prefs him to move that way. He knew that if the king thould get into Silefia without any oppofition from him, Laudohn might not only be deprived of all the advantages he could hope for from his late victory, but by being attacked by the united armies of the king and his brother, would run the risk of a defeat that might fully revenge that of Landthut.

Whatever the merit of either of the commanders might be on this occafion, it is certain that Laudohn met no confiderable obftruction.

He appeared before Breslau the 30th of July; the following day the town was completely invested; and on the first of Auguft they had erected their batteries of cannon and mortars.

But Laudohn, who faw all things prepared for an obftinate defence, did not wholly truft to his military manœuvres. He fent a letter to the governor count Tavenzien, to intimidate him by the difplay of his ftrength. He fet forth, that his forces confifted of- 50 battalions and 80 fquadrons; that the Ruffian army of 75,000 men were within three days march; that it was in vain for the governor to expect fuccour from the king of Pruffa, who was then at the other fide of the Elbe; that it was ftill more vain to look for relief from prince Henry, who could scarce hope to fiand his own ground againit the grand army of the Rulians; that in cafe of obitinacy he could expect no reasonable terms; and that thefe were the last that thould be offered. Moreover, he reminded him, that the place was a mercantile town, not a fortrefs; and that he could not defend it without contravening the laws of war.

Thefe rules, by which honour is reduced to act, not by its own feelings but according to extrinfical circumstances; rules by which they have attempted to determine exactly and mechanically that nicett of all lines which difcriminates courage fromrathnefs, form one of the ftrongeft inftances of the great difference between the ancient and modern methods and ideas of war. In the antient times, a brave commander would have aufwered this threatening metfage in general terms of defiance. But count Tavenzien refpected thefe imaginary laws. He took care to prove that in defending the town he did not infringe them; and fpoke as Laudohn had done in the character of a military jurifconfult, as well as a foldier; he gave for reply, "That the town of Breflau being furrounded with works and wet ditches, was to be confidered as a place of strength, and not fimply as a mercantile town. That the Auftrians themfelves defended it as fuch in 1757, after the battle of Liffa, That the king had commanded him to defend it to the last extremity; that therefore general Laudohn might fee it was not from humour.he had refufed to liften to his fummons. That he was not frighted with the general's threats to deftroy the town; for he was not entrusted with the care of the houfes, but the fortifications."

Laudohn had also sent in a memorial in the fame menacing style, where he thought it might have a greater effect, to the civil magiftrates, hoping that the ruin with which the town was threatened, might induce them to join with the inhabitants, to perfuade the governor to a speedy furrender.

All thefe menacing measures feemed to argue a fear in baron Laudolin,

Laudohn, that the Ruffians were not fo near as he pretended, and that the town might poffibly be relieved before their arrival. However he thewed them, at nine of the very evening of the meffage, that his threats were not vain, by a terrible difcharge of mortars and red-hot balls that fellin an uninterrupted shower upon the city until midnight. During this fierce bombardment, that made a dreadful havock in the town, he attempted the outworks by affault. His Croats attacked the covered way in many places at once, with the ufual impetuofity of those brave irregulars; but they were received and repulfed with refolutionequal to theirown, and with more fteadinefs. The operation of this dreadful night having made no impreffion on the inflexible determination of the governor, baron Laudohn had once more recourse to negociation. He now changed his ftyle, and held out the most flattering propofitions; offering to grant him what capitulation he fhould think proper to atk, and even to leave himfelf to draw up the articles. The governor replied, that the firing the town had made no change in his refolution; that he would wait with firmnels for the enemy upon the ramparts; but that he could not help oblerving, it was

contrary to the laws of arms to be gin the fiege of a fortrefs by ruin ing its inhabitants. The meilenger made anfwer, that the trenches would foon be opened. The governor faid, it was what he had long expected.

The Auftrians, foiled in their hopes from treaty, continued to batter the town, and made feveral attempts upon the outworks for three days fucceflively. They found every poft bravely defended; the Rulian army did not appear, but they now began to perceive the approach of another army lefs agreeable, that of prince Henry; which having marched with the utmoft diligence, from Great Glogau, now came faft upon him; and, on the 5th of Auguft, reached within a few miles of the town.

