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Speech by the Honorable Joseph T. Robinson, at the Luncheon of the Association of American Correspondents, London, February 19, 1930

In asking me to discuss "What the United States Expects of the London Conference" you have assigned a task which is difficult to perform in the limited time which it is appropriate to speak.

Always one's interpretation of public opinion is likely to be influenced by his personal bias or prejudice. This is a form of vanity unconsciously yet frequently indulged by speakers. In the absence of authentic evidence of the state of the public mind touching any subject, one necessarily avails of those sources of information which he believes reflective of general thought. It is in the choice of these sources that one may yield to the agencies most nearly in harmony with his own position.

There exist in the United States, as in other countries, groups holding decisive but diverse opinions touching matters pertaining to the best methods for the promotion of international peace and good will-groups whose convictions are at variance with what may be accepted as the consensus of opinion among the masses. These groups embrace members somewhat contemptuously designated by those of opposing notions as "pacifists," "internationalists, and "big navy" champions. It does not appear necessary to elaborate this classification or to enter upon an explanation of the distinctions since the terms are suggestive of the general principles which distinguish the groups. Moreover, if it is possible to state what the public in the United States expects this conference to accomplish, such a statement necessarily implies that these various groups taken singly or combined are not true guides to accurate conclusions but are to be regarded as representative of policies not approved by the body of our citizens.

In spite of the notable groups referred to and others whose positions are irreconcilable as to what the conference should do, the great majority of our populations who have given thought to the questions involved have a fairly well-defined and harmonious impression of the range of possible achievements, and disappointment. will be inevitable if the decisions depart very widely from their

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convictions of what is reasonable and practicable. With these thoughts in mind the following seems true:

First. The American people in mass realize that permanent peace is inseparable from confidence in security. They believe that the fair limitation of all classes of armament by treaty will of itself add to and stir up national security and promote good will upon which lasting peace must rest. There is one principle almost universally adhered to; namely, competition in armament is calculated to arouse fear and may lead to war, hence the primary purpose for which the London Conference was convened is heartily supported. We are expected to agree on programs for the limitation of all fighting ships.

Second. They not only believe that the prevention of competition should be extended to all forms of combat vessels but that when just and well-considered limitation has been assured it will prove helpful in arranging for reductions which would be impossible unless. all categories are limited.

Third. Our people anticipate the extension of the arrangement in the Washington treaty for capital ships so as to establish the same relation, substantially, between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, as now exists with regard to capital ships.

"Parity" or equality in naval armament as between Great Britain and the United States is accepted as logical for the avoidance of possible competition between the two powers.

Fourth. They believe that when the limitation of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines is in plain sight, further reductions in battleships below the Washington treaty plan will be logical and desirable. Fifth. Our people realize that war can not be made a pleasant pastime, but they would like to see inventive genius diverted from efforts to produce more deadly weapons through agreements to refrain from the use of such agencies and instruments as neither courage nor skill can effectively resist. They have comprehended the inhuman character of the submarines' attack against merchant ships without regard to safety of crews and passengers; and quite generally condemn bombardments from the air directed against unfortified cities and noncombatants. Americans and other peoples are becoming conscious of the amazing absurdity of exhausting scientific efforts to invent more deadly and destructing weapons of war, while at the same time seeking in every possible way to repair the injuries and mitigate the sufferings of the victims of studied cruelty and inhumanity.

Sixth. American public opinion strongly supports a policy of reducing naval armament and they will be slow to accept any arrangement which does not have this end in view. They will realize, however, that by the limitation now of the categories left unregulated 111757-30- -5

in the Washington treaty and by further reduction of capital ships below the number in that treaty we may point the way to further conferences when it has been demonstrated that security is more likely to be found in reduced rather than in unlimited programs for naval armament.

Seventh. My understanding is that the people of the United States quite generally adhere to the traditional policy of our Government to avoid if possible involvement in European politics. They would repudiate emphatically any treaty expressly or impliedly obligating our Government to employ the Army or the Navy for the enforcement of obligations assumed by other nations. It is for this reason that they do not encourage their delegates to this conference to join. in guaranties of security respecting areas remote from territory or possessions of the United States. Americans realize that no power will deliberately violate its undertaking for the limitation or reduction of armaments. They believe that no sanction is necessary to assure the good-faith performance of any treaty for that purpose. This attitude does not imply indifference or lack of sympathy for the problems of others. It is grounded on the American conception of sound policy and constitutional limitations.

