So far as our future relations with Great Britain are concerned, we believe that the most effective way for us to create and maintain the good will between us which we both seek is by agreeing with Great Britain to an equal limit on the total strength of our Navies. ( The Washington treaty of 1922, to which I have just referred, created such parity between us as to our battleships and airplane carriers. We now seek to extend that parity to all the rest of our respective fleets, a policy with which I am glad to say Great Britain is in entire accord. Parity between Great Britain and America is not a doctrine of naval rivalry; rather it is a slogan of mutual confidence, as well as a means of mutual disarmament. We in America know that so long as we have a Navy equal in power and efficiency to Britain's Navy, with only such minor differences as the differing problems of the two nations make necessary, America will have a Navy adequate for its national defense. Furthermore, we know that so long as parity is maintained we can safely reduce our Navy down as far as Great Britain is willing to reduce her Navy. Instead of producing rivalry it removes it; instead of arousing apprehension it insures confidence and creates a standard by which both Navies can be reduced in safety.

Mr. MacDonald's announcement in Washington last October that Great Britain agreed to this policy of naval parity with America, did more to relieve the feeling of anxiety and irritation which had followed the failure of the naval conference in Geneva in 1927 than any other single event.

We are also interested in the limitation of the Navies of France and Italy, for although we have no immediate interest in the Mediterranean where these countries border on each other, it is nevertheless a fact that every great navy in the world influences every other navy. Therefore the security and stability of the world and the serenity of mind on which international good will rests cannot be fully attained until all danger of competition of naval building is removed by agreements of limitation.

This being the general situation which confronts us, and these being the public purposes and motives that actuate us, we are trying to accomplish the following results:

In the first place, we hope to make an agreement with the other foreign nations represented here which will put an end to competition between them in cruisers and destroyers. These vessels are not now covered by any agreement.

In the second place, we should like to abolish submarines. If we cannot abolish them, we wish to reduce their number as much as possible and at the same time to make an agreement to prevent their being used against merchant vessels in the ruthless and inhuman way in which submarines were used in the last war.

Then we want to reduce the battleship programs below the programs which were provided in the Washington treaty.

It is the present competition in respect to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines which has caused the chief anxiety and irritation during recent years. An agreement as to them would be the greatest contribution to international good will and for some countries it would also provide economy. For us, the first economy would lie in the reduction of the battleship program, for unless that program is reduced we shall be faced with an expenditure of approximately $300,000,000 on battleships alone in the next six years, and in the next six years thereafter another $300,000,000.

These are the problems which the American Delegation has before it and on which all of the delegations here are hard at work. We have been getting acquainted with the members of the other delegations and have been studying the conditions of each of their countries which affect their naval programs. The organization of the conference has been effected and members of our delegation have been holding conferences with each other and with their colleagues from other countries almost all day for every day that we have been here. We know the other delegations and they know us far better than when we landed here ten days ago. We know their problems and their points of view with an intimacy that was impossible before. I think I run no risk in saying for them and for us that we have confidence in each other's determination to make a long step forward in human progress before we leave here, and that confidence not only augurs well for the success of this naval conference, but for that international good will in the future which is the main object of the conference.

Let me add one little word of caution. Some 400 newspaper reporters and representatives are gathered here in London to report this conference, and hardly a day passes but that some excited reporter comes to me with a rumor of some crisis that he has heard of that is going to wreck the conference. I have no doubt that some stories of these alleged crises have got into the newspapers of America. Crises make good news, much better news than mere reports of good progress. I can only tell you that thus far every rumor of such a crisis which has come to my ears has been quite unfounded. No such crises have in fact occurred; nothing but hard work and friendly good will among the various gentlemen of the delegations who are getting together every day. I therefore recommend that you be not troubled by reports of crises unless they are confirmed by us. We intend to make this conference a success and we think we can do so. Our own delegation is a unit in energy, good will, and determination to accomplish such a result, and everything that we have seen points to a similar state of mind on the part of our colleagues from the other

countries. The members of the American Delegation here in one capacity or another went through the Great War. Most of us have had to study national defense in the course of our official duties. We are united in believing that our national defense, our national interests, and our prospects for continued peace and prosperity can best be served by naval limitation and its consequent good will. In the belief that the same agreement which holds out such prospects for us holds equal prospects for the other nations here, we go at our task with the assurance of the support of the people of these five great nations.

