19

Radio Address to the United States by the Honorable Joseph T. Robinson, London, April 20, 1930

The conference having concluded its work, except for the formal ceremony of signing the treaty, it seems appropriate to summarize the results. No effort is in mind to speak from a technical viewpoint. The desire is to present in condensed form the principal features of the arrangement entered into with regard to the programs of the three chief naval powers.

Objectives

The prime objectives of our delegation have been:

1. To cooperate with other delegations in terminating naval competition by limiting all classes of warships;

2. To assure equality of naval strength for the United States with Great Britain;

3. To arrange a satisfactory relation between our Navy and that of the Japanese;

4. To bring about reductions in tonnage wherever practicable. Let us consider the degree to which these objectives have been attained.

Partial failure of five-power plan

It is clear that as a five-power enterprise there is not complete success. The importance of this is not to be minimized. Unquestionably it would have been more satisfactory to have a treaty defining the programs of France and Italy as well as those of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. The Italians insisted on parity with the navy of the strongest continental power, even though there is little likelihood that Italy would actually build up to French tonnage during the period of the treaty. The French refused this demand. France is carrying forward a naval construction program materially increasing her tonnage in cruisers, submarine boats, and destroyers. She was not disposed to reduce these tonnages without new guaranties of security.

Failure to incorporate sanctions

The various methods of creating new guaranties of security were amply discussed in the press while the negotiations were in progress. No delegation asked the United States to participate in any security

pact. The American Delegation made it plain that the United States. would not join any consultative pact which could by implication be regarded as giving security. The French said that a mere consultative pact would not take one ton off their navy. The French and British tried to restate their security obligations as a basis for a reduction in French tonnage. This effort had to be linked with a settlement between France and Italy. It was the realization that this double settlement would have to be postponed that led to the conclusion of the conference on the present basis, and the insertion of a contingent clause to which further reference will be made.

We took the position that fair limitation of armament is of itself a wholesome and effective measure of security, tending to promote international good will and pacific measures for adjustment of disputes where treaty relations are threatened or disturbed, consultation is a logical and probably inevitable process; but agreements for consultation, unless carefully safeguarded, entered into in advance, in the opinion of many, tend to the formation of alliances and to the assumption of responsibility for decisions, which might result in involvements which our people desire to avoid.

Efforts to negotiate a five-power arrangement were continued— perhaps they were unduly prolonged-finally resulting in a postponement of conclusions between the European powers and participation by France and Italy in the provisions of the treaty except those relating to the limitation of tonnages the provisions in which all five powers join, while less comprehensive than those entered into by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, include the battleship holiday and the restriction on the use of submarines against merchant ships in time of war, which in themselves are achievements of magnitude and value.

With respect to the above-mentioned restriction on the use of submarines, the five powers accept as rules of international law: (1) that submarines in action with regard to merchant ships must conform to the rules applicable to surface vessels; (2) more definitely stated, save in case of persistent refusal to stop when duly summoned or of active resistance to visit or search, neither surface craft nor submarine may sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant ship, without first safeguarding the passengers, crew, and ship's papers. It is further declared that placing passengers, crew, and ship's papers in the ship's boats is not a compliance with this rule unlesssafety is assured by sea and weather conditions, proximity to land, or the presence of another vessel to take them on board. The acceptance of these rules as international law may not prevent all abuses of the character denounced. Undoubtedly, in time of war belligerents will be tempted to violate them. However great such temptations may prove, parties to future conflicts will be slow to challenge

the resentment of mankind by ruthless destruction of merchant vessels, for such a course would invite results disastrous to the offender.

The limitations agreed to by the three powers are accompanied by a contingent clause which provides that if any one of the three feels its national security jeopardized by new naval construction of any power whose auxiliary fleet has not been limited, it may notify the others what increase it requires. The others may then make proportionate increases. This is in no sense a sanction, neither does it provide for consultation.

Of course it may be said in criticism that this clause permits a disturbance of the figures agreed to on the sole responsibility of either the United States, Great Britain, or Japan; and that if any one of the three adjudges it to be necessary to build in excess of the treaty program, this will increase the building of the other two. But even if this should happen, the relation of the fleets and the principles of limitation would still be maintained. It should also be remembered that the limitation of armaments must proceed only through the voluntary action of nations and that no power can arbitrarily impose on another restrictions of the means of defense without assuming more responsibility for its safety. It is of first importance that the limitation of armaments shall be regarded as increasing rather than diminishing the safety of peoples, and if emergencies, regarded as remote but nevertheless as possible, arise threatening immediate danger, a people should be free to respond to the requirements of their situation. Otherwise the fate of nations must forever be bound up with the maintenance of large armaments and the imminence of war. This clause is based upon the good faith of the three nations and it is inconceivable that it will be used except upon necessity. It leaves the responsibility of determining the requirements for national security where it belongs; namely, on the respective nations. A clause providing for consultation or mutual agreement might imply some measure of obligation of all who enter into it. Failure to bind ourselves to consult or mediate in no way impairs the right of the United States to consult and give advice and even tender good offices should the occasion justify, but we should be left free to act as the friend of both parties to a dispute or at least as impartial in all controversies which do not involve American rights or interest.

