nisters, they could not be justified unless by openly disclosing the means by which such treasonable acts were discovered; and, to prevent such practices in future, the informations should remain secret. He said, the conduct of the late ministers, in arresting persons for treason (on solid grounds), might truly be said to have saved the country. And as no corrupt motives could be imputed to them, especially to the duke of Portland, whose known humanity placed him beyond the suspicion of wanton cruelty, the house on every principle of justice should indemnify them for boldly performing an act of public duty so advantageous to the interests of the empire. It need not be repeated, that an act of indemnity was not unprecedented. Such had often passed; especially in 1694, 1715, and 1746, universally approved. If, therefore, such acts had been highly proper for actions not warranted by law, but which tended to suppress rebellion, surely those were equally entitled to them who had prevented it both in Ireland and here by their vigilance and energy. He would now move that the bill be read a second time. The earl of Suffolk regretted the necessity he was under of opening a debate of the highest importance. Far from thinking, however, that those ministers merited indemnity for the various suspensions of the habeas-corpus, they had greatly abused the powers granted them; while many had been long imprisoned under severe hardships and oppression, against whom no charge had been made to bring them to trial. This sort of conduct (issuing lettres de cachet) first caused the subversion of a neighbouring government. As to the last report of the committee, it referred rather to Ireland than England. It was therefore an Irish rather than an English report, and he thought it an unfit ground for He such a bill as the present. was sorry to see England and Ireland identified. He must withhold his confidence from the rcport; because drawn up by a committee who, though individually respectable, were known supporters of the ministers' measures, and consequently prejudiced. Had the committee been fairly chosen from both sides of the house, the report would have met with more credit. Why were not lords on his side, equal in fortune and character to the others, appointed members? Could either he or the noble duke (Bedford) gain any thing by rebellion? Noble lords should recollect, ere they broke down one of the last fences of the constitution, the patience with which the people had borne the heavy burdens necessarily imposed on them by the war, and the aggravation of their distress by two years of scarcity, which had placed provision almost beyond the reach of industry and labour. The partial risings in the west were the only riotous proceedings he had heard of, and immediately imputable to the former causes, and directly quelled. Why then would ministers renew this odious unconstitutional bill? Let their lordships look to the lenity of the late ministers in the exercise of their power, and judge from two instances out of many. One of a noble lord tried for a few inadvertent words, who had been sentenced to twelve months imprisonment in the Tower, without any abridgement of the time. The other of a noble relation of his, who had uttered a few imprudent words, for which he was afterwards extremely sorry. For this P 2 mighty mighty offence he was immediately removed from the lord-lieutenancy of a county, to which he easily submitted. But ministers did more, by depriving him of the best militia regiment in the whole kingdom, though considered by them as a father. He knew, when the duke went to take leave of his regiment at Portsmouth, it was reported that he went for a different purpose. A mutiny was then in the feet, and was talked of in the army; on which reports injurious to his honour had been grounded. But he deserved not censure: he went to conciliate the minds of the officers, to reconcile them to the Joss of their colonel, and to prevent their resigning their commissions. Here he succeeded; for there was no resignation but of a lieutenantcolonel: the rest continued, though all resigned since. He mentioned what had happened to his ancestors; and the fate of that noble predecessor of his, the earl of Surry, put to death by the tyrant Henry VIII.; but his attainder was afterwards taken off. He was about to proceed, but felt so much overcome that he was compelled to desist. The earl of Caernarvon said he naturally expected the noble secretary of state would have explained the ground for this indemnity, being in a situation of the highest responsibility. Why was it now more necessary than eight years ago? The secretary had only asserted that former acts, granting extraordinary powers to administration, were justifiable on the several reports of secret committees. The question was not to-day on these acts, whatever was thought of them, nor concerning their reports. The sole object was a bill of indemnity for misconduct in executing those powers, on which in demnity the reports had not even touched. The secretary of state appealed to the house if he had not stated that the bill was to indemnify the late ministers from all actions for detaining those apprehended and suspected of high treason; else ministers could not defend the same without openly disclosing the means by which those designs had been discovered. This he thought all the explanation necessary. Lord Caernarvon continued, saying, he could not think it easy for the noble lord to support this extraordinary attempt of an indemnity, pending those powers obtained