estuary to inquire of the blockading squadron; that it is only under special circumstances that she is entitled to do so. Union.

1551. If this doctrine is confined to the ship after she has received notice of the blockade, or after it has become so well known as to raise a fair presumption that she has become informed of it, the proposition is accurate: but it seems to have been stated generally; if so, it is erroneous. The only presumption on which a ship at peace with all nations, and uninformed of blockade, is bound to proceed on her voyage is, that every port is open, on payment of usual dues, to receive her. The belligerent who closes a port by blockade is bound to discharge his duty by informing her of it before he interferes with her progress, or calls upon her to perform a duty which does not arise until he has given her due information. The prudent mariner will, however, avail himself in time of war of convenient opportu nity of inquiry, especially from ships of the belligerent, as to the condition of the ports of his destination, especially if they have been blockaded. Whea. 577. Betsy. Nep

tunus.

1552. The Privy Council of England has of late corrected some of the disgraceful doctrines of the prize court, and; among other such corrections, has declared in effect that if a mariner has, on sailing, no notice of an effectual blockade, although he had been in a situation in which it would be presumed that he had been informed of a blockade which was improperly proclaimed, he is not bound to speculate upon a blockade de facto being established.

1553. ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE BLOCKADE.-We have stated what ships are privileged to quit a blockaded port, and what notice is essential to constitute the attempt of others to enter or quit it a violation of the law of blockade.

1554. We have now to inquire what act, after such notice, is sufficient to constitute the offence. It must be the proceeding to enter the port, which we denominate ingress; or

the attempt to quit it, which we call egress, although neither of the words may be quite apposite.

1555. INGRESS.-There can be no breach of blockade, unless the true destination of the ship is to a blockaded port or place; that is, either her original sole place of destination, or one of her original places of destination, or a place at which she is to call without reference to its being blockaded, or a new destination adopted instead of, or in addition to, her original destination; or a deviation to enter it.

1556. Her destination to any port of a neutral, or to any open port of either belligerent, however near the beleaguered place, is no violation of the law of blockade.

1557. The true destination is often concealed, and a false one indicated by the papers. Papers indicating destination to the blockaded place are evidence against a vessel. All her papers are to be assumed to be honest, unless there is some just cause of suspicion, and it is incumbent on those who allege it to prove fabrication.

1558. Concealment of destination is indicative of an intention to proceed to an unlawful port; as with munitions of war, to proceed to the port of a belligerent ;-in the neighbourhood of a blockaded port, of an intention to enter it.

1559. The offence of attempting ingress begins from the moment of sailing, whether on her original or altered destination, for the purpose of proceeding to the besieged port. But she may sail from a distant country to an open port near that which is blockaded, to await the discontinuance of the blockade. Calypso. Jonge Petronella. Franciska.

1560. She may not sail from a port so near that under blockade as to indicate an intention of entering it, unless news has arrived that the blockade has been raised or discontinued.

1561. She may not hover so near as to raise a fair presumption of her intention to enter. Searching for a pilot and other pretexts will not avail a vessel endeavouring to get under the protection of the land batteries of a blockaded harbour. Neutralität.

1562. EGRESS.-Coming out with a cargo loaded after the notice of blockade, although she had entered in ballast, is breach of blockade. Betsy. Francisca.

1563. A blockading squadron ought to allow ships found in a blockaded port a reasonable time after notice to unload, and even to load and sail out. This is sometimes done. Elize.

1564. Coming out even in ballast, after having broken through the same blockade, has been held a breach of blockade. A vessel purchased from the enemy after notice of the blockade is guilty of a breach of it, although coming out in ballast. Whea. 584.

1565. A vessel licensed to enter a blockaded port is inferentially licensed to come out again with a new cargo.

1566. A ship which came out in ballast, but took on board, outside the blockaded harbour, a cargo from boats sent along the coast to meet her, was held guilty of breach of blockade. Neutralität. Stert.

