its neutral possessor from selling it, and undertaking to deliver it to the belligerent, either in the neutral port or in that of the purchaser, subject to the right of the other belligerent to seize it as contraband if he meets it on the high seas or within his enemy's waters.' "The existing law, according to the summary of it given by Chancel lor Kent (Com., i, 128) and adopted by Wheaton (Lawrence's Wheaton, 729), declares it to be a misdemeanor for any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to augment the force of any armed vessel belonging to one foreign power at war with another power with whom they are at peace; or to hire or enlist troops or seamen for foreign military or naval service, or to be concerned in fitting out any vessel to cruise or commit hostilities in foreign service against a nation at peace with them; and the vessel in this latter case is made subject to forfeit ure. The President is also authorized to employ force to compel any foreign vessel to depart, which by the law of nations or treaties ought not to remain within the United States, and to employ generally the pub lic force in enforcing the duties of neutrality prescribed by law. (Revised Statutes, §§ 1033 ff. Note by Mr. Lawrence in Whart. Crim. Law, 8th ed., § 1908.) "In the Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat., 283, Judge Story, giving the opinion of the court, maintained that the sale of armed ships-of-war to belligerents by neutrals was never held unlawful in the United States. 'There is nothing in our laws,' he said, ' or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels as well as munitions of war to foreign ports for sale."" Whart. Com. Am. Law, § 249. "Mr. Baron Channell, in the case of The Alexandra, said: "The foreign enlistment act, particularly the seventh section, is very im perfectly worded. There is no doubt that it was in a great measure, but with what appeared to me very important variations, penned from an act of the United States, passed in Congress in 1792, and re-enacted in 1818.' This vessel was built at Liverpool, nominally for Frazer, Trenholm & Co. She was, after being launched, immediately taken to a public dock for completion. According to the evidence at the trial, she was apparently built for war, but not for commerce, but might have been used as a yacht. At the trial, which took place before the chief baron of the court of exchequer, on an information by the attorneygeneral, the jury found for the defendants. The question was left to the jury by the chief baron as follows: Was there any intention that in the port of Liverpool, or in any other port, she should be either equipped, furnished, fitted out, or armed with the intention of taking part in any contest? If you think the object was to equip, furnish, fit out, or arm that vessel at Liverpool, then that is a sufficient matter. But if you think the object really was to build a ship in obedience to an order and in compliance with a contract, leaving to those who bought it to make what use they thought fit of it, then it appears to me that the foreign enlistment act has not in any degree been broken.' (The Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War, Montague Bernard, ch. xiii, 355.) The arguments on the motion to discharge the rule are in Attorney-General v. Sillem, 2 Hurl & C., 431. 66 Contrary to the course of the United States, in confiding the exe cution of her neutrality acts, including that of 1818, to the admiralty courts, the English act of 1819 gave jurisdiction to the common-law courts; and the case of the Alexandra, which was formally decided in favor of the defendant, though the opinions of the judges of the court of exchequer were divided on a technical question of construction, produced an irritation in the minds of the American people, which neither the decision, in a contrary sense, of a Scotch court, nor even the inter ference of the Government with the purchase of the Anglo-Chinese squadron, supposed to be intended for the South, had any effect in allaying. "So far back as January, 1867, a commission was appointed, consisting of some of the most eminent English jurists, including Phillimore, Twiss, and Vernon Harcourt, all high authorities on international law, and to which Mr. Abbott (now Lord Tenterden) was attached in the capacity that he held to the high commission at Washington. The result of their labors was embodied in the act of 9th of August, 1870, the passage of which was hastened by the Franco-Prussian war. This act prohibits the building, or causing to be built, by any person within Her Majesty's dominions any ship, with intent or knowledge of its being employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state; issuing or delivering any commission for any such ship; equipping any such ship, or dispatching or causing any such ship to be dispatched for such purpose. It is deserving of notice that Mr. Vernon Harcourt dissented to that portion of the report of the commissioners that applied to the prohibition of ship-building. Jurisdiction in cases under the act is given to the court of admiralty, which is not the least important amendment of the law." Note by Mr. W. B. Lawrence to Whart. Crim. Law (9th ed.), § 1908. (4) OR PASSAGE OF BELLIGERENT TROOPS OVER SOIL. § 397. The Government of the United States will not at the request of a foreign Government, intervene to prevent the transit to the country of the latter persons objectionable to it unless they form part of a hostile military expedition. Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to the minister of France, Nov. 30, 1793. MSS. "I transmit a copy of letters to this Department from the Secretary of War, of the 13th, 15th, and 16th instant, with their accompaniments. They relate to a conflict between troops in the service of Diaz and other forces, supposed to be in the interests of Lerdo, on the Rio Grande frontier. It seems that the Diaz troops, after defeating and routing their adversaries on Mexican soil, pursued them into Texas, where they again attacked and dispersed them. This was a violation of the territory of the United States which you will lose no time in remonstrating against. "While it is deemed hardly probable that this unjustifiable invasion of American soil was made in obedience to any specific orders from the Mexican capital, it is, nevertheless, a grave violation of international law, which cannot for a moment be overlooked. You are instructed to call the attention of the officers of the de facto Government with whom you are holding unofficial intercourse to this case, and to say that the Government of the United States will confidently expect a prompt disavowal of the act, with reparation for its consequences, and the punishment of its perpetrators." Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Foster, June 21, 1877. MSS. Inst., Mex.; For. That this is a breach of neutrality, see Field's Int. Code, § 971, and see supra, As to permission to belligerent to transport troops, see correspondence in 4 Hamilton's Works, Lodge's ed., 48 ff; and see, also, supra, § 13, where the question is further discussed. (5) BOUND NOT TO PERMIT TERRITORY TO BE MADE THE BASE OF BELLIGERENT OPERATIONS. § 398. "It is the right of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within its limits, and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring powers." Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Mr. Genet, June 5, 1793. 1 Am. St. Pap. (For. It is a principle of the law of nations that no belligerent can rightfully make use of the territory of a neutral state for belligerent purposes, without the consent of the neutral Government. 7 Op., 387, Cushing, 1855. See further supra, § 27; infra, § 399. When belligerent troops, in order to escape the other belligerent, take refuge in neutral territory, if they do not lay down their arms they should be compelled to do so by the neutral sovereign. In such case they are protected by the law of nations from the opposing belligerent. This, it is true, is contested by Bynkershoek. "But this opinion of Bynkershoek is not supported by the practice of nations, nor by writers on public law. Abreu, Valin, Emerigon, Vattel, Azuni, Sir William Scott, Martens, Phillimore, Manning, and other European writers maintain the sounder doctrine, that when the flying enemy has entered neutral territory he is placed immediately under the protection of the neutral power, and that there is no excep tion to the rule that every voluntary entrance into neutral territory, with hostile purposes, is absolutely unlawful. Kent, Wheaton, Story, and other American writers oppose the doctrine of Bynkershoek, and the Government of the United States has invariably claimed the absolute inviolability of neutral territory." 2 Halleck's Int. Law (Baker's ed.), 180. See supra, § 394. The question how far it is a breach of neutrality to supply coal to a belligerent has been already incidentally considered (supra, § 369). It may be here stated, in connection with the present head, that it is not a breach of neutrality for a neutral state to permit the coaling of belligerent steamers in its ports to the same extent as it permits the coaling of other foreign steamers resorting to its ports casually and without settled stations established for them. Nor is it a breach of neutrality for a neutral state to permit the sale of coal to any extent to a belligerent. It would, however, be a breach of neutrality for a neutral to permit a permanent depot or magazine to be opened on its shores, on which a particular belligerent could depend for constant supplies. To require a neutral to shut up its ports so as to exclude from coaling all belligerents, would expose a nation with ports as numerous as those of the United States to an expense as great as would be imposed by actual belligerency. It is on the belligerent, who goes to war, not on the neutral, who desires to keep out of it, that should be thrown expenses so enormous, and constitutional strains so severe as those thus required. On the other hand, the breaking up of central depots or magazines for the constant supply of particular belligerents would be within easy range of ordinary national