THE Emperor of the French has once again resumed the command of his armies, and the Allies may say to each other what the French King said of Richard the First after his release from captivity, "Take care of yourself, the Devil has broke loose once more!"-No intelligence has yet arrived of any material operation, unless we except the reported defeat of the Viceroy by the advanced divisions of the Russian and Prussian forces under Wittgenstein and Blucher. Great hopes have been excited by the estimated numerical strength of the Allies, while the armies of the French have not been attempted to be computed, or if computed are spoken of with ridicule and contempt. These notions are drawn from certain received opinions, advanced by certain authors, among the most prominent of whom may be reckoned Sir Francis d'Ivernois, who treating of the effect and competency of the Conscription-Law, on which for the most part the present levies to replace the Grand Army have been made depend, speaks to this effect

-:

"Till within a year or two, the sanction of the Senate was given to the levy of 80,000 men only, yet the Emperor found means (as his Minister declared, 18th September, 1809) to raise 102,500. This was accomplished by conniving at the escape of many of the youths who were drawn in the first instance, which authorizes a repetition of the drawing then, but not sooner, every exertion is made to apprehend the runaways; and Buonaparte's rule being to keep all, the number raised is thus made to exceed considerably the number prescribed.

"Notwithstanding the magnitude of the numbers levied by the conscription, the aggregate of effective force at Buonaparte's disposal is much smaller than is commonly imagined.

"Ever since the year 1795, the æra when the paper-money of France lost its magic virtues, their armies have ceased to present those overwhelming masses which were brought into the field in 1794; and if we estimate their effective force at 400,000 men, with temporary additions

VOL. III.

from the particular occasions on which the conscripts joined their baktalions, we shall probably not be far from the truth.

"At the time of voting Buonaparte Emperor (May, 1804), the collective suffrages of the army and navy were reported at 450,000. This was not a moment to diminish their ostensible amount; and it is remarkable, that, in late years, much caution has been used in concealing. their actual numbers. The Emperor's force admits not of being numbered, nor his treasures of being counted,' says the Minister of Public Worship in his Circular Address of 20th March, 1807,- the devoted attachment of his subjects multiplies and reproduces them without end.' In pursuance of this system of exaggeration, the Finace-Minister declared in 1809 that the Emperor maintained in arms a force of a million of men.

"While Buonaparte was boasting that he had 350,000 men in Spain, we know, from better authority (Lord Wellington's official letters to his brother, Marquis Wellesley), that they were short of 200,000, and that of the latter number, only 125,000 could be considered disposable for service in the field," the rest being sick, wounded, or employed in garrison or escort-duty."

The next point for consideration is his finances, the very strength and sinews of war; and these we shall find, according to the same writer, to promise little better to the furtherance of his future schemes, or the supply of present exigencies:-it is however freely acknowledged that his resources ia this respect are not easily to be developed, owing to the care so studiously taken to disguise or conceal them: he thus says:

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Buonaparte cautiously avoids introducing into his budget either the money raised at home by secret loans, or that which is received in the shape of tribute from abroad. Such supplies are on several accounts unfit for the public eye, and their precarious nature affords reason enough to exclude them from a list in which no pains are spared to convey the idea of stability and progressive increase. Hence the ne cessity of sinking a part of the army-expense, that the public may remain unacquainted with the excess of the expenditure above the regular income.

"The particular sums exacted from each country are kept secret: but it is believed that the amount payable by Austria, on the conclusion of the treaty of Presburg (January, 1806,) was four millions sterling, and, on the more recent treaty of 1809, about three millions and a half. The King of Prussia's tribute formed, it is believed, a sum of five millions; and at the conferences of Erfurth, he is reported to have obtained of the period fixed for its payment. Three years* time, it is said, was then granted him to make out the successive instalments; and the circumstance is sufficiently probable, because it was on that occasion Buonaparte's interest to conciliate the Powers of the North, and to pou: the mass of his force into Spain. Add to these sums a large contribution from Dantzic, in return for her nominal independence, and four millions of American property seized by the Rambouillet Decree. The most important remark to be made on such receipts as these is, that they are all of a temporary nature, and appeas

by this time to have reached their termination in Germany by a natufal course, as much as by a violent one in Spain and Portugal. Hol land and Italy remain to France: but of their tribute the extent is limited, and full credit is taken for it in the Ways and Means.' Westphalia also remains: but both its population and its resources are too inconsiderable to attract much attention. It follows from all these circumstances that Buonaparte's pecuniary resources have of late undergone a notable diminution.

"It is chiefly since 1810 that the financial pressure of the Spanish war has been felt in France. In 1808 and 1809 the stores (positos) of corn, the stock of wool, and other merchandize, with the plate in the churches and monasteries, and the contents of the Spanish arsenals, enabled Buonaparte to carry on hostilities as he had done in other countries, at little more sacrifice to France than that of lives: but in the latter part of 1809 things began to look differently, and have ever since been going on from bad to worse. In July, 1810, a dispatch was intercepted by the lamented Romana, in which King Joseph's Ambassador at Paris represents Napoleon as complaining that he had already employed in Spain 400,000 soldiers, and a sum of eight millions sterling; while the spoliation of the churches and convents had yielded nothing adequate to expectation.' Every season has since added to the exhaustion of Spain, and to her consequent inability for defraying any considerable part of the expenditure of the French army. The sickness and mortality, too, among the troops, is from various causes so serious, that Sir Francis is probably justified in the calculation that a fourth part of the whole French force in Spain is put hors de combat in the course of every year. That this is no exaggeration appears but too likely from the incessant decrease in our own numbers, though our men are much better fed, better clothed, and, above all, better at tended in the hospitals, than the French. From all these data, Sir Francis draws the conclusion, that the loss of the French armies, by death, desertion, and invaliding, is such as to require the whole conscription (now 120,000 men. annually) to keep up its numbers to 400,000. He infers also that the annual expenses of the War-department, including the ordnance, the garrison, and the pensioners, will exceed, during the continuance of hostilities, the rate of 150,000 livres a man; forming, for the whole 400,000, a sum of 24,000,0001. sterling. From this sum, as paid out of the French coffers, we are to deduct only the proportion afforded, in the shape of provisions, by the vassal States of Germany on whom Napoleon's troops are quartered. While treating of the expense of the army, it deserves to be mentioned, that the French troops have of late been in the habit of consenting to put off the demand of pay till the end of a campaign; an arrangement which, among other recommendations, has that of saving to the State the arrears of the killed: no demands being regarded from such humble claimants as the representatives of privates and non-commissioned officers."

