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Another blockade that of Boston-was in like CHAP. manner maintained through the winter months. Washington had deemed it feasible to attack the city in boats, and more than once brought forward a project for that purpose, but was checked by the unanimous opinion against it of his officers in a council of war. Besides the deficient supply of powder, and the other difficulties of his situation which have elsewhere been explained, he had also to strive against the evils resulting from the short periods of enlistment. These evils were such that, as Washington declares, no person who had not witnessed them could form an idea of their extent. He adds: "It takes you two or three months to

bring new men acquainted with their duty; it "takes a longer time to bring a people of the

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temper and genius of these into such a subor"dinate way of thinking as is necessary for a "soldier. Before this is accomplished the time "approaches for their dismissal, and you are be

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ginning to make interest for their continuance "for another limited period; in the doing of which you are obliged to relax in your discipline, in "order as it were to curry favour with them. "Thus the latter part of your time is employed "in undoing what the first was accomplishing!" Washington found also that the patriotism of New England, which he had admired at a distance, was by no means so conspicuous when closely viewed. Thus he charges the Connecticut troops with "scandalous conduct," observing of them that

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a dirty mercenary spirit pervades the whole." And of Massachusetts he remarks: "Notwithstanding all the public virtue which is ascribed "to these people, there is no nation under the sun, that I ever came across, which pays greater "adoration to money than they do." And again, in another place: "Such a dearth of public [spirit] "and want of virtue; such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another in this great change of military management, I never saw before, and pray God I may never be witness to again!"* No wonder if at that time, under such circumstances and with such coadjutors, this great man regretted never indeed the cause he had espoused—but sometimes the rank he had accepted." Could I have foreseen what I have, and "am like to, experience, no consideration upon earth "should have induced me to accept this command. "A regiment, or any subordinate department, "would have been accompanied with ten times "the satisfaction-perhaps ten times the honour."

Meanwhile the English, enclosed in Boston, had to encounter evils of another kind. The small-pox raged among them, and so ill-contrived was the commissariat that, notwithstanding their command of the sea, their supplies, both of food and fuel,

* Letters to Joseph Reed, Nov. 28, 1775, February 1. and 10. 1776, and to the President of Congress, Dec. 4. 1775. Most of those passages or epithets are carefully excluded from Mr. Sparks's compilation.

It became CHAP.

were neither plentiful nor constant.
impossible to supply fresh meat or vegetables even
to the sick and wounded. It became necessary
in some cases to pull down houses, that the timber
might be used for firing. Many perplexities more-
over arose in the mind of their General. It
seemed to him that considering the enemy's works
around the bay, and the thorough disaffection in
the province, Boston would be a most unfavour-
able point from whence to issue in the ensuing
spring, and begin the campaign against the insur-
gents. It seemed to him far preferable that the
army should be embarked and directed towards
New York, where means of transport were plenty,
where the friends of the King were numerous, and
where his standard might best be raised. Such
had also been the opinion of his predecessor in office,
General Gage.* The Ministry in London, im-
pressed by views such as these from so concurring
and so competent advisers, gave their assent to
them, authorizing Howe to remove the troops
from Boston whenever he might judge it expedient.
His own inferior officers unapprised of this design,
were rather disposed to murmur at the neglect of

* Despatch of General Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth, July 24. 1775. See also Lord Barrington's Life by the Bishop of Durham (p. 140.), by which it appears that so early as November 12. 1774, the Secretary at War had suggested to the Cabinet whether the troops and their General "should not be "directed to leave a place where at present they can do no "good and may do harm."- How just a foresight of Lexington and Bunker's Hill!

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CHAP. England. Thus writes one of them: "For these "last six weeks or near two months we have been "better amused than could possibly be expected "in our situation. We had a theatre, we had "balls, and there is actually a subscription on "foot for a masquerade. England seems to have "forgot us, and we endeavoured to forget our"selves." *

Such was the state of things at Boston when early in March, the rigour of the cold having somewhat abated, General Washington, having received large reinforcements, roused his troops to offensive operations. He began to throw up works on Dorchester Heights, facing the city on the side opposite to Charleston, and commanding the British lines on Boston Neck. Thus it became necessary for the British commander either to dislodge the enemy or to evacuate the place. General Howe, as we have seen, was not unprepared for the latter alternative; nevertheless he deemed it ignominious to give way at once before the advancing "rebels," and determined on an immediate attack, being, as he states, encouraged in this hazardous enterprise by the ardour of his troops. The vanguard, consisting of several regiments, was already embarked, and fell down to Castle William, from whence the descent was to be made. Thus a general action seemed close at hand, to be fought on the anniversary of that event most

Letter, March 3. 1776. American Archives, vol. v. p. 425.

unjustly and wrongfully termed the Massacre of CHAP. Boston. That event was fresh in the minds of

the

enemy, and a cry of "Remember the fifth of "March!" ran along the American lines. At this crisis the intended combatants were parted by a higher power than their own. A most violent storm arose, scattering the British boats, and rendering their attempts impracticable. By the time that it could be renewed the works on Dorchester Heights had so much advanced and had grown so strong that, as General Howe conceived, they could no longer be assailed with any prospect of success. Accordingly reverting to his first idea, he made hasty preparations to embark the troops and evacuate the town. Here again he had to strive against the shameful negligence which at that period pervaded the whole civil administration of the British military service. Thus writes one of his officers: "When the transports came to be "examined they were void of both provisions and "forage. If any are got on board to-day, it will "be as much as can be done. Never were troops "in so disgraceful a situation; and that not in "the least our own fault, or owing to any want "of skill or discretion in our commanders, but

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entirely owing to Great Britain being fast asleep. "I pity General Howe from my soul!"*

No compact or convention of any kind passed between the British and American commanders ;

* See the American Archives, vol. v. p. 426.

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