fact that we have built less than any other country represented at the conference.

This is the story of the treaty in figures as comprehensively related as found practicable within the proper limits of this address. There are other bases than that here employed for comparison, but it is believed that the one chosen for present purposes gives the clearest showing possible of what has been accomplished and some reasons for the programs incorporated in the treaty.

20

Radio address by the Chairman of the American Delegation, Henry L. Stimson, to the Associated Press Luncheon in New York City, London, April 21, 1930

MR. NOYES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS: When I had the pleasure of meeting the directors of the Associated Press last January at the dinner given by Mr. Ochs, I warned you that the London Conference would be a prosaic performance. I prophesied that what it lacked in drama it would make up in length. I think you will agree with me that my prophecy has been fulfilled. Yet because it has involved tedious and necessarily private negotiation it would be a great error to jump to the conclusion that it does not contain dramatic promise for the future. As a matter of fact, the past fourteen weeks have given me more confidence in my belief that the peaceful methods of diplomacy can eventually take the place of war than anything I have witnessed since the last war drew to a close. This confidence is based on the fact that limitation of arms gives us an affirmative plan for promoting good relations. Merely negative opposition to war is not sufficient. Progress in civilization comes only from the affirmative cultivation of habits of good will.

Nearly two years ago the nations of the world met together at Paris and signed a document containing a good resolution of epochmaking importance. That was the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact in which the nations renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed in future to solve their controversies only by pacific means. That instrument proposed a new era. It laid down a new international policy and it had behind it a general and overwhelming popular support. But such a proposal cannot be made and then left alone to hatch. New eras do not come out of old conditions merely by a new edict or a good resolution. In order to reach a condition when no nation will resort to war as an instrument of national policy there must be established a larger measure of confidence than now exists in the ability of the different nations of the world to maintain their pacifie intentions under all the temptations and circumstances which are sure to confront them. History shows us only too clearly what will happen if we leave the old conditions unchanged. Affirmative constructive steps must be taken to carry out our good resolution and to begin the evolution in mutual confidence and good will upon which the success of our resolution depends.

Otherwise the failure of our good resolutions may produce a condition worse than if they had never been made.

Last spring President Hoover wisely decided that one of the most important of such constructive steps was a move towards naval limitation.

He realized that if the nations mean the Kellogg Pact literally they must not allow conditions to arise that will jeopardize their promise. The first method to that end is an agreement on limitation of armaments. That is a clear and positive test of a national intention to maintain pacific relations under all circumstances. Such an agreement by its very nature precludes the idea of war as an instrument of national policy. For no nation is likely to agree that its neighbors shall have a navy large enough for such a purpose. One of the surest tests, therefore, of the effectiveness of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is the progress which is being made in the limitation of armament. Limitation of armament is a barometer or gauge of the development of confidence between nations which will enable them to deal with each other wholly upon an amicable basis. It is for this reason that my experience in the Naval Conference has given me so much encouragement. This encouragement is not based solely on an appraisal of just how much has been accomplished in the particular treaty which we are signing, but also upon the demonstration which this treaty affords that the process of limitation can be carried further in the future.

The work of the London Conference has really comprised two quite separate naval problems: the problem of the relations between the Navies of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan on the one hand, and the problem of the relations between the Navies of Great Britain, France, and Italy on the other. These are quite distinct problems. The first of these has been solved. This is a great achievement in itself and fruitful of great benefit to the general conditions of the world for the future. But it is a far simpler problem than the other because the naval relations of three countries, separated by such great oceans and wide distances as separate Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, are necessarily less complex than the naval relations of the great powers of Europe. The latter are complicated by many conditions from which the former are entirely free. Furthermore, America's isolated and advantageous position and the national security which this position affords imposes upon us the duty to lead in the limitation of armaments and to refrain from criticizing others less fortunately placed. In the second of these problems-the problem of the relations of the Navies of Great Britain, France, and Italy-valuable discussions have been had and the underlying questions upon which a final solution must rest have been explored and clarified. In much of the discussion,

members of the American Delegation have been privileged to sit as friendly observers, watching the development and clarification of these underlying questions. The discussion has not merely involved a negotiation about the size of navies or the types of ships. It has been a study and debate concerning the political questions which govern the relations of these three nations of Europe to each other. Into these political questions it has not been America's business to enter. But sitting on the sidelines it has been quite evident that the result of the conference has been to clarify issues and make their solution in the future more possible. In this way a long step forward has been made towards ultimate limitation by those nations which have not yet agreed on a complete limitation of their navies. This came not only by clarifying the results of their discussion but by the patience and good temper in which those discussions were carried on. This has been a good augury for the prospects of their final success. They are separating now full of determination to grapple with these problems as they now stand revealed and to finally solve them.

In summary, the message which I should like to make clear to you all to-day is that the success of the London Naval Conference is necessarily related to the success of the Kellogg Pact. The good resolutions of that pact can not stand alone. They must be followed by national effort, prompt, constant, unremitting effort, to make them good, and no line of effort offers a better earnest of its success than the line of naval disarmament. In selecting that line President Hoover laid his finger upon the best method of insuring that our solemn promise of two years ago should be fulfilled. There are but two possible roads to travel. One is the road of competitive armament and this, whether accompanied or unaccompanied by good intentions, will lead to war. The other is the way of limitation with its constant effort to forestall war by creating such confidence and friendliness between nations as will prevent the seeds of war from growing. We have now before us not only a definite objective but a concrete method of going at it. There is something to work on, to get our teeth into. The hard work and constant vigilance which will translate good intentions into practical realities can be accomplished and are being accomplished by naval limitation. This, to me, is the significance and encouragement of the conference we have just been through.

21

Address by the Chairman of the American Delegation, Henry L. Stimson, at the Final Plenary Session of the Conference, London, April 22, 1930

MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to congratulate you on the successful conclusion of this Naval Conference and to take the occasion at the same time to thank you for the sterling qualities of your leadership which have contributed so effectively to that end. I do not propose to elaborate upon this subject, but I cannot refrain from a personal word to tell you how deeply we appreciate the unwearying patience, skill, and tact with which you have led us through these difficult weeks.

We are also very grateful for the considerate hospitality of your government, particularly because it has been clear throughout that it was no perfunctory hospitality but an expression of your genuine and friendly desire to make us feel at home.

We sign this treaty with a realization that it fixes our naval relationship with the British Commonwealth of Nations upon a fair and lasting basis and that is equally advantageous to us all.

It also establishes our naval relationship with our good neighbor across the Pacific and insures the continuous growth of our friendship with that great nation towards whom we have grown to look for stability and progress in the Far East.

We are happy to have participated with France and Italy in the solution of some important general problems and to have had the pleasure and benefit of constant association with their delegations. We are glad to know as we separate that it is their purpose to continue their discussions in the hope of soon completing a five-power agreement of naval restriction.

The fundamental purpose for which we of the American Delegation came to London was to help in the promotion of good relationship between the nations of the earth. It is our belief that the limitation of armament by mutual agreement is one of the most effective methods of increasing the confidence of each nation in the pacific intentions of every other nation. We believe that such limitation increases the ability of every nation to carry out its own pacific intentions. As we believe that limitation of itself increases security, so we look forward in the future to periodically recurring conferences