To judge therefore from this representation, added to his wellknown losses, there would scarcely appear a shadow of hope remaining for France against the collected power of her enemies,

But against this flattering description we have only to refer our rea

ders to the evidence of facts, and to our suggestions given in our last Review; and these, we doubt not wil form a criterion that will be borne out by experience and the issue of events.-Let us already regard their application.We said, if France be so weak as represented, the powers she holds in subjection would gladly throw off the yoke; Austria would not be bound by contracts, nor Denmark by promises or professions; while Holland, who sighs for her maritime benefits would eagerly embrace the moment of deliverance:- and we appeal to reason to bear us out in our conjecture. Austria will not secede from France; she still dreads her overwhelming power, nor can any bribes or promises induce her to coalesce with the Allies, whose suc cess it is evident she more than doubts; for, did she not mistrust their capacity, a necessary regard for her own safety would induce her to court their friendship to preserve her own possessions, which, in the event of their triumph, might be subjected to their caprice, for they declare themselves to be the Deliverers of Germany.-Holland is inactive from a consciousness of inability and a hopeless cause,-while Denmark has been the medium of French policy to cozen and mislead us. -She sends to us to treat, and makes a pretence of a pacific disposition: while her demands only serve to widen the breach, and betray us into a misunderstanding with Sweden. Our Ministers, as a lure to in duce Sweden to confederate against the Common Enemy, had rashly promised her a portion of the dominions belonging to the Crown of Denmark Sweden consents, and agrees to take possession of her own long-lost territory in Pomerania; confiding in the good faith of England to fulfil her part of the contract, and give her possession of Norway. The French Emperor at once perceives the opening to sow dis content among the Allies, and accordingly instigates Denmark to pretend a desire for reconciliation. England, at this unexpected change, becomes perplexed; being first pledged to Sweden to plunder Denmark, she knows not how to satisfy the latter, and still engage her in the common cause: if she do not rob Denmark, Sweden is unrecompensed, the bond is not fulfilled; and, if she do, Denmark is lost for ever. France saw and planned the perplexity, and will not fail to profit by the result, fall which way it will; or even if it be kept in suspense, it will not fail to furnish him with the means to conciliate the Prince of Sweden: he will not fail to say, "Look to your new Allies, who will form a league even in the very face of recent protestations, and treat with those exclusively, who but now they threatened conjointly to plunder and destroy!" It has been ever our opinion, and

is so still, that Sweden is not hearty in the cause. While others are pretending to a chivalrous desire to restore Liberty and Equality to harassed Europe, she is purely seeking her own aggrandizement. Her hope was first for Finland; but, that failing, she bargains for the possession of Norway; and being promised this, she is content to draw the sword, that is, to re-assert her claim to Pomerania in fact, to place herself in such a prominent situation, during the present convulsed condition of the Continent, as to be able to take a momentary advantage of any fortunate change, aud put in for a share of the spoil.Sweden has been politic hitherto; but it will be well if she be not outwitted by her Master in the art of policy. It is scarcely prudent to indulge in speculation in times so critical and varying, yet so far we may venture to pronounce, that Sweden will wait the turn of fortune before she will venture to proceed to that extreme, when to retreat were as bad as to go on. She knows the power, perhaps the views, of France, too well, to risk her own salvation in any scheme of fortune; nor should we be surprised to find a mutual understanding to subsist, in a certain degree, between Bernadotte and his ci-devant Master,

With regard to PRUSSIA, she is like a restless bark, directed and go yerned by every shifting wind; at one time fighting for her foes, at another for her friends, but at neither doing much service for herself, She is first made the instrument to break the chains of Poland which she had contributed to forge; and next to fight for the liberation of Germany, which she had agreed to enslave. She that had neither spirit nor inclination to defend herself, now calls on her neighbours to imitate her example, and contend for freedom. Notwithstanding which, we are greatly deceived if she be not herself drawing imperceptibly near the close of her career as an Independent State. France has declared she held the name of Kingdom but in sufferance, and now she comes to claim it from her hands, and dispossess her.

RUSSIA has lost her opportunity to do the good or gain the glory she intended. She has taken her repose too long, and dallied with her good fortune, which she should have pressed even to the heels of her discomfited enemy; by which exertion, the present campaign might have had for its first scene the borders of the Rhine instead of the Elbe or the Oder, and Austria have no choice left her but in coalition. But we will not anticipate; the event is in the hands of Him, who can "break the spear, the sword, and the battle;" and human prediction is as faulty as the wind, which mocks and baffles all control,