rally learn to sing, as from another consideration. Musical people, who have acquired skill and taste, are desirous of obtaining every new musical publication, as it comes out. This desire is produced where there is an aim at perfection in this science. The professed novel-reader, we know, waits with impatience for a new novel. The politician discovers anxiety for his morning-paper. Just so it is with the musical amateur with respect to a new tune. Now though many of the new compositions come out for instrumental music only, yet others come out entirely as vocal. These consist of songs sung at our theatres, or at our public gardens, or at our other places of public resort; and are afterwards printed with their music and exposed to sale. The words, therefore, of these songs, as well as the music that is attached to them, fall into the hands of the young amateur. Now as such songs are not always chaste or delicate, and as they frequently contain such sentiments as I have shown the Quakers to disapprove, the young musician, if of this Society, might have his modesty frequently put to the blush, or his delicacy frequently wounded, or his morality often broken in upon, by their perusal. Hence, though instrumental music might have no immoral tendency in itself, the Quakers have rejected it among other reasons, on account of its al most inseparable connexion with vocal. SECTION. V. Objection anticipated, that, though the arguments used by the Quakers in the preceding chapters are generally fair and positive, yet an exceptionable one seems to have been introduced, by which it appears to be inculcated, that the use of a thing ought to be abandoned on account of its abuse—Explanation of the distinction made by the Quakers in the use of this argument. I PURPOSE to stop for a while, and to make a distinction, which may now become necessary, with respect to the use of what may appear to be a Quaker-principle of argument, before I proceed to a new subject. It may have been observed by some of my readers, that, though the Quakers have adduced arguments which may be considered as fair and positive on the subjects which have come before us, yet they appear to have advanced one, which is no other than that of condemning the use of a thing on account of its abuse. Now this mode of reasoning, it will be said, has been exploded by logicians - and for this, among other reasons; that, if we were bound to relinquish customs in consequence of it, we should be obliged to give up many things that are connected with the comforts, and even with the existence of our lives. To this observation I must reply, that the Quakers never recommend an abstinence from any custom merely because the use of it may lead to its abuse. Where a custom is simply liable to abuse, they satisfy themselves with recommending moderation in the use of it. But where the abuse of a custom is either, in the first place, necessarily, or, in the second, very generally connected with the use of it, they commonly consider the omission of it as morally wise and prudent. It is in these two cases only that they apply, or that they lay any stress upon, the species of argument described. This species of argument, under these two limitations, they believe to be tenable in Christian morals, and they entertain this belief upon the following grounds. It may be laid down as a position, that the abuse of any custom, which is innocent in itself, is an evil, and that it may become a moral evil. And they conceive it to become a moral evil in the eye of Christianity, when it occasions either the destruction of the health of individuals, or the misapplication of their time, or the excitement of their worst passions, or the loss of their moral character. If, therefore, the use of any custom be necessarily (which is the first of the two cases) connected with its abuse, and the abuse of it be the moral evil described, the user or practiser cannot but incur a certain degree of guilt. This first case will comprehend all those uses of things which go under the denomination of gaming. If, again, the use of a custom be either through the influence of fashion, or its own seductive nature, or any other cause, very generally (which is the sccond case) connected with its abuse, and the abuse be also of the nature supposed, then the user or practiser, if the custom be unnecessary, throws himself wantonly into danger of evil, contrary to the watchfulness which Christianity enjoins in morals; and, if he fall, falls by his own fault. This watchfulness against moral danger the Quakers conceive to be equally incumbent upon Christians as watchfulness upon persons against the common dangers of life. If two-thirds of all the children, who had ever gone to the edge of a precipice to play, had fallen down and been injured, it would be a necessary prudence in parents to prohibit all such goings in future. So they conceive it to be only a necessary prudence in morals to prohibit customs, where the use of them is very generally connected with a censurable abuse. This case will comprehend music, as practised at the present day; because they believe it to be injurious to health, to occasion a waste of time, to create an emulative disposition, and to give an undue indulgence to sensual feelings. And as the Quakers conceive this species of argument to be tenable in Christian morals, so they hold it to be absolutely necessary to be adopted in the education of youth. For grown-up persons may have sufficient judgment to distinguish between the use of a thing and its abuse. They may discern the boundaries of each, and enjoy the one while they avoid the other. But youth have no such power of discrimination. Like inexperienced mariners, |