Sivut kuvina
PDF
ePub

E. To me it seems, that á man may know, whether he perceives a Thing or no; and if he perceives it, whether it be immediately or mediately, and if mediately, whether by means of fomething like or unlike, neceffarily or arbitrarily connected with it.

A. It seems so.

E. And is it not certain, that Distance is perceived only by Experience, if it be neither perceived immediately by itself nor by means of any Image, nor of any Lines and Angles, which are like it, or have a necellary Connexion with it?

A. It is.

E.

Doth it not seem to follow, from what hath been faid, and allowed by you; that before all Experience a Man would not imagine the Things he faw were at any Distance from him?

A. How! let me fee.

E. The Littleness or Faintnefs of Appearance, or any other Idea or Sensation not neceffarily, connected with or resembling Distance, can no more fuggeft different Degrees of, Diftance, or any Distance at all, to the Mind, which hath not experienced a Connexion of the Things fignifying and fignified, than Words can fuggeft Notions before a Man hath learned the language.

[blocks in formation]

E. Will it not thence follow, that a Man born blind, and made to fee, would, upon firft receiving his fight, take the Things he faw, not to be at any Distance from him, but in his Eye or rather in his Mind? I must own it seems so, and yet, on the other hand, I can hardly perfuade myself, that, if I were in

A.

[blocks in formation]

fuch a State, I fhould think thofe Objects, which I now fee at fo great Distance, to be at no Distance at all.

E. It feems then, that you now think the Objects of Sight are at a great Distance from you.

A. Doubtlefs I do. Can any one question but yonder Castle is at a great Distance?

E. Tell me Alciphron, can you difcern the Doors, Windows, and Battlements of that fame Castle?

A. I cannot. At this Distance, it feems only fmall round Tower..

E. But I, who have been at it, know that it is no fmall round Tower, but a large fquare Building, with Battlements and Turrets, which it seems you do not see.

A. What will you infer from thence?

E. I would infer, that the very Object, which you strictly and properly perceive by fight, is not that Thing which is feveral Miles diftant,

A. Why fo?

E. Because a little round Object is one Thing, and a great fquare Object is another. Is it not?

A. I cannot deny it.

E. Tell me, is not the visible Appearance) alone the proper Object of Sight?

A. It is. What think you then (faid Euphranor pointing towards Heavens) of the visible appearance of yonder Planet? Is it not a round luminous Flat, no bigger than a sixpence?

A. What then?

E. Tell me then, what you think of the Planet itfelf. Do you not conceive it to be a vast opa

que

que Globe, with feveral unequal Rifings and

Vallies?

A. I do.

E. How can you therefore conclude, that the proper Object of your Sight exists at a Distance?

[merged small][ocr errors]

E. For your farther Conviction, do but confider that crimson Cloud. Think you, that if you were in the very Place where it is, you would perceive any Thing like what you now see?

A. By no means. I fhould perceive only a dark Mift.

E. Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the Castle, the Planet, nor the Cloud, which you see here, are those real ones which you suppose exift at a Distance?

[ocr errors]

A What am I to think then? Do we see any thing at all, or is it altogether Fancy and Illusion?

E. Upon the whole, it seems the proper Objects of Sight are Light and Colour, with their several shades and Degrees, all which, being infinitely diversified and combined, do form a language wonderfully adapted to fuggeft and exhibit to us the Distances, Figures, Situations, Dimensions, and various Qualities of tangible Objects; not by Similitude, nor yet by the arbitrary Imposition of Providence, just as Words fuggeft the Things fignified by them.

A. How! Do we not, ftrictly speaking, perceive by Sight fuch Things as Trees, Houses, Men, Rivers, and the like?

E. We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend those Things by the Faculty of Sight.

P 3

But will it follow

from

from thence, that they are the proper and immediate Objects of Hearing, which are fignified by the Help of Words or Sounds?

1

A. You would have us think then, that Light, Shades, and Colours, variously combined, answer to the feveral Articulations of Sounds in Language, and that by means thereof all forts of Objects are fuggested to the Mind through the Eye in the fame manner as they are fuggefted by Words or Sounds through the Ear; that is, neither from necellary Deduction to the Judgment, nor from Similitude to the Fancy, but purely and folely from Experience, Cuftom and Habit.

E. I would not have you think any thing more, than the Nature of Things' obliges you to think, nor Lubmit in the leaft to my Judgment, but only to the Force of Truth, which is an Impofition, that I fuppofe the freeft Thinkers will not pretend to be exempt from. You have let me, it seenis Step by Step, till I am got, I know not where. But I fhall try to get out again, if not by the Way I came, yet by fome other of my own finding.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small]
[ocr errors][merged small]

"En

James Harris, Esq., ein Schwestersohn des Grafen von Shaftesbury, dessen Gelehrsamkeit, Geschmack und Scharfsinn fein Erbtheil geworden zu seyn scheint. Geb. 1709;, geft. 1780. Am berühmtesten hat ihn sein Hermes, or a Philofophical quiry concerning Univerfal Grammar gemacht, ein Werk, wels ches Bischof Lowth mit Recht das schdufte und vollkommenste Muster der Analysis, seit der Zeit des Aristoteles, nennt. Auch in seinen Philofophical Arrangements und Philological Inqui·ries findet man überaus viel Belehrung, und einen durch tiefes Studium der Klassiker, vornehmlich der Griechen, gebildeten Schriftsteller. Früher, als alle diese Schriften, erschienen seine Dialogen über Kunst, Musik, Mahlerei, Poesie und Glückseligs keit, von denen man auch eine deutsche Uebersehung hat. - Er nennt fie Treatises; und sie sind auch, der zufälligen dialogischen Form ungeachtet, wirkliche Abhandlungen; gleich den Dialogen des Cicero eingeleitet, und nicht dramatißirt. Die Manier der Ideenentwickelung darin ist indeß ganz sokratisch ; und ich habe daher folgende Stelle, aus dem Gespräch über Glückseligkeit lies at fegetichen Dialog ausgeregen, um sie nicht batch bas beständige: faid 1, replied I, faid he, continued he, zu unters brechen fan of a

[ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors]

exifts among a

ani

4. Every Being on this our terreftrial dwelling exists encompaffed with infinite objects; exifts mals tame, and animals wild; among plants and vegetables of a thoufand different qualities; among heats and colds, tempests and calms, the friendships and discords of heterogeneous elements. What fay you? Are all these things exactly the fame to it, or do they differ, think you, in their effects and confequences?

[merged small][ocr errors]
« EdellinenJatka »