Laudohn did not thinkit expedient to put the advantage he had gained, and thofe which he had yet to expect from the management of time, to the iffue of a battle: he therefore decamped, and made his retreat in good order,but with fufficient quicknefs; having procured from this enterprife only the wretched fatisfaction of reducing a great part of the city to a heap of rubbish, and of having revenged upon Breslau fome part of the fufferings of Drefden.

the theatre of fo ruinous a war, had been too much wafted to make the fubfiftence, and confequently the free motion of the armies easy. The winter had been fevere and long; and it was not until the green forage appeared plentifully above ground, that thofe great bodies of cavalry, which make fo large a part in our modern armies, were in a condition to act. The fufferings of the English horse, from a want of dry forage, during a great part of the winter and the fpring, had been extreme; this obliged them to fall much farther back from the French cantonments, and to moleft them lefs than they otherwife would have done. It was befides a lofs, that, at the opening of the campaign, they had not fo extenfive a tract between them and Hanover; which by an artful choice of pofts might have been yielded step by step, and the campaign fo managed and fpun out, that the feafon of action must have expired, before the French could have reaped any decifive advantage from their fuperiority.

Although the French were during the winter fupplied far better than the allies with all neceffaries by the command of the Maine, the Mofelle, and the Rhine; and that the countries at their back had been much less confumed by the war; yet the fame difficulties embarrafled them as foon as they thought of taking the field, and quitting their advantageous cantonments. Therefore there was a flowne's in the principal armies upon both parts, until the middle of fummer.

Not, however, but that fomething was attempted, in this interval, by leffer parties. On the tide of the Rhine, fome actions happened between the army of St. Germain,

and the corps of general Sporcken, who was pofted at Dulmen, to obferve the French in that quarter. Dulmen formed the right flank of the chain of cantonments made by the allied army, which extended its left to the fouth-caft frontiers of the country of Heffe, above an hundred and fifty miles diftant. The hereditary prince, who was on that wing, exerted, as much as circumstances would permit, his ufual activity and enterprife. He threw himfelf into the diftrict of Fulda; he laid it under a heavy contribution, and broke up several French corps that were pofted there.

These actions decided nothing. The French army, fuperior in number and in fituation, advanced; and the allies, who feemed to have chofen the defensive, gradually retired. In effect, if the French had purfued their original plan, it would have proved almoft impoffible for the allied army to maintain its ground. If St. Germain, possesfed of Cleves, Wefel, and Duffeldorp, had advanced on the fide of Munfter; and M. Broglio moving forward through the country of Heile, had made a ftrong detachment to the eastward of the Wefer, whilft with his main body he engaged the attention of prince Ferdinand, the allies would fhortly have found themfelves inclofed upon three fides; and nothing could have extricated them but a capital victory obtained under every difadvantage.

The French army was fufficiently numerous for thefe operations. But it was fufpected that the jealoufy which fubfifted between M. de St. Germain and the Duke of Broglio prevented their being carried into execution. This misunderstand

ing daily increased. Infomuch that M. Broglio thought fit to order the corps of St. Germain to unite itself with the grand army. The count, who could not brook obe dience to a younger officer, and one befides with whom he was not on the best terms, retired from the fervice. He had only June 23. ferved before upon condition of commanding an army entirely diftinct, and under his own particular orders. This difference deprived France of one of its moft able generals, and difconcerted one of its most promifing schemes of operation.

Before this mifunderstanding had produced thefe effects, the affairs of the French went on with all imaginable profperity. The principle army not retarding itself, by confideration of the places of ftrength which the allies poffeffed in their front, the caftles of Marpurg and Dillenbourg pushed forward into the landgraviate of Heffe, leaving detachments to reduce thofe fortreffes. The first of which furren dered on the 30th of June, the latter held out to the 16th of July: but the garrifons of both furrendered prifoners of war.

