ting of a book, the building of a house, the laying out of a garden, the digging of a fish-pond,-even the raising of a cucumber or a tulip.

Whilst the mind is taken up with the objects or business before it, we are commonly happy, whatever the object or business be; when the mind is absent, and the thoughts are wandering to something else than what is passing in the place in which we are, we are often miserable.

· III. Happiness depends upon the prudent constitution of the habits.

The art in which the secret of human happiness in a great measure consists is, to set the habits in such a manner, that every change may be a change for the better. The habits thmselve are much the same; for whatever is made habitual becomes smooth, and easy, and indifferent. The return to an old habit is likewise easy, whatever the habit be. Therefore the advantage is with those habits which allow of an indulgence in the deviation from them. The luxurious receive no greater pleasure from their dainties, than the peasant does from his bread and cheese: but the peasant, whenever he goes abroad, finds a feast; whereas the epicure must be well entertained, to escape disgust. Those who spend every day at cards, and those who go every day to plough pass their time much alike; intent upon what they are about, wanting nothing, regretting nothing, they are both in a state of ease; but then, whatever suspends the occupation of the card player, distresses him; whereas to the labourer, every interruption is a refreshment: and this appears in the different effects that Sunday produces upon the two, which proves a day of recreation to the one, but a lamentable burthen to the other. The man who has learned to live alone, feels his spirits enlivened whenever he enters into company, and takes his leave without regret; another, who has long been accustomed to a crowd, or continual succession of company, experiences in company no elevation of spirits, nor any greater satisfaction than what the man of a retired life finds in his chimney-corner. So far their conditions are equal: but let a change of place, fortune, or situation, separate the companion from his circle, his visitors, his club, common room, or coffeehouse, and the difference and advantage in the choice and constitution of the two habits will show itself. Solitude comes to the one clothed with melancholy; to the other, it brings liberty and quiet. You will see the one fretful and restless, at a loss how to dispose of his time, till the hour comes round when he may forget

himself in bed; the other, easy and satisfied, taking up his book or his pipe, as soon as he finds himself alone, ready to admit any little amusement that casts up, or to turn his hands and attention to the first business that presents itself; or content, without either, to sit still, and let his train of thought glide indolently through his brain, without much use perhaps, or pleasure, but without hankering after any thing better, and without irritation. A reader, who has inured himself to books of science and argumentation, if a novel, a well written pamphlet, an article of news, a narrative of a curious voyage, or the journal of a traveller, fall in his way, sits down to the repast with relish, enjoys his entertainment while it lasts, and can return, when it is over, to his graver reading, without distaste. Another, with whom nothing will go down but works of humour and pleasantry, or whose curiosity must be interested by perpetual novelty, will consume a bookseller's window in half a forenoon; during which time he is rather in search of diversion than diverted; and as books to his taste are few, and short, and rapidly read over, the stock is soon exhausted, when he is left without resource from this principal supply of innocent amusement.

So far as circumstances of fortune conduce to happiness, it is not the income which any man possesses, but the increase of income, that affords the pleasure. Two persons, of whom one begins with a hundred, and advances his income to a thousand pounds a-year, and the other sets off with a thousand, and dwindles down to a hundred, may, in the course of their time have the receipt and spending of the same sum of money; yet their satisfaction, so far as fortune is concerned in it, will be very different; the series and sum total of their incomes being the same, it makes a wide difference at which end they begin.

IV. Happiness consists in health.

By health I understand, as well freedom from bodily distempers, as that tranquillity, firmness, and alacrity of mind, which we call good spirits; and which may properly enough be included in our notion of health, as depending commonly upon the same causes and yielding to the same management, as our bodily constitution. Health, in this sense, is the one thing needful: Therefore no pains, expense, or self-denial, or restraint which we submit to for the sake of it, is too much. Whether it require us to relinquish lucrative situations, to abstain from favourite indulgence, to cor trol intemperate passions, or undergo tedious regimens: whate

difficulties it lays us under, a man who pursues his happiness rationally and resolutely, will be content to submit to.

When we are in perfect health and spirits, we feel in ourselvės a happiness independent of any particular outward gratification whatever, and of which we can give no account. This is an enjoyment which the Deity has annexed to life; and probably constitutes, in a great measure, the happiness of infants and brutes, especially of the lower and sedentary orders of animals, as of oysters, periwinkles, and the like: for which I have sometimes been at a loss to find out amusement.

The above acount of human happiness will justify the two following conclusions, which, although found in most books of morality, have seldom been supported by any sufficient reasons:FIRST, That happiness is pretty equally distributed amongst the different orders of civil society.

