not have had sensible evidence of this, otherwise than in the actual destruction of sinners. Had God saved sinners without any atonement, his government would have furnished no evidence of any such aversion of the divine mind from the character of sinners. Consequently, there could not have been evidence that the salvation of sinners is of grace.

ACCORDING to this view of the matter, the atonement is so far from being inconsistent with the doctrine of grace, in the salvation of sinners, that it exceedingly illustrates it. Atonement is so far from proving that it is not an act of grace to pardon and save sinners; that, above every other consideration whatever, it shows it to be pure grace. Yea, the atonement of Christ is so far from obscuring divine grace, in the salvation of sinners; that, without this, grace could not have appeared. Had God saved sinners without doing any thing to vindicate the honor of his law, and witness his infinite hatred of iniquity; it could not have been evident that this salvation is of grace. The atonement, therefore, is so far from obscuring the lusture of divine grace, that it greatly adds to it: Yea, it is absolutely essential to the evidence of any grace whatever, in the salvation of sinners.

GOD, himself exerciseth no grace, excepting toward sinners. They, who are no sinners, cannot be the objects of grace. The divine righteousness itself is full security, for the innocent, against every evil. Grace, in God, is the bestowment of good upon those whose character he righteously abhors. Grace, therefore, as a quality of the divine character, can be seen no farther than his righteous abhorrence of the object of it becomes visible. The glory and greatness of divine grace, can be estimated only by the detestation in which God holds the character of the object toward whom it is exercised. Therefore, by how much the

more sensible the demonstrations of divine anger are, against the character of the sinner, by so much the more conspicuous is the grace of God, in his pardon and salvation. The clearer views we have of the displeasure of God, on one hand; the more lively apprehension shall we have of divine grace on the other.

VIEWING the atonement, therefore, as a glass in which the righteousness of God may be seen; instead of obscuring the lustre of divine grace, in the salvation of sinners, it greatly increases it. Yea, the atonement is the only glass in which the true beauty and glory of the free, sovereign grace of God can be seen.

OBJ. "IT is a beauty in the character of the civil "magistrate to pardon; and, this without any atonement; which may, nevertheless, be termed grace."

ANS. COULD human laws be framed with such per fection as that their penalties should express the is pleasure of the community only in cases where the public good requires it should exist; pardon could in no case be, either consistently exercised by the su preme magistrate, or appear to be of grace. Were haman laws thus perfect, it would be injurious to the public to pardon, in any case whatever; and absurd to lodge a power to exercise it, in any branch of the executive authority. Pardon, in this case, would be so far from partaking of the real nature of grace, that it would be evident injustice. For the penalties of the law could never be incurred, excepting in cases where the common good requires that a public odium should be exercised and expressed. Therefore, from the propriety of pardons in civil government, we can infer nothing concerning the propriety and beauty ef pardons, in the divine. And, should we admit as the case now actually is, that it is an act of grace, in the civil magistrate to pardon without atonement; it could

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not, however, be from thence inferred that it would be grace in God, even in any instance to forgive the sinner without an atonement.

If the displeasure of God exist in every case wherein the penalties of the divine law threaten it; pardon without an atonement, would be so far from being an act of grace, that it would be an injury to the public : And, for this obvious reason, that the divine displeasure exists in no instances whatever, but in those wherein the good of the universe requires it should be exercised. This may certainly be concluded from the perfect and infinite regard the divine Being has for the greatest good of the universe. But, in every case wherein the universal good requires that divine displeasure should exist and be exercised; it is exceedingly evident that the same principle requires it should also be expressed. Therefore, pardon cannot consistently be bestowed without an atonement: Nor could it, without this, be an act of grace.

THESE observations give us to see the reason why the scheme of the salvation of sinners, through the atonement of Christ, is so much celebrated, in the gospel, for its consummate and unsearchable wisdom: And why a crucified Christ is represented as the pow er of God and the wisdom of God. (h) No wisdom, but that which is absolutely and infinitely perfect, could ever have found a way wherein the sinner could be pardoned, and yet the public good be saved: because God is not offended, nor hath the least disposition to punish, excepting in those cases wherein the public good requires that his displeasure be express

ed.

Could this displeasure be made to appear, and yet the public good be secured; pardon, in that case, might be consistently bestowed; and, would appear

(h) 1 Cor. i. 24.

to be a glorious act of divine grace. Nothing but the atonement of Christ effects these ends; and, nothing like this bestows such lustre and glory on divine sovereign grace.

CHAP. IX.

Shewing in what way it may be accounted for, that the sufferings of Christ should be exceedingly great.

IN order to see a possibility that the sufferings of Christ might have been very extreme, notwithstanding the absolute perfection of his moral character, we are to observe,

1. THAT the ground of happiness and misery in creatures, doth not lie merely in the mind, independently of all other considerations.

CERTAIN kinds, both of happiness, and of misery, are peculiar to certain particular temperaments of mind. But, susceptibility of pleasure and pain, is common to all creatures, whether good, or bad. It is not the virtuous only, who are susceptible of happiness; or, the vicious, of misery. Had this been the case, the hap, piness and misery of creatures would be the measure of their moral characters, and exactly proportionate to the degrees of their virtue, or vice. Constant experience and observation prove that, as holiness and happiness are not in the nature of things necessarily connected together; neither are sin and misery. agree that Christ endured some natural evil: And, all know that sinners enjoy much natural good. Holy creatures are therefore susceptible of sufferings; and, sinful ones, of enjoyment. And, were it otherwise, there would be, neither occasion, nor room for moral government: But, virtue would always bring its owa

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reward; and vice, its own punishment. Happiness consists, not in the exercise of desire, but, its gratification; And, misery, not in the exercise of sinful af fection, but in something which is disagreeable.

God hath established an indissoluble connection between holiness in this world, and happiness in the next; and, between persevering wickedness here, and complete misery hereafter. This is essential to the most perfect moral government. But, were these connections originated by the mere nature of things, the necessity of a day of judgment would be wholly superseded: And, every creature would even now, enjoy all the rewards which are annexed to the prac tice of virtue; or, feel all the misery which is the just desert of sin. It is, therefore, manifest that the Batural dependence which is universally found in crea-tures, whatever be their moral characters, renders them susceptible of good and evil, of pleasure and pain. There is, therefore, no natural inconsistency in supposing that the creature, who is wholly vicious, may enjoy much natural good; or, that one who is wholly virtuous, may suffer extreme misery. Therefore,

2. THERE is no apparent difficulty in supposing that the man Jesus Christ might endure a very great and extreme weight of suffering. It was as truly compatible with the power of God to inflict pain upon this Son of his love, as on any other creature; and, to cause distress to rise to a very great height in him. It is inconsistent with the nature of things to suppose that Christ should suffer those horrors of an accusing conscience, which will make no inconsiderable part of the sufferings of the damned, in hell; and, with the very design of his coming, to imagine that he should endure, even for a moment, that despair, which will make a very bitter part of the pains of God's enemies. There are, however,