5

Speech Delivered by the Honorable Hugh S. Gibson, American Ambassador to Belgium and Delegate to the London Naval Conference, at the Plenary Session of the Conference, London, January 30, 1930

MR. CHAIRMAN: The reference to a committee for study and report of the important subject of methods of naval limitation may tend to create an erroneous impression as to the scope of the task that we are asking this committee to undertake. It is gratifying however to be able to say that the scope of this inquiry has been very materially reduced by previous discussions and that the task of the committee is reduced to a purely practical problem bearing on the work of this conference. Perhaps the most expeditious way of making this clear is briefly to restate the various steps in the previous discussions by which we have narrowed the question at issue. The general problem of methods of naval limitation was first taken up by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1926. Subcommittee "A" of that body sat for some months and carried on exhaustive and sometimes exhausting discussions with a view to finding a single and ideal method by which naval limitation could be achieved. It soon became apparent however that the various powers entertained divergent views as to what constituted this ideal method. Roughly there were two schools of thought, that of limitation by categories, and that of limitation by total tonnage. Limitation by categories fixes the tonnage which each country may use for each type of ship and thereby fixes the total tonnage. Limitation by the global method fixes the total tonnage for each navy and allows each country to apportion that tonnage among the various types of ships as it sees fit. The discussions in the first session of the Preparatory Commission revealed the divergence of views of the various powers as to the merits of limitation by categories as opposed to the system of total tonnage limitation. I think it is as important to stress the fact that these discussions were not immediately concerned with the reaching of an agreement but were carried on merely with a view to determining the merits of these methods and there was therefore no reason for attempting to conciliate the divergent needs of the various naval powers at that time. Indeed the general work of the Preparatory Commission, as indicated by its name, has been to draw up a plan of method rather than any exact limitation.

When, however, the Preparatory Commission met at its second session in 1927 this divergence of views had crystallized into a complete deadlock between the two opposing schools of thought and it became important to devise some means of bridging the gap in an endeavor to accomplish this. The French delegate, Monsieur Paul Boncour, brought forward a compromise proposal. This proposal was based upon the author's understanding of the inability of any power supporting one of these schools of thought to accept for its own navy the system advocated by the other school and has had a most important bearing upon the subsequent course of events. modified form it is one of the most important elements in our discussions to-day. The proposal was placed before the Preparatory Commission on April 11, 1927. In its essence it provided for the allocation of a total tonnage for the navy of each of the naval powers. This tonnage was then to be subdivided into four categories: capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface vessels of 10,000 tons, and submarines. The provision was added that each of the high contracting parties while keeping within the limits of the total tonnage could alter the employment of that tonnage as apportioned among the various categories subject to one year's notice before laying down the portion of tonnage transferred from one category to another. In the course of subsequent discussions the four categories were increased to five by the division of the auxiliary surface vessels into two categories from 10,000 to 1,850 tons and from 1,850 to 600 tons. Moreover a limited right of transfer between the last three categories was recognized in principle, any tonnage added to one of the other categories being reduced from one or both of the other categories with the result that the total tonnage should never be exceeded. Although there was no definite agreement at this stage as to the percentage of transfer, it was generally understood that the deviation should be small.

The proposal put forward by Monsieur Paul Boncour was conceived in the desire to facilitate agreement among the naval powers. This conciliatory spirit found ready response and was the first step toward recognition by each school of thought that agreement must be found through consideration of the special needs of different types of navies.

This session of the Preparatory Commission was followed by the three-power naval conference in Geneva but, as the three powers party to that conference were all in favor of limitation by categories, the compromise proposal found no application and was only brought to the fore again after the adjournment of the three-power conference.

As a result of conversations between representatives of the British and French Governments during the early part of 1928, agreement