1567. Blockade is a sea-siege, and consequently cannot be violated by ingress or egress by land or by inland waters. Therefore, notwithstanding a blockade, a merchant is entitled to import or export his goods, or to send his vessels by inland navigation, river, or canal, to or from a blockaded port, from or to one which is open, as freely as he may convey them by carriages or a caravan. Comet.

SECTION 8. VISITATION AND SEARCH.

A sail! a sail! a promised prize to hope

Her nation-flag-how speaks the telescope?-Corsair. 1568. Visitation and search are to be performed by an officer who is interested in the extravagant exercise of his office, who is interested in being suspicious, and who has been generally indemnified by the prize court in even unwarranted suspicion.

1569. We have spoken of it in its limited character in connection with the national revenue, and as conceded, to

some extent, with reference to piracy and the slave-trade. As an international right, or rather as a concession of neutrals to belligerents, it is confined to contraband of war, the detection of attempts to interfere with blockade, and the ascertaining that the vessel is not an enemy.

1570. It is an act of sovereignty, and therefore can be exercised only by the officers of public ships of the state. Until lately, the neutral nations were insulted by the institution of search by the licensed plunderers called privateers. If the sovereign is so destitute of war-ships as to be under the necessity, as in times of yore, of summoning the merchant service to his assistance, and thus improvising a navy, let him at least convert them into public ships, and make their commanders, however ill-disciplined, responsible for their conduct to him, and thus, for the honour of his nation, towards foreign states.

1571. The execution of the office consists in ascertaining, by her flag and papers, to what nation a ship belongs, to what port she is really bound, and by these papers and examination of her cargo, so far as it is practicable on the open sea, whether she carries contraband of war.

1572. NOT OF PUBLIC SHIPS.-As the act is one to be exercised only by the armed ships representing the sovereignty of the state, so they cannot violate the sovereign rights of any other state by visiting or searching the ships which bear its commission. No government will permit its sovereignty to be insulted, or its ships of war to be suspected of piracy, of enmity, or rendering service to a hostile. state. The neutral war-ships enjoy entire immunity from search, even within the national waters of the belligerents. If they offend, complaint of their conduct must be addressed to the sovereign of whose power they constitute a part. We have spoken of visitation and search as connected with convoy.

1573. PRIVATE VESSELS.-In time of war all private ships not under convoy are liable to the visitation and search of the ships of war of either belligerent.

1574. In time of peace, according to the law of nations, the armed ships of one nation have no right of visitation or search of the private ships of another, except when, and to the extent in which, it has been conceded by the nation to which the private ship belongs.

1575. PURPOSE.-The only purposes for which search is justified, as between a belligerent and a neutral, are to ascertain the character of a vessel, whether pirate, enemy or neutral, and to ascertain whether, if neutral, she is bound to a blockaded port or carries contraband of war.

Distinctions have been attempted between the right of visitation and search; but it is vain to attempt to define the limitation between them, for, except to the extent before mentioned, in the case of convoy, where visitation is admitted, the right of reasonable search must be admitted as a consequence. If the flag is false, the papers are probably false, and if so, the cargo may be expected to be contraband; the falsity of the flag and of the papers may be capable of detection only by a more or less rigorous examination of the cargo. But the admission of the right is conditional on its being exercised with care and moderation.

1576. England claimed a right of search for a purpose different from that of contraband; a right to search for deserters from her service, and to impress her own seamen found in neutral merchantmen. This claim was resisted by the United States, and is destitute of foundation. It was an attempt to pursue fugitives from its own into a friendly dominion, and to exercise a municipal authority within the province of another state. It was founded on the pretence of necessity; a pretence which, if a justification, would justify every crime. It is not probable that such a claim will be reasserted.

1577. The pirate is not entitled to use the flag of any nation; he is at war with all, and when he is unmistakably known, he may not only be searched, but captured by any public ship, whatever flag he may have assumed. But in