal prosecution and carried on at the same time. Clark's Criminal Law, 7 (1894).

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