We are at peace with all mankind and confidently expect this condition indefinitely to continue. There exists no secret motive on our part against any people. We intend to keep faith both in letter and spirit with the pledge not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy and to seek the settlement of any dispute that may arise by only peaceful means. We cannot understand the consistency in wars to enforce the peace. We believe that the dignity, independence, and security of nations, certainly of our own, lies along the pathway of cooperation, mutual understanding, and the employment of good offices. These are calculated to preserve peace without undue impairment of sovereignty.

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Radio Address by the Secretary of the Navy, Charles Francis Adams, Delegate to the London Naval Conference, London, March 2, 1930

Mr. Wile has kindly invited me to use the facilities of the Columbia Broadcasting Co. to talk to you about the Naval Conference. It is a pleasure to do it this way for one can sit in comfort and without raising his voice reach about ten thousand times as many people as he can shouting to an audience from a platform.

Since 1922 the United States has not laid down a battleship nor an airplane carrier. Since that date the United States has actually built and put into commission 12 cruisers, and that is all we have that are less than 20 years old. There are 16 others wholly or partly appropriated for and some of these are in process of construction. We have built no destroyers and only one submarine that had not been begun before the Washington treaty. This is probably the smallest amount of building of any first-class navy on record for an eight-year period. Even considering that we had left over from the war an adequate fleet of battleships and destroyers, so small a building program is extraordinary.

We are now coming to-if we are not actually at-the time when the replenishments of ageing vessels is upon us, for ships grow old like other engines and machinery.

The question before us is on what scale are the replacements and building for the future to be. The United States believes in the limitation of naval armaments by agreement between nations. The American Delegation to the Naval Conference is here in London to make an equitable agreement on which to base our naval plans for the immediate future.

We of the Navy do not rate efficiency by size only. We do not believe that the bigger the navy the better necessarily. Our task is to give a justified sense of security to the Nation, therefore a navy adequate for defense is what is required, comprising a fleet of warships, well organized, well equipped, well trained, and of sufficient size to carry on those operations and maneuvers which will develop the personnel and train the fleet to the minute; but we do not wish a fleet larger than is necessary for national security. Also, in a measure the minimum to which the Navy can be reduced depends upon the size of other navies for the matter is somewhat relative, though not entirely so.

Our task here in London is to fix our program in a proper relation to the programs of other nations and to get all the programs fixed as low as is compatible with sense and efficiency.

The Navy asks the American people's support in two thingsapproval of the lowest limit that can be achieved here consistent with the programs of other nations and with our own needs, and secondly, the approval of the necessary expenditure to build the ships that are agreed on.

To those people who believe we are not reducing navies as much as we should, I suggest a study of the programs at Geneva in 1927. To those who feel we are reducing too much, I suggest a cessation of criticism until the ships provided in the agreement we are working for are all built and there is evidence that the limitation agreed on has in any way jeopardized our security. With such evidence, if it appears, we can readjust our situation at the next conference.

If we had no succession of conferences and we were to go on in a competitive building of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, we should undoubtedly have an ever-increasing number of irritating incidents. It is in fact quite possible that our Navy would be built by spasmodic irritation. This means intermittent support of the Navy and for each era of support an era of irritation that lessens our sense of security almost as much as the ships it produces increase it. I hope to see the time come immediately as the result of this conference when the naval appropriations will not be coupled with arguments about the evil possibilities of other navies against us. I do not want to build a navy on suspicion. I want the United States to build upon an agreed-upon program, a program that can be carried out in an orderly manner. The Navy's morale and effectiveness, as well as economy in building and operation, are dependent upon planning ahead just as any business involving construction and maintenance is. There is neither virtue nor prestige in a bigger navy than our security calls for, nor is there a strengthening of peace nor real economy in building the Navy on bursts of competition caused by the building by other nations. A navy built upon a regular program agreed to in relation to other navies and which the other nations know about can be built and maintained without arousing fear or suspicion abroad and more effectiveness in men and ships can be maintained for less money just as an orderly planned method of doing business is more effective in any undertaking.

The interests of peace and the interests of the navy are the same. I do not mean to say that it is not possible for a nation to build so large a navy as to breed the fears that provoke war. It is. Also it is possible to have so feeble a navy as to provoke the indignities that likewise lead to war. There is between these two a point at which a nation's navy breeds serenity at home and no suspicion