under severe responsibility. The defence of the powers themselves, or the secret committee's reports, were not before them then, and it would be disorderly to go beyond the question of the indemnity. Such acts were passed from supposed necessity, admitting of their dangerous tendency, and presuming it obviated by responsibility accompanying it, which gave to those exposed to injuries ultimate redress from wanton oppression. That constitutional responsibility under which ministers always acted was the country's sole security against the power of the crown; in some measure protecting the people from the possible oppression of new and extraordinary powers. It were indeed a desertion of sound principles and common sense, had the legislature removed responsibility from powers the most dangerous and liable to abuse in the execution of ministe rial duties. Parliament granted the powers with responsibility; the present application was to remove this, and leave the power. By this. act, therefore, they were freed from fear for past misconduct, and would proceed proceed without apprehension; but no cause was now assigned pending the existence of these powers, why responsibility should be removed, which by the wisdom of the legislature and constitution had been aiways attached to them, whatever powers they might possess. The sole reason assigned was in applicable to such a proposition; for the public inconvenience alleged from their defence, by discovering the incomprehensible mysteries of the secret committee, could not go beyond a temporary suspension of investigating their conduct during the suspension of the habeas corpus, the limited time of a year, or to the end of the war. The advice of the secret committee never could be a motive for depriving the subject of all redress from the oppressive conduct of ministers. The grant of extraordinary powers was new, but responsibility was not so. Ministerial discretion must be responsible. The powers not lodged with them, nor entrusted to their discretion, if openly exercised for the public good, might require indemnity. Such was the opening and shutting the ports; with acts done during open rebellion, or when there was no time for deliberation: and the public good must absolutely be secured. But the circumstances should be publicly known, and capable of legislative judgment; liable to objections at the time of indemnitynot given through ignorance of the offence. At present there could be no possible inquiry-no objections admitted-all being secret: therefore there could be no reasonable indemnity, which no more than condemnation could arise from ignorance. The indemnities after the rebellion of 1715 and 1745 were after the whole-was-over, and time had for objections. They were given in gratitude for known be nefits. The present case was not on that footing, nor pretended to be due to those protected by the indemnity. The pretence now was to protect the public from inconvenience, in disclosing the secret motives of this conduct, in defence of that which maybe pursuedvindictively-not for the purpose of stopping vindictive prosecutions. There were no precedents for this case; but otherwise they deserved not to be followed. The powers granted were subject to responsibility. Former indemnities were not controuled by particular responsibility, but were applied to public events past and concluded. Facts pending, or events in contemplation, were out of the question; the bill aimed only at irresponsibility, we being now ignorant of all that justified or condemned ministers-they assuring us of their innocence and merit, but that a disclosure would hurt the public. If, therefore, in total ignorance we indemnified the past, we could not refuse the same in future. Indemnity of all that had been done might be confined to the past in terms, but was perfect irresponsibility for the future. We had now broken down some of the firmest barriers of our freedom upon the assertion of unknown invisible dangers, to arm government for our destruction. We were now invited one step further-to render them invulnerable while assaulting the rights of the people. Step by step each useful maxim was degraded by suspension; first through a disavowal of its permanent use to accustom us to its final disuse. The favoured and essential' maxim of responsibility was now first infringed; and this, with the destruction of our liberties, underP 3 mined mined the security of the crown. No maxim in the English law was more useful than that the king can do no wrong; which secured the throne and the tranquillity of the people. This was rooted in and grew out of the responsibility of ministers; while the advisers of sovereign power were answerable, the king could do little harm, and the mischief arising from his responsibility was obvious. It was not for the public good that odium should be cast on the throne. It was the most ingenious part of our constitutional fabric, by which a limited monarch sat firm amidst popular liberty, and by which the law has diverted the wrath of an injured people from its sovereign to his advisers and seducers. By in trenching on this, the security of the crown was fundamentally shaken. If we now extended it to say the king and his ministers can do no wrong, the consequence was, that the odium of all the evil done by his ministers would be imputable to the king, whence their powers were derived. This was another dangerous infraction of constitutional principles, not ending even there; for while ministers declared that they could not wrong the people, under the acts