was reached as to the terms of a proposal which divided warships for the purposes of limitation into four classes: capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre, and oceangoing submarines of over 600 tons. With regard to the last two classes it was agreed that the disarmament conference eventually to be called would fix a maximum tonnage applicable to all powers which no power would be allowed to exceed during the period covered by the treaty, and within this maximum limit each power should indicate at the final conference for each of these categories what tonnage it proposes to reach and would undertake not to exceed during the period covered by the treaty.

This compromise proposal was submitted to the American, Italian, and Japanese Governments. In setting forth the reasons for its inability to accept this plan the American Government expressed its determination not to close the door on any possibility of obtaining a mutually satisfactory basis of limitation and declared its willingness to take into consideration the special needs of other naval powers for the particular classes of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defense and suggested that this might be accomplished by permitting any of the powers to vary the percentage of tonnage in classes within the total tonnage, this percentage to be agreed upon and any increase in one class to be deducted from the tonnage used by another class or classes. In other words the American Government suggested a reexamination of the proposal of Monsieur Paul Boncour.

Shortly after the opening of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission in April 1929 the American Government in expressing its willingness to undertake negotiations for a formula to determine equivalent naval strengths, taking into account other factors besides tonnage, further stated that for the immediate purpose of discussion it was prepared to take as a basis the French compromise proposal of 1927 which constituted a middle ground between the thesis of global tonnage limitation and limitation by categories.

At the same time the American Government indicated that it did this because it considered the technical aspects of naval reduction to be secondary to the spirit in which the problem is approached.

This statement of the development of the past discussions in regard to the methods of limitation has been made with a view to showing that much has already been accomplished and that when we refer to a committee the study of the methods of limitation we are as a practical matter asking them to consider the various methods already devised and discussed with a view to determining how the

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gap between them can be bridged as a matter of practical application for the purposes of the treaty we seek to conclude.

The American Government has consistently held the view that the method of limitation by categories is better calculated than any other method thus far devised to reduce international competition in the building of armaments and the feeling of mistrust, suspicion, and insecurity inevitably attendant upon such competition. If the system of global tonnage limitation were applied to all navies no nation would know exactly what its neighbor is contemplating nor would it know exactly what steps it would have to take to meet the situation. All would be faced with an unknown factor calculated to introduce an element of tenseness into the situation instead of one of complete certainty and security. It is the fear of the unknown that engenders distrust. As an example of what this means let us assume that the three largest existing navies, British, Japanese, and American, were to adopt the system of global tonnage for those categories not now covered by the Washington treaty. We would each have available several hundred thousand tons which might be applied in such a way as definitely to create suspicion and possibly endanger international security through the use of an undue proportion of that tonnage for construction in some special type of ship which would upset all the calculations of the other navies and provide all the elements of the competition which would exist in the absence of any agreement.

In brief, our conviction is that a strict system of limitation by categories affords a clear understanding as to the intentions of each naval power and affords a maximum of reassurance to all the parties to an agreement so that they can regard each other's programs without misgiving or alarm.

While we feel that the system of limitation by categories affords a maximum of benefits, still we recognize that smaller navies have inevitably a tendency towards specialization and we are not disposed to press our methods for the purpose of preventing such specialization. Further, specialization can be taken care of under the category method, nevertheless we are not disposed to impose our theories upon other people who do not agree with them and it is this which has led us to accept the compromise proposal for discussion.

6

Radio Address by the Honorable Joseph T. Robinson, United States Senator and Delegate to the London Naval Conference, London, February 2, 1930

Through the courtesy of Mr. Frederick William Wile and the Columbia Broadcasting Co., I have the privilege of sending this message from the scene of the London Conference to radio hearers in many parts of the United States. Friendly contact with the representatives here of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, as well as cordial relations with my associates from the United States, compensate in part for the temporary separation from friends in the home. land.

Warned before leaving Washington by senatorial colleagues and by others likewise endowed with wisdom, to beware of the wily European diplomat, let me express regret that my social adviser, Mr. Will Rogers, the self-constituted unofficial observer for the simple minded, abandoned his post and sailed for home when it became known that he could not distinguish golf knickers from presentation trousers.

The prudence and foresight of our Chief Delegate Secretary Stimson, the inherited and cultivated capacity for diplomacy of Secretary Adams, the notable clear-headed effectiveness of Ambassador Dawes, the diplomatic skill and experience of Ambassadors Morrow and Gibson, the capacity for painstaking labor of Senator Reed-these serve to safeguard against ill-considered agreements and inspire me with confidence that our efforts will not likely contribute to irretrievable or even serious mistakes.

