must impute to our good fortune, (as