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issued, to concede as one whole undivided sovereignty to Great Britain, as a friend, all the guarantees for her commerce that she might claim as a neutral from this Government as one of her two imagined belligerents. It seemed to us that these two great and kindred nations might decline to be dogmatic, and act practically with a view to imme diate peace and ultimate good understanding.

"So, on the other hand, it is my duty to admit, as I most frankly do, that the directions given by the British Government that our blockade shall be respected, and that favor or shelter shall be denied to insurgent privateers, together with the disallowance of the application of the insurgent commissioners, have given us good reason to expect that our complete sovereignty, though theoretically questioned in the Queen's proclamation, would be practically respected. Lord Lyons, as you are aware, proposed to read to me a dispatch which he had received from his Government, affirming the position assumed in the Queen's proclamation, and deducing from that position claims as a neutral to guarantees of safety to British commerce less than those we had, as I have already stated, offered to her as a friend. I declined, as you have been advised, to hear the communication, but nev ertheless renewed through you, as I consistently could, the offer of the greater guarantees before tendered.

"The case then seemed to me to stand thus: The two nations had, indeed, failed to find a common ground or principle on which they could stand together; but they had succeeded in reaching a perfect understanding of the nature and extent of their disagreement, and in finding a line of mutual, practical forbearance. It was under this aspect of the positions of the two Governments that the President thought himself authorized to inform Congress on its coming together on the 4th of July instant, in extra session, that the sovereignty of the United States was practically respected by all nations.

"Nothing has occurred to change this condition of affairs, unless it be the attitude which Lord John Russell has indicated for the British Government in regard to an apprehended closing of the insurrectionary ports, and the passage of the law of Congress which authorizes that measure in the discretion of the President.

"It is my purpose not to anticipate or even indicate the decision which will be made, but simply to suggest to you what you may properly and advantageously say while the subject is under consideration. First. You will, of course, prevent misconception of the measure by stating that the law only authorizes the President to close the ports in his discretion, accordingly as he shall regard exigencies now existing or hereafter to arise.

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Secondly. The passage of the law, taken in connection with attendant circumstances, does not necessarily indicate a legislative conviction that the ports ought to be closed, but only shows the purpose of Congress that the closing of the ports, if it is now or shall become neces

sary, shall not fail for want of power explicitly conferred by law. When, on the 13th of April last, disloyal citizens defiantly inaugurated an armed insurrection by the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the President's constitutional obligation to suppress the insurrection became impera

tive.

"But the case was new, and had not been adequately provided for by express law. The President called military and naval forces into activity, instituted a blockade, and incurred great expense, for all which no direct legal provisions existed. He convened Congress at the earliest possible day to confirm these measures if they should see fit.

"Congress, when it came together, confronted these facts. It has employed itself less in directing how and in what way the Union shall be maintained, than in confirming what the President had already done, and in putting into his hands more ample means and greater power than he has exercised or asked.

"The law in question was passed in this generous and patriotic spirit. Whether it shall be put into execution to-day or to-morrow, or at what time, will depend on the condition of things at home and abroad, and a careful weighing of the advantages of so stringent a measure against those which are derived from the existing blockade.

"Thirdly. You may assure the British Government that no change of policy now pursued, injuriously affecting foreign commerce, will be made from motives of aggression against nations which practically respect the sovereignty of the United States or without due consideration of all the circumstances, foreign as well as domestic, bearing upon the question. The same spirit of forbearance towards foreign nations, arising from a desire to confine the calamities of the unhappy contest as much as possible, and to bring it to a close by the complete restoration of the authority of the Government as speedily as possible, that have hitherto regulated the action of the Government, will continue to control its counsels.

"On the other hand, you will not leave it at all doubtful that the President fully adheres to the position that this Government so early adopted, and which I have so continually throughout this controversy maintained; consequently he fully agrees with Congress in the principle of law which authorizes him to close the ports which have been seized by the insurgents, and he will put into execution and maintain it with all the means at his command, at the hazard of whatever consequences, whenever it shall appear that the safety of the nation requires it.