Prominent features of three-power agreement

This treaty vitally affects the relations between the Navies of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States in every category of war vessels.

Battleships

The treaty contemplates two important changes to the Washington treaty adjustment regarding capital ships. Under the plan now in force, prior to December 31, 1936, the United States would lay down 10, Great Britain 10, and Japan 6 new capital ships. Under the proposed London treaty no new ship of this class will be laid down.

In addition to the holiday the three powers will commence to scrap in this class prior to December 31, 1931: Great Britain 5, United States 3, Japan 1.

Thus substantial parity between the United States and Great Britain will result following the close of 1931. Postponement of construction of the 10 ships referred to will probably contribute to a final permanent reduction in this category. It will certainly defer the expenditure by the United States of at least $300,000,000 during the life of the treaty. The early scrapping agreed upon likewise will result in avoiding expenditure which otherwise would be required for repair, maintenance, and operation.

Our experts are of the unanimous opinion that these amendments to the battleship program will bring about actual parity between the United States and Great Britain in capital ships.

Eight-inch Cruisers

In the large cruiser class, carrying 8-inch guns, the United States will have 18 ships with a tonnage of 180,000; Great Britain will have 15 ships aggregating in tonnage 148,000; and Japan 12 ships totaling 108,400 tons. The United States desired a considerable number of vessels having a long-cruising radius; while Great Britain found a comparatively large number of the small type better adapted to her purposes. The superiority afforded the United States in these large cruisers constituted recognition to some extent of the difference in type of cruisers required for her purposes as compared with the British needs. Prolonged investigation of the subject led to the conclusion that no scientific basis exists for measuring the difference in value between large 8-inch-gun cruisers and vessels carrying 6-inch guns. To offset the American advantage of 33,200 tons in 8-inch-gun cruisers Great Britain has the right to employ in 6-inch-gun cruisers 48,700 tons more than the United States, making a net difference in the cruiser tonnage of the two powers of 15,500 in favor of Great Britain in cruisers of all classes.

It is not possible to say that this difference corresponds with mathematical accuracy to the superior value of the large cruisers which the United States has the right to possess over those allowed Great Britain.

Within certain ranges 6-inch guns are more effective than 8-inch guns. At great distances, however, the advantage clearly is in the ship carrying guns with the longest range. On the other hand the smaller guns can be fired more rapidly and perhaps more accurately than the heavy 8-inch weapons. There can be no important advantage to either of the two powers because of this difference in 8-inch cruiser tonnage.

Moreover, it may be emphasized that the United States has the option to build exactly Great Britain's program and thereby produce a ton for ton parity between the two countries.

Destroyers

In the destroyer category very material reductions are made. The United States now has a tonnage considerably in excess of 200,000, but many of the ships are old and nothing like the present number is required. Great Britain and the United States will each have 150,000 tons in destroyers. The present Japanese Fleet of 6-inchgun cruisers is 98,415 tons. The treaty gives Japan 100,450 tons. The present Japanese destroyer fleet is 129,375 tons. In these two categories Japan will have 70 per cent of our fleet and 17,000 tons less than the present.

Submarines

Finally, each of the three powers may have 52,700 tons in submarines. In the conference the United States and Great Britain sought to abolish warships of this class, but other powers were unwilling to do so and limitation was resorted to at a relatively low tonnage.

The United States at the time of the conference was inferior in submarine tonnage to both Great Britain and Japan. Our inferiority in this class, as in the crusier category, is attributable to our failure to build following the Washington Conference. From the ratification of the Washington treaty until now the United States has neglected building not only in those classes in which a war surplus remained, but also in cruisers in which our Navy was deficient.

The total tonnage in all classes of auxiliary craft laid down by the United States during the years 1922 to 1930, inclusive, was 138,120. During that time Great Britain laid down 203,725 tons, Japan 242,771 tons, France 249,454 tons, and Italy 163,943 tons. apparent that in those years the United States had a much smaller building program than any of the other four powers.

Our war tonnage is now becoming obsolescent and we are faced with the necessity of rebuilding much of the Navy. The treaty enables us to proceed with the task in an orderly manner and at a lower total tonnage than we have had in the past, in spite of the