police. Nor can there be any charge of partiality made in allowing coaling with the limitation above stated, when the same privilege is granted to both belligerents. Whart. Crim. Law (9th ed.), § 1903. Supra, § 369; infra, §§ 399, 402a. (6) Nor to PERMIT BELLIGERENT NAVAL OPERATIONS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS. § 399. "I inclose you also several memorials and letters which have passed between the Executive and the ministers of France and England. These will develop to you the principles on which we are proceeding between the belligerent powers. The decisions, being founded on what is conceived to be rigorous justice, give dissatisfaction to both parties, and produce complaints from both. It is our duty, however, to persevere in them and to meet the consequences. You will observe that Mr. Hammond proposes to refer to his court the determination of the President that the prizes taken by the Citoyen Genet could not be given up; the reasons for this are explained in the papers. Mr. Genet had stated that she was manned by French citizens. Mr. Hammond had not stated to the contrary before the decision. Neither produced any proofs. It was therefore supposed that she was manned principally with French citizens. After the decision Mr. Hammond denies the fact, but without producing any proof. I am really unable to say how it was, but I believe it to be certain that there were very few Americans. He says the issuing the commission, etc., by Mr. Genet within our territory was an infringement of our sovereignty; therefore, the proceeds of it should be given up to Great Britain. The infringement was a matter between France and us. Had we insisted on any penalty or forfeiture by way of satisfaction to our insulted rights, it would have belonged to us, not to a third party. As between Great Britain and us, considering all the circumstances explained in the papers, we deemed we did enough to satisfy her. We are moreover assured that it is the standing usage of France, perhaps, too, of other nations, in all wars, to lodge blank commissions with all their foreign consuls to be given to every vessel of their nation, merchant or armed, without which a merchant vessel would be punished as a pirate were she to take the smallest thing of the enemy that should fall in her way. Indeed, the place of the delivery of a commission is immaterial, as it may be sent by letter to any one. So it may be delivered by hand to him anywhere; the place of signature by the sovereign is the material thing. Were that to be done in any other jurisdiction than his own, it might draw the validity of the act in question." Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pinckney, June 14, 1793. MSS. Inst., Ministers. "France, England, and all other nations have a right to cruise on our coasts, a right not derived from our permission, but from the law of nature. To render this more advantageous, France has secured to herself by a treaty with us (as she has done also by a treaty with Great Britain, in the event of a war with us or any other nation), two special rights: (1) Admission for her prizes and privateers into our ports. This, by the seventeenth and twenty-second articles, is secured to her exclusively of her enemies, as is done for her in the like case by Great Britain, were her present war with us instead of Great Britain. (2) Admission for her public vessels-of-war into our ports, in cases of stress of weather, pirates, enemies, or other urgent necessity, to refresh, victual, repair, etc. This is not exclusive. As, then, we are bound by treaty to receive the public armed vessels of France, and are not bound to exclude those of her enemies, the Executive has never denied the same right of asylum in our ports to the public armed vessels of your nation. They, as well as the French, are free to come to them in all cases of stress of weather, piracies, enemies, or other urgent necessity, and to refresh, victual, repair, etc. And so many are these urgent necessities to vessels far from their own ports, that we have thought inquiries into the nature as well as the degree of the necessities which drive them hither as endless as they would be fruitless, and therefore have not made them. And the rather because there is a third right, secured to neither by treaty, but due to both on the principles of hospitality between friendly nations, that of coming into our ports, not under the pressure of urgent necessity, but whenever their comfort or convenience induces them. this ground, also, the two nations are on a footing." On Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hammond, Sept. 9, 1793. MSS. Notes, For. A foreign sovereign who uses the hospitality of our ports as a base of operations for the purpose of sallying forth to harass our allies as well as our own citizens, may be called upon for reparation. Mr. Randolph, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hammond, Apr. 13, 1795. MSS. Notes, For. "As it is contrary to the law of nations that any of the belligerent powers should commit hostility on the waters which are subject to the |