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III. Elaboration of a Convention respecting the Laws and Practices of Naval Warfare concerning

(A.) The Special Operations of Naval Warfare, such as the Bombardment of Ports, Towns, and Villages, by a Naval Force, the laying of Mines, &c.

14. His Majesty's Government consider that the objection, on humanitarian grounds, to the bombardment of unfortified towns is too strong to justify a resort to that measure, even though it may be permissible under the abstract doctrines of international law. They wish it, however, to be clearly understood that any general prohibition of such practice must not be held to apply to such operations as the bombardment of towns or places used as bases or storehouses of naval or military equipment and supply, or ports containing fighting ships, and that the landing of troops, or anything partaking of the character of a naval or military operation, is also not covered.

15. His Majesty's Government would view with satisfaction the abandonment of the employment of automatic mines in naval warfare altogether. Failing the acceptance of such a total prohibition they earnestly hope that the employment of these engines of war will only be sanctioned under the strictest limitations. They would advocate an arrangement by which the use of automatic mines should be limited to territorial waters, and, if possible, to such portions of territorial waters as adjoin naval bases or fortified ports. All mines thus employed should be effectively anchored, and so constructed that, in the event of their breaking adrift, they would either automatically become harmless or sink, and that in any case their active life should not exceed a limited period of, say, six months.

(B.) The Transformation of Commercial Vessels into War-ships

16. As the best and surest means to meet the many difficulties arising in connection with the question of the status, or belligerent character, of ships engaged in naval operations, His Majesty's Government would like to see the Powers agree upon some precise definition of a war-ship.' Having given their attentive consideration to the problem in its many various aspects, they are of opinion that if such definition is to cover all vessels which may be directly associated with the warlike operations of a fleet, it should establish and comprise two categories of ships, viz. : (A) fighting ships, and

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(B) fleet auxiliaries. For these two classes of vessels, you might propose for acceptance some such definition as the following:

(A) Any vessel under a recognized naval flag, officered and manned by regular commission, and armed for the purpose of attacking an enemy, no vessel being allowed to assume this status unless before leaving a national port, or to surrender it except after arrival at one.'

(B) A vessel under the mercantile flag of either a belligerent or neutral State which is engaged in transporting troops or on duties bringing her into direct communication with the belligerent fighting ships for the purpose of assisting their operations, either by the conveyance of seamen, munitions of war, fuel, provisions, water, or any kind of naval stores, or by executing repairs, or by carrying despatches or information, and whether such ship sails in company with the figthing ships or only meets them from time to time.'

17. The general acceptance of definition (A), as supplemented by definition (B), coupled with a general undertaking that no vessel was to perform fighting services unless qualified under definition (A), would, it is believed, prove sufficient to prevent the issue by any Power of letters of marque (whether such Power were a party to the Declaration of Paris or not), as none but regularly commissioned men-of-war would have the status of fighting ships.' You might with advantage ascertain the views of your United States' colleagues on this subject, to which particular importance is likely to be attached by their Government, special regard being had to the fact that, although conditionally refusing to sign the Declaration of Paris, the United States intimated their intention of observing it during the war with Spain in 1898.

(C.) The Private Property of Belligerents at Sea

18. It is probable that a proposal will be brought before The Hague Conference to sanction the principle of the immunity of enemies' merchant ships and private property from capture at sea in time of war. His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to this question, and the arguments on both sides have been fully set out in the various papers which have been at your disposal. They cannot disregard the weighty arguments which have been put forward in favour of immunity. Anything which restrains acts of war is in itself a step towards the abolition of all war, and by diminishing the apprehension of the evils which war

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would cause, removes one incentive to expenditure upon armaments. It is also possible to imagine cases in which the interests of Great Britain might benefit by the adoption of this principle of immunity from capture.

19. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that the principle, if carried to its logical conclusion, must entail the abolition of the right of commercial blockade. Unless commercial blockade is discontinued there will be constant interference with an enemy's ships, and constant disputes as to what constitutes an effective blockade. And when such disputes have once arisen between belligerent Powers it is obvious that the one which considers itself aggrieved by the application of commercial blockade to any of its ports would cease to respect the immunity of the merchant ships and private property of its enemy, wherever they were to be found. It seems to them, therefore, that it is impossible to separate this question of immunity from capture from that of commercial blockade ; and that the question to which His Majesty's Government have to apply themselves is whether they should agree to a proposal which would deprive the British navy in time of war of the right of interfering with an enemy's merchant ships or property, and of the power of commercial blockade.