A FLASH LIGHT

If you could behold a flash light of the assembly room in St. James Palace you would catch a glimpse of the delegates seated on three sides of a rectangle: the chairman and other members of the British Delegation in the center, the French and Americans on the chairman's right, the Italians and the Japanese on his left. Interpreters and stenographers occupy space within the rectangle. Advisers, secretaries, press reporters, and messengers fill the room to its capacity. Formal addresses by the chiefs of the five delegations, each speaker briefly dealing with the purpose of the conference from the standpoint

of his country, constituted the proceedings of the first plenary session held, January 21.

Numerous private conferences touching subjects of particular interest-conferences designed to simplify the issues with respect to those matters of peculiar concern to two or more nations, followed in preparation for the second plenary session which authorized a committee to consider methods of limitation-whether the same shall proceed by categories or by total tonnage, or with option for limited transfers.

Interesting and impressive social entertainments have been givenentertainments of a formal character affording opportunities for the formation of acquaintanceships, helpful in the conduct of negotiations touching the vital differences which must be adjusted before an agreement can be made-social functions, banquets, and receptions, held in historical places and participated in by renowned personages; and the enjoyment of which was marred only by our consciousness that the sooner the general felicitations incident to such events were concluded, the earlier we might hope to reach the real task.

THE TASK

The formalities are ended. The problems to be considered are suggested by such words as "Parity", "Limitation", "Cruisers", "Destroyers", "Submarines", "Reduction", "Battle Ship Replacement Program", and "Holiday".

The American Delegation is committed:

(1) To the limitation by treaty among the five powers of the categories not embraced in the Washington treaty of 1922; namely, cruisers, submarines, and destroyers. We would abolish the submarine. Failing in that, our desire is to restrict its number and its use against merchant vessels. Succeeding in arrangements as to cruisers, submarines, and destroyers, we desire also to reduce the battleship replacement contemplated by the Washington Conference treaty.

All limitations and reductions supported by our delegations are conditioned that equality between Great Britain and the United States shall result.

The controversy as to whether limitation shall proceed by categories or by "global tonnage" has been much discussed during the last four years. As ably set forth in the address of Ambassador Gibson to the second plenary conference, the American delegates fear that limitation by "global tonnage" will not prevent, but in some respects will stimulate competition. It is conceivable that under such a process one nation might place so large a proportion of its fleet in a particular kind of fighting ship as to disturb the peace

of mind of its neighbors. To avoid this possibility, we prefer the certainty implied in limitation by categories. It is recognized of course that those who prefer the "global" plan believe it allows more opportunity for naval construction in accordance with their special needs, and they do not advocate it because they desire to create. uncertainty or lack of security.

Negotiations relating to limitation of cruisers, submarines, and destroyers have not proceeded to the point where the prospective results may be reliably defined. No impasse has occurred. No insuperable obstacle has been found. It would be untruthful to say that we are certain of an arrangement which will meet with the President's approval and receive the advice and consent of the Senate.

All important business must be transacted with unanimous consent. We hope in concert with other delegations to find a basis of agreement fair to all. No other arrangement should be entered into because it cannot prove of lasting benefit. "Limitation" and "Reduction" from the American standpoint are connected with "Parity". This complicates the problem and makes satisfactory reductions difficult to secure.

Limitation of navies and their reduction, if properly and fairly arranged, will not only save money, which is important; what is more important it will also increase and strengthen the feeling of security in each nation, without which little progress may be expected. It is that increase in security that gives birth to international confidence, out of which the prospects for a more peaceful world must come. The inherent complications in the relations of five nations raise an infinity of questions compared to which the schedules of a tariff bill are few in number. Previous conferences and diplomatic negotiations have unquestionably prepared the way for probable success. Surely we shall not fail without full consciousness of the significance of our failure. It means a renewal and quickening of naval construction and consequent anxiety among the peoples of the naval powers certain to bring forth insecurity and suspicion.

The London Conference is not a fight, a race, or a sporting event. Prudence and deliberation are far more important than speed. There exists no fixed amount of naval security in this world out of which the various delegations should try to obtain the larger share. If we succeed our success will itself provide an increasing amount of security for all. Abiding peace among the nations must rest on confidence and good will. Future conferences may be relied on to carry forward the reduction of armament if the London Conference is guided by justice and wisdom.