In the mean time, whilft July 10. M. Broglio advanced on the fide of Helle, the corps of St. Germain had penetrated through the duchy of Weftphalia, and the two armies joined near a place called Corbach. The allied army had fallen back from the poft they occupied at Fritzlar, and were retreating towards the river Dymel. As yet they had received no advice of the dreaded junction of the French armies: but as it was imagined that the corps of St Germain only moved that way, and the vanguard enly of that corps could be arrived

at Corbach, which could not be eftimated at more than 10,000 foot, and 17 fquadrons at the utmost, the bereditary prince formed a scheme of attacking and driving them from that poft.

When he had begun the attack, contrary to his expectation, he found the enemy already formed; but it was now impoffible to recede. The action grew every moment more furious and bloody. The French ftood their ground with firmness ; and the main army being extremely near, inftead of being wafted in the action, they grew more numerous by the reinforcements that were continually fent.

In this fituation it was neceffary that the Prince thould make as speedy a retreat as poffible; but the difficulty of drawing out of the field in the middle of the day, before an enemy quite fresh, and every inftant reinforced, may be eafily imagined. To compleat this difficulty, fome bodies of the German troops, both horfe and foot, fell into great confufion. The enemy faw it at the first glance, and to increafe it to the utmoft diforder, pufhed forward upon them with a numerous artillery and a large body of cavalry. The allied feemarmy ed to be in the way of inevitable ruin.

In this exigence, the hereditary prince, at his laft refource, put himfelf at the head of a fquadron of Bland's and Howard's regiments of dragoons. By thefe the uncommon heroifm of their young leader was perfectly feconded. They charged the enemy with the utmoft fury, topped the career of their victorious horfe; and enabled the allied battalions to make an undifturbed retreat.

The hereditary prince waswound

ed in this action; about 900 men were killed, wounded, or prifoners. Fifteen pieces of cannon, the whole of the artillery, was left to the enemy but ftill in their circumftances to have avoided a total defeat was in fome fort victory. The welltimed impetuofity of the hereditary prince and the spirit of the English horfe could not be too highly praifed. The prince retired to the main army of the allies, who had now poffeffed themfelves of the ftrong poft of Saxenhausen; whilft the French continued oppofite to them in the no lefs firong poft of Corbach, which they had acquired by their victory; and here for fome time they watched each other.

The hereditary prince fuffered more by this check than from the wounds he had received. His mind, forgetful of his pain and weakness, only brooded over his defeat, feeking out with anxiety an opportunity of revenging his lofs by fome bold, fignal, and unexpected ftroke against the enemy. It was not long before an occafion prefented itself.

Advice had been received, that among the detachments which the French employed to reduce thofe fortreffes which the allies had garrifoned on their retreat, there was one very confiderable formed of French and Saxons, under Monf. Glaubitz, moving toward Ziegenhagen, a place of importance in the landgraviate of Hefle. The hereditary prince undertook 14 July. to relieve it, and for that purpofe felected fix battalions of the German troops, two brigades of hunters, a regiment of huilars, and Elliot's light dragoons. Although this laft corps was but juft arrived, had been newly railed, and had never feen any kind of

that

fervice, the prince was fo well pleafed with their countenance, he chofe them preferably to all other for this difficult enterprise; and the event proved that he was not mistaken.

Monf. Glaubitz remained in the most perfect fecurity; he was under no fort of apprehenfion of being molefted by a detachment of an army at fixty miles diftance, under the eye, and as it were guard of a fuperior body which demanded all its attention; when on a fudden he found himself atJuly 16, tacked with the utmost violence. The hereditary prince having reconnoitered his position, made a detour of two leagues through woods and mountains, fell upon his left, whilft the rest of his troops climbed the mountains on the oppofite fide, and rushed with the fame fpirit upon the right.

Glaubitz had fcarce time to form his troops; and they were only formed to be immediately broken. They retired with precipitation, leaving their camp, and all it contained, to the enemy. The prince had fo difpofed his cavalry as to cut off the retreat of fome; but the most confiderable part gained ground upon him. On this occafion he relied entirely on Elliot's horfe, as it was altogether impoffible for the infantry, already haraffed by the action, and a most fatiguing forced march of two days, to follow them. At the head of this borse he overtook the fugitives as they came out of a wood, charged and broke through them five different times, feparated a body of 500 from the reft, furrounded them, and obliged them to throw down their arms. Having routed this, with the like rapidity he fiew to

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