For example, A., properly pursuing his work as a slater, lets fall a slate on B.'s head; B. dies in consequence of the injury. Here A. will not be liable; but it would have been otherwise had he at the time been engaged in some criminal act; or if he had not exercised proper skill or care. We shall find cases of this description. most frequently in drawing the line between culpable and excusable homicide. Physical Compulsion-As if A. kills B. with C.'s 26. Physical hand. The third division comprises cases where the act is done under a fear stronger than that which the law inspires. compulsion. minas. Fear of Excessive and Unlawful Harm.-When a 3a. Duress per person is driven to commit an offence by such threats and menaces of personal violence from others as induce a well-grounded apprehension of present death or grievous bodily harm, in some cases he is excused. The danger must threaten his person; it will not be sufficient if it only endangers his property. And this plea of duress per minas will not be of avail in every crime. Thus, though a man be violently assaulted, and has no other possible means of escaping death but by killing an innocent person, if he commit the act he will be guilty of murder; for he ought rather to die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent man. But in such case he may kill his assailant (g). Questions of this sort are especially likely to occur when persons are compelled to join in a rebellion or riot (h). State of Married Women.-In cases of felony, if a 3b. Married married woman commits the crime in the presence of when women, No other relation an excuse. her husband, the law presumes that she acts under his coercion, and therefore excuses her from punishment. But this exemption is not allowed in all felonies, though it seems unsettled where the line is drawn. It appears that the wife is liable in treason, murder, manslaughter, and robbery (i). In no case is she excused if her husband be not present, not even if the act be done by his order (k). The presumption of law may be rebutted by evidence. Thus, if it can be shewn that she acted voluntarily, at least if she took a principal part in the commission of the crime, she will be convicted, although her husband were present (1). In cases of misdemeanor, the prevailing opinion seems to have been that the wife is responsible for her acts, although her husband be present at the commission. However, in recent cases, this has been doubted, and the rule prevailing in felony applied (m). At any rate, the exemption does not extend to those offences relating to domestic matters and the government of the house, in which the wife may be supposed to have a principal share, as for keeping a disorderly or gaminghouse. It requires the co-operation of two, at least, to constitute a conspiracy. Of this crime, therefore, a husband and wife cannot by themselves be convicted, inasmuch as in the eye of the law they are regarded as one person. So a wife cannot be convicted of stealing her husband's goods; nor of harbouring him when he has committed a crime. This relation of wife to the husband is the only one (i) R. v. Manning, 2 C. & K. 903; R. v. Cruse, 8 C. & P. 541 ; 1 Hale, P. C. 45-48; 1 Hawk. c. i. s. II; I Russ. 139; Starkie on Evidence, tit. Husband and Wife. (k) R. v. Morris, R. & R. 270. (1) R. v. Torpey, 12 Cox, 45. (m) R. v. Price, 8 C. & P. 19; R. v. Torpey, supra. which the law recognises as a shield from criminal. punishment. The other private relations, parent and child, master and servant, will not excuse nor extenuate the commission of any crime; either child or servant being liable notwithstanding the command or coercion of the parent or master. Certain exceptional cases, where the ordinary rules as to capability of committing crime do not entirely prevail, require a brief notice. and crime. The Sovereign.-The sovereign can do no wrong: The sovereign therefore he is not amenable to the ordinary criminal courts of his kingdom. Blackstone forbids us even to imagine such delinquency on the part of the sovereign. "He is not under the coercive power of the law; which will not suppose him capable of committing a folly, much less a crime. We are, therefore, out of reverence and decency, to forbear any idle inquiries of what would be the consequence if the king were to act thus and thus; since the law deems so highly of his wisdom and virtue, as not even to presume it possible for him to do anything inconsistent with his station and dignity; and therefore has made no provision to remedy such a grievance" (n). Inasmuch as it is presumed that he can do no wrong, although he commands an unlawful act to be done, e.g., an unlawful arrest, the instrument is not indemnified, but is punishable. and crime. Corporations. Even corporations aggregate, such as Corporations railway companies, may be indicted by their corporate names for breaches of duty; whether such breaches consist of wrongful acts, e.g., obstructing highways; or wrongful omissions, e.g., neglecting to repair bridges (o). A corporation may also be indicted by (n) 4 Bl. 33. (0) R. v. Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co., 9 C. & P. 469; 2 Q. B. 47. Aliens and crime. Ambassadors and crime. its corporate name and fined for an assault committed or a libel published by its order (p). Aliens. Foreigners who commit crimes in England are punishable exactly as if they were natural-born subjects. It is no defence on behalf of a foreigner that he did not know he was doing wrong, the act not being an offence in his own country. Though this is no defence, it may mitigate the punishment (9). Ambassadors.-Different views, materially conflicting with each other, have been held as to the criminal liability of ambassadors and their suites. Some writers maintain that for no offence, whether it be against the life, person, or property of an individual, is an ambassador amenable to the criminal law of the country to which he is sent (r). Others assert that though he is not punishable for crimes made such by the laws of the particular country; he is so for any great crimes which must be such in any system. Or, as it is sometimes expressed, he is punishable for mala in se, but not for acts which are merely mala quia prohibita. Thus, an ambassador might be convicted for murder or rape, but not for smuggling. The more probable and reasonable course seems to be to request the recall of the offender by his own state, with or without an expression of opinion that the offender should be punished in his own country. If this be refused, the ambassador might be dismissed, and pressure brought to bear on the other state to induce the latter to put him on his trial. There is one class of offences which stands on a different footing, namely, offences affecting the existence and safety of the state. For a direct attempt against the life of the sovereign, it is said that the offender (p) Eastern Counties Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314. (q) R. v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456. (r) Phillimore's International Law, vol. ii. part vi. c. 7. would be directly punishable by the state (s). But, at any rate, in this and other offences against the government, the state might demand the punishment of the offender by the foreign state; and if this demand were not complied with might treat him as a public enemy, and demand satisfaction from that foreign state. The matter would then pass from the province of law to that of politics. (s) 1 Hale, P. C. 96–99; Fost. 187, 188. C |