20. The British navy is the only offensive weapon which Great Britain has against Continental Powers. The latter have a double means of offence: they have their navies and they have their powerful armies. During recent years, the proportion between the British army and the great Continental armies has come to be such that the British army operating alone could not be regarded as a means of offence against the mainland of a great Continental Power. For her ability to bring pressure to bear upon her enemies in war Great Britain has, therefore, to rely on the navy alone. His Majesty's Government cannot therefore authorize you to agree to any Resolution which would diminish the effective means which the navy has of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy.

21. You should, however, raise no objection to the discussion of this question of immunity from capture at the Conference, nor should you refuse to participate in it, nor need you necessarily take the initiative in opposing a Resolution if brought forward. If at some future date the great Continental armies were to be diminished, and other changes favourable to the diminution of armaments were to take place, the British Government might be able to reconsider the question. If, for instance, nations generally were willing to diminish their armaments, naval and military, to an extent which

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would materially relieve them from the apprehension of the consequences of war, and by rendering aggression difficult would make war itself improbable; and if it became apparent that such a change could be brought about by an agreement to secure this immunity from capture at sea under all circumstances, and was dependent upon it, the British Government might feel that the risks they would run by adhering to such an agreement and the objections in principle now to be urged against it, would be outweighed by the general gain and relief which such a change would bring. But at the present time they are unable to assent to a Resolution which might, under existing conditions, so limit the prospective liability of war as to remove some of the considerations which now restrain public opinion from contemplating it, and might, after the outbreak of war, tend to prolong it.

(D.) The Period to be accorded to Commercial Vessels in leaving Neutral Ports or those of the Enemy after the Outbreak of Hostilities.

22. It has been customary on the outbreak of hostilities for belligerents to grant certain days of grace to enemy and neutral ships. In the view of His Majesty's Government the allowance of such an interval before the strict rules of hostilities are enforced should, as indeed the term 'days of grace' implies, be treated purely as a matter of grace and favour, and not as one of right, and they are of opinion that any fixed rule on the point would be undesirable, as the circumstances of each case must necessarily differ. It will be to the general interest of this country to maintain the utmost liberty of action in this particular.

(E.) The Rights and Duties of Neutrals at Sea: among other Questions that of Contraband; the Treatment to which the Ships of Belligerents should be subjected in Neutral Ports; Destruction by force majeure of Neutral Ships of Commerce as Prizes.

23. Many questions in regard to neutrality obligations may be raised at the coming Conference as a result of the experience of the late war between Russia and Japan. On the general principles involved nations are agreed, but in the application of these principles great divergence in the standard of obligations adopted by different Powers is sure to arise. Rules based on the following principles would, His Majesty's Government consider, help to clear the situation::

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(a) Neutrals shall not allow their territorial waters to be used for purposes which will directly assist a belligerent in operations of war.

(b) Neutrals shall not allow fighting ships, or ships built or equipped, wholly or partly, for fighting purposes to leave their ports or territorial waters after the outbreak of war with the intention of assisting either of the belligerents.

(c) The customary maritime facilities known as 'hospitality shall not be withheld.

(d) A neutral State is not called upon to enforce the observance of the restrictions imposed upon trade by a belligerent by declarations of contraband, but must not assist in their violation.

(e) A neutral shall not allow the entrance of prizes into its harbours unless the prize is in want of fuel or supplies, or in actual danger on account of bad weather or unseaworthiness.

24. Great Britain as a belligerent is not likely, in any conditions which can at present be foreseen as probable, to have to depend on the assistance of neutrals in the direct carrying out of operations of war. Her interests as a neutral require uniformity of practice on the part of neutrals generally, and it would be desirable that the rules which obtain in this country as regards the obligations of neutrality should, if possible, obtain international sanction at the Conference.

25. With regard to contraband, many most difficult questions arose during the late war. These cases were sufficient to show that the rules with regard to contraband that were developed at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries are no longer satisfactory for the changed conditions under which both commerce and war are now carried on. His Majesty's Government recognize to the full the desirability of freeing neutral commerce to the utmost extent possible from interference by belligerent Powers, and they are ready and willing for their part, in lieu of endeavouring to frame new and more satisfactory rules for the prevention of contraband trade in the future, to abandon the principle of contraband of war altogether, thus allowing the oversea trade in neutral vessels between belligerents on the one hand and neutrals on the other, to continue during war without any restriction, subject only to its exclusion by blockade from an enemy's port. They are convinced that not only the interest of Great Britain, but the common interest of all nations will be found, on an unbiassed examination of the subject, to be served by the adoption of the course suggested.

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