subjecting them to their power, they also declared they cannot wrong the king under whom they act, for the act also makes them irresponsible to the king. To make ministers wholly irresponsible, the people must be deprived of their right of redress; and, that punishment might be averted from delinquents, the subject was deprived of the king's parental care and the protection of the law. He therefore gave his dissent. The lord chancellor said, that after what had passed he must state to their lordships and the public why the bill had his hearty concurrence. It was highly important, he agreed, and what the house should regard most zealously, and what the genuine principles of the constitution required. The house should be convinced of its necessity before it passed, which ought to be the first consideration. One of his earliest maxims was (and which he now practically thought), that political liberty could not exist long, unless the administration parted with it occasionally to secure it for ever: if not, liberty would destroy itself. It was their duty; and at present the bill before them afforded the best means of defending the genuine liberty of the British constitution from all conspiracy against it; and he trusted, under the providence of God, it would be preserved for ever. As to necessity, he knew it was often the plea of tyrants; yet on this the most moderate men must act when they took prudence for their guide.. In all our history it would be found that the habeas-corpus was occasionally relinquished; and that must be so while we would preserve the blessings of the British constitution. These were lately often hazarded; but its security would remain in the wisdom of parliament and the steady loyalty of the people. The suspension of the act did not make ministers irresponsible; yet the general term of suspension was improper. Ninety-nine parts out of a hundred were not suspended, but merely one which was certainly important. But yet a prejudice might be harboured by those ignorant of the circumstances: he therefore rectified the mistake. As to the advisers of the measure, it should be considered how they were obliged to act. He was aware of the irregularity of referring to what was was said elsewhere; yet it was sometimes necessary to be " regularly irregular." He was reported to have said that ministers would never need indemnity. He had not so asserted. As to those measures, the house should remember that when attorney-general he was no minister. His advice was legal not political. These were cases when if a minister did not act he ought to lose his head. For instance, when ambassadors passed from Ireland through England to France, and vice versa, for treasonable purposes, where the fact was clear, if a minister would not act what did he deserve? There could be but one opinion. And yet such a man could not be indemnified without such a bill. It was hard to say how such information was obtained perhaps by secret servicemoney through persons in the enemy's country, whose lives would be unsafe were some discoveries made. Nor could the real grounds of acting be proved. Therefore they properly applied for indemnity, even against the king's indictment, as the case might be incapable of establishment by evidence. Besides, those who created, not those who acted under, the necessity were responsible. He further observed, that as a member of that house he must act from the committee's reports-not his own private knowledge; and nothing was harder than to fix a term for the act, as it was uncertain when the necessity would cease-he might as well say when assassination would cease. Much had been said of spies, &c. but they deserved much less censure and obloquy. He thought his noble and learned friend had the stout heart of a British judge, not suffering witnesses to be treated as they sometimes were, while stating facts before more than a hundred persons, when not one contradicted them. Such people as created the necessity of spies deserved the censure and punishment in the organisation of treason and sedition, where some were directors, some delegates, and others chiefs of certain divisions. Persons were thus the instruments of traitors, who went further, and bound them by an oath. No disclosure was to operate against them, but the government was to diclose every thing for them. This were to palsy the sinews of the executive government.-He then mentioned the Maidstone trials, particularly that of O'Connor, on whom some of his defenders implicitly relied. His word was with them sufficient security for his political integrity and love of the constitution. But what was he? what his defenders would formerly have utterly re jected. He assured their lordships, from his own knowledge, that traitorous conspiracies existed still in the country. To oppose effectually, large powers must be given to the executive government, or the legislature, the sovereign, and the people, be sacrificed. That the government. might act more effectually, the measure was necessary; for they must be safe, or betray their duty. Much had been said of the late ministry's lenity. He would do them justice: and, as to a prosecution alluded to, circumstances appeared which made inquiry into the accusation necessary. He must exercise or betray that duty-debase himself or the law of the land. For, by the laws of England, the highest peer and meanest peasant were equal: and he believed the noble lord would suffer all the imprisonment sooner than not prove that only practical equality, that all men were equal in the eyes of its laws. [A |