SECONDLY, That vice has no advantage over virtue, even with respect to this world's happiness.

CHAPTER VII.

VIRTUE.

VIRTUE is "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the "will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."

According to which definition, the "good of mankind" is the subject; the "will of God" the rule; and "everlasting happiness" the motive of human virtue.

Virtue has been divided by some into benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. Benevolence proposes good ends; prudence suggests the best means of attaining them; fortitude enables us to encounter the difficulties, dangers, and discouragements, which stand in our way in the pursuit of these ends; temperance repels and overcomes the passions that obstruct it. Benevolence, for instance, prompts us to undertake the cause of an oppressed orphan; prudence suggests the best means of going about it; fortitude enables us to confront the danger, and bear up against the loss, disgrace, or repulse, that may attend our undertaking; and temperance keeps under the love of money, of ease, or amusement, which might divert us from it.

Virtue is distinguished by others into two branches only,― prudence and benevolence: prudence, attentive to our own interest;

benevolence, to that of our fellow-creatures: both directed to the same end, the increase of happiness in nature; and taking equal concern in the future as in the present.

The four CARDINAL virtues are,-prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.

But the division of Virtue, to which we are now-a-days most accustomed, is into duties,

Towards God; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude &c. Towards other men; (or relative duties;) as justice, charity, fidelity, loyalty, &c.

Towards ourselves; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preservation of life, care of health, &c.

There are more of these distinctions, which it is not worth while to set down.

I shall proceed to state a few observations, which relate to the general regulations of human conduct, unconnected indeed with each other, but very worthy of attention; and which fall as properly under the title of this chapter as of any other.

I. Mankind act more from habit than reflection.

It is few only and great occasions that men deliberate at all; on fewer still, that they institute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for the result of it. We are for the most part determined at once; and by an impulse which is the effect and energy of preestablished habits. And this constitution seems well adapted to the exigences of human life, and to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the current occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is oftentimes little leisure for reflection; and were there more, a man, who has to reason about his duty, when the temptation to transgress it is upon him, is almost sure to reason himself into an error.

If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits, where, it is asked, is the exercise of virtue, the guilt of vice, or any use of moral and religious knowledge? I answer, in the forming and contracting of these habits.

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And from hence results a rule of life of considerable importance, viz. that many things are to be done and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit. We will explain ourselves by an example or two:---A beggar, with the appearance of extreme distress, asks our charity. If we come to argue the matter, whether the distress be real, whether it be not brought upon himself, whether it be of public advantage to admit such applications, whether it be

not to encourage idleness and vagrancy, whether it may not invite impostors to our doors, whether the money can be well spared, or might not be better applied: when these considerations are put together, it may appear very doubtful, whether we ought or ought not to give any thing. But when we reflect, that the misery before our eyes excites our pity, whether we will or not; that it is of the utmost consequence to us to cultivate this tenderness of mind; that it is a quality, cherished by indulgence, and soon stifled by opposition; when this, I say, is considered, a wise man will do that for his own sake, which he would have hesitated to do for the petitioner's; he will give way to his compassion, rather than offer violence to a habit of so much general use.

A man of confirmed good habits will act in the same manner without any consideration at all.

This may serve for one instance; another is the following :— A man has been brought up from his infancy with a dread of lying.

An occasion presents itself, where, at the expense of a little veracity, he may divert his company, set off his own wit with advantage, attract the notice and engage the partiality of all about him. This is not a small temptation. And when he looks at the other side of the question, he sees no mischief that can ensue from this liberty, no slander of any man's reputation, no prejudice likely to arise to any man's interest. Were there nothing further to be considered, it would be difficult to show why a man under such circumstances might not indulge his humour. But when he reflects, that his scruples about lying have hitherto preserved him free from this vice; that occasions like the present will return, where the inducement may be equally strong, but the indulgence much less innocent; that his scruples will wear away by a few transgressions, and leave him subject to one of the meanest and most pernicious of all bad habits,—a habit of lying whenever it will serve his turn. When all this, I say, is considered, a wise man will forego the present, or a much greater pleasure rather than lay the foundation of a character so vicious and contemptible.

From what has been said, may be explained also the nature of habitual virtue. By the definition of Virtue, at the beginning of this chapter, it appears, that the good of mankind is the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive and end of all virtue. Yet, a man shall perform many an act of virtue without having either the good of mankind, the will of God, or everlasting happiness in his thoughts; just as a man may be a very good servant, without being conscious, at every turn, of a regard