Sivut kuvina
PDF
ePub

exchange being taken into account FIGURE 5.-Average weekly quoted price of lead at New York and London, 1923, fluctuations in

1922

1923

Cents JAN FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC. JAN FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT OCT. NOV. DEC. Cents

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small]

but in July the decline in price at New York left scarcely more than a cent difference in the price in the two markets. In November and early December the rise in lead at London brought the two markets within less than a cent of each other, but by the end of the year the spread was equal again to more than the tariff differential, 22 cents a pound. These facts are shown in a striking way by the graphs in Figure 5, which take into account the iluctuations in exchange and show that the London market was more responsive to trade conditions than the New York market.

As stated on page 129, the value of the refined lead produced in the United States from domestic ores in 1923 was $76,138,000 at the average price of refined lead, as compared with $51,562,000 at the average price in 1922, a gain of 48 per cent.

MANGANESE AND MANGANIFEROUS ORES

By HELENA M. MEYER

INTRODUCTION

The year 1923 marked an interesting period in the history of the manganese industry, affording the first chance for a demonstration of what domestic operators would produce under tariff stimulation. Although the tariff became effective September 22, 1922, there was not sufficient time before the end of that year to indicate whether or not a large increase in production would take place-in fact, the shipments in 1922 were slightly lower than those in 1921. In 1923 shipments of ore containing 35 per cent or more of manganese increased to more than two and one-third times those of 1922 but were considerably less than tariff advocates hoped they would be and amounted to only a little over 4 per cent of the manganese ore required for the production of ferromanganese in 1918, when steel production was slightly less than in 1923. Sixty-two per cent of the domestic high-grade ore shipped in 1923 was chemical ore from Philipsburg, Mont., and a large part of the remainder was not consumed in making ferromanganese.

The imports of manganese ore in 1923 were less than those in 1918, when domestic production was nearly 10 times as great as in 1923. The domestic production plus imports in 1923 (451,000 gross tons) was less than three-fifths of production plus imports in 1918 (797,000 gross tons). As nearly 95 per cent of the manganese used in industries in the United States is consumed in the production of ferromanganese and spiegeleisen for steel manufacture, the natural assumption from the foregoing comparison would be that considerably less steel was produced in 1923 than in 1918. On the contrary, however, there was an increase in steel production from 44,462,432 gross tons in 1918 to 44,943,696 gross tons in 1923, a total exceeded only in 1917 (45,060,607 tons). The large steel production in 1923 was possible, in spite of the low total of domestic shipments and imports of manganese, mainly because large quantities of manganese ore were imported and stocked at the furnaces prior to September 22, 1922, and because in both 1922 and 1923 more ferromanganese was imported than in any other year since 1913.

In 1923 an average of about $28 a ton was received for domestic manganese ore, compared with about $34 a ton in 1922. The decrease is apparently due to the fact that of the ore shipped in 1923 a large part contained only from 35 to 45 per cent of manganese, whereas in 1922 little of this grade was shipped, most of the ore containing 50 per cent or more.

The tariff brought out shipments of high-grade ore from mines in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, which were idle the year before, and increases from all other States that produced in 1922 except Nevada. Nevada shipped a small quantity of ore in 1922, but no operations were reported in 1923. There were 36 shippers in 1923 from all States, exactly double those reporting shipments in 1922. Montana made the largest output of highgrade ore, producing over twice as much as all other States together. Throughout the dull period between the World War and the time the tariff became effective Montana found a market for the highgrade chemical ore of Philipsburg.

An extensive study of manganese ore reserves in the United States has been completed by the subcommittee on manganese of the committee on foreign and domestic mining policy of the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America, and its report was published in the early part of 1924. The personnel of the subcommittee was as follows: C. M. Weld, chairman; D. F. Hewett, of the United States Geological Survey; J. W. Furness, of the United States Bureau of Mines; Robert Linton, John A. Mathews, J. V. W. Reynders, and Bradley Stoughton.

Älthough the subcommittee attempted to estimate the reserves of ore at known deposits and in this work had the cooperation of the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Mines, and a number of mine operators and independent engineers, special emphasis was placed on an attempt to estimate future production at assumed prices. In order that the prices throughout a long period should be independent of fluctuations in general commodity prices and therefore be comparable, past production and estimates of future production were based upon "manganese index prices." The manganese index price is the price of the ore in dollars per ton divided by the commodity index number prevailing at the same time. An attempt was made to estimate the amount of manganese ore, containing more than 35 per cent of manganese, which would be produced during three successive years at manganese index prices of $10, $20, $35, and $50 a gross ton for 50 per cent ore. A table, prepared by the subcommittee, showing the annual requirements of manganese ore, based on an annual output of 50,000,000 gross tons of steel, is given below: Manganese ore required annually for 50,000,000 tons of steel

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

The subcommittee states that according to the best information available, domestic deposits, under the stimulation of an index price of $50 a ton for manganese ore, would be capable of producing ore containing 46,000 tons of recoverable manganese metal for metallurgical purposes the first year, 82,000 tons the second year, and 105,000 tons the third year, and that thereafter production would decline rather than increase. The possible output of chemical

1

ore, which is not used in steel making and is not included in the above table, is placed at 40,000 tons of ore a year for the three years. The following estimates of reserves of manganese ore were prepared by the subcommittee. The minimum and maximum figures given correspond in a general way to the terms "probable and 'possible" as commonly used in discussions of ore reserves, although many of the minima include possibilities.

Indicated total reasonably possible reserves of manganese ore of ferro grade (35 per cent or more of manganese), at an index price of $50 a ton, in gross tons, by States

[blocks in formation]

• Idaho, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming.

The subcommittee drew the following conclusions:

1. The domestic resources of ferro-grade and chemical ores of the United States are so out of balance with the major foreign resources that under natural conditions of international exchange imports of such ores into the United States can be efficiently stopped only at great cost.

2. Should, nevertheless, legislation be enacted which should effect a measurable substitution of domestic for foreign ferro ores, the chief result, aside from the cost, would be the dangerous depletion of reserves, which as it is are totally inadequate for the country's needs.

3. Domestic resources of low-grade reserves, on the other hand, are comparatively adequate. Any effective attempt, however, to force their adaptation to the country's needs beyond the normal development which may be looked for through increase in skill and vigorous educational campaign would result in a cost so enormous as to be quite disproportionate to the purpose to be served.

« EdellinenJatka »