"I cannot leave the subject without endeavoring once more, as I have so often done before, to induce the British Government to realize the conviction which I have more than once expressed in this correspondence, that the policy of the Government is one that is based on interests of the greatest importance and sentiments of the highest virtue, and therefore is in no case likely to be changed, whatever may be the varying fortunes of the war at home or the action of foreign nations

on this subject, while the policy of foreign states rests on ephemeral interests of commerce or of ambition merely. The policy of these United States is not a creature of the Government but an inspiration of the people, while the policies of foreign states are at the choice mainly of the Governments presiding over them. If, through error, on whatever side this civil contention shall transcend the national bounds and involve foreign states, the energies of all commercial nations, including our own, will necessarily be turned to war, and a general carnival of the adventurous and the reckless of all countries, at the cost of the exist ing commerce of the world, must ensue. Beyond that painful scene upon the seas there lie, but dimly concealed from our vision, scenes of devastation and desolation which will leave no roots remaining out of which trade between the United States and Great Britain, as it has hitherto flourished, can ever again spring up."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, July 21, 1861. MSS. Inst., Gr. Brit.;
Dip. Corr., 1861.

"At the close of my dispatch, No. 17, on the subject of my last conference with Lord John Russell, I mentioned my intention to write to Mr. Dayton, at Paris, to know whether he felt authorized to proceed in a simultaneous negotiation on the subject of the declaration of the congress at Paris. I have now to report that I executed my purpose on the 19th instant.

"On the evening of the 24th I received a note from Mr. Dayton announcing his arrival in town and his wish to confer with me upon this

matter.

"Yesterday morning I had the pleasure of a full and free conversation with him, in the course of which we carefully compared our respective instructions and the action taken under them.

"I am very glad he has taken the trouble to come over to see me, for I confess that I was a little embarrassed by not knowing the precise nature of his proposal to the French Government at the time when I heard of it from Lord John Russell. Had I been informed of it I should perhaps have shaped my own course a little differently. So I doubt not that he would have been pleased to know more exactly my own proceedings as well as the more specific character of my instructions. An hour's interview has had the effect to correct our impressions better than could have been accomplished by an elaborate correspondence.

"I can now perfectly understand as well as enter into the reasons which prompted his proposal of the declaration of Paris, connected as it was with the modification first suggested by Mr. Marcy. There can be no doubt that the attempt to secure such an extension of the application of the principle contained in the first point of that declaration was worth making, on the part of the new Administration, particularly at a place where there was no reason to presume any disinclination to adopt it. Neither did the reply of Mr. Thouvenel entirely preclude the hope of ultimate success, so far as the disposition of France may be presumed.

"The obstacles, if any there are, must be inferred to have been thought to exist elsewhere. And an advance could be expected only when the efforts to remove them had been applied with effect in the

proper quarter. It was, therefore, both natural and proper for Mr. Dayton, after having made his offer, and received such an answer, to wait patiently until it should become apparent that such efforts had been made, and made without success.

"There can be no doubt that the opposition to this modification centers here. Independently of the formal announcement of Lord John Russel to me that the proposition was declined, I have, from other sources of information, some reason to believe that it springs from the tenacity of a class of influential persons, by their age and general affinities adverse to all sudden variations from established ideas. Such people are not to be carried away by novel reasoning, however forcible. We have cause to feel the presence of a similar power at home, though in a vastly reduced degree.

"All modifications of the public law, however beneficent, naturally meet with honest resistance in these quarters for a time. It is to be feared that this may have the effect of defeating, at this moment, the application of the noble doctrines of the declaration of Paris, in the full expansion of which they are susceptible. But to my mind the failure to reach that extreme point will not justify the United States in declining to accept the good which is actually within their grasp. The declaration of the leading powers of civilized Europe, made at Paris in 1856, engrafted upon the law of nations for the first time great principles for which the Government of the United States had always contended , against some of those powers, and down to that time had contended in vain.

"That great act was the virtual triumph of their policy all over the globe. It was the sacrifice, on the part of Great Britain, of notions she had ever before held to with the most unrelenting rigidity. It would therefore seem as if any reluctance to acknowledge this practical amount of benefit, obtained on the mere ground that something remained to require, was calculated only to wither the laurels gained by our victory.

"It would almost seem like a retrograde tendency to the barbarism of former ages. Surely it is not in the spirit of the reformed Government in America to give countenance to any such impression. Whatever may have been the character of the policy in later years, the advent of another and a better power should be marked by a recurrence to the best doctrines ever proclaimed in the national history. And if it so happen that they are not now adopted by others to the exact extent that we would prefer, the obvious course of wisdom would seem to be to accept the good which can be obtained, and patiently to await another opportunity when a continuance of exertions in the same direction may enable us to secure everything that is left to be desired."

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, July 6, 1861. MSS. Dispatches, Gr. Brit.; Dip.
Corr., 1861.

The blockade (in 1861-'62) "is a legitimate war measure intended to exhaust the insurrection. As I have already intimated, we are willing to conform to the law of nations as it is, or to consent to modifications of it, upon sufficient guarantees that what we concede to other nations shall be equally conceded by them. It is not the blockade that distresses European commerce; it is the insurrection that renders the blockade necessary. Let the European powers discourage the insur

rection, it will perish. The blockade has not been unreasonably protracted."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, Feb. 19, 1862. MSS. Inst., France;
Dip. Corr., 1862.

As to blockade of Confederate ports, see Brit. and For. St. Pap., 1860-61, vol.
51; ibid., 1864-'65, vol. 55.

"The rule adopted by the French Government in 1861, in respect to the civil war then existing in the United States, was as follows: The Southern States exhibit to foreign eyes the appearance of a Government de facto, and are hence to be recognized as belligerents, and can employ against their adversaries such measures as are usual in war. France recognizes in them (the United States) the right to establish blockades, without at the same time recognizing the Confederacy as a new state, never having entered into an official relation with it. The United States followed the same course in reference to French interposition in Mexico, never having recognized Maximilian as Emperor, but never having contested his right to establish a blockade. It is true that on August 17, 1866, President Johnson refused to recognize the imperial decree of July 9 declaring the blockade of Matamoras, but this was only because the blockade was ineffective.' (Archiv. Dip., 1866, iv, 276.)"

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Fauchille. du Blocus Maritime, Paris, 1882.

If

'Blockades are divided by English and American publicists into two kinds: (1) a simple or de facto blockade and (2) a public or governmental blockade. This is by no means a mere nominal distinction, but one that leads to practical consequences of much importance. In cases of capture, the rules of evidence which are applicable to one kind of blockade, are entirely inapplicable to the other; and what a neutral vessel might lawfully do in case of a simple blockade, would be sufficient cause for condemnation in case of a governmental blockade. A simple or de facto blockade is constituted merely by the fact of an investment, and without any necessity of a public notification. As it arises solely from facts, it ceases when they terminate; its existence must, therefore, in all cases, be established by clear and decisive evidence. The burden of proof is thrown upon the captors, and they are bound to show that there was an actual blockade at the time of the capture. the blockading ships were absent from their stations at the time the alleged breach occurred, the captors must prove that it was accidental, and not such an absence as would dissolve the blockade. A public, or governmental blockade, is one where the investment is not only actually established, but where, also, a public notification of the fact is made to neutral powers by the Government, or officers of state, declaring the blockade. Such notice to a neutral state is presumed to extend to all its subjects; and a blockade established by a public edict is presumed to continue till a public notification of its expiration. Hence the burden of proof is changed, and the captured party is now bound to repel the legal presumptions against him by unequivocal evidence. It would, probably, not be sufficient for the neutral claimant to prove that the blockading squadron was absent, and there was no actual investment at the time the alleged breach took place; he must also prove that it was not an accidental and temporary absence, occasioned by storms, but that it arose from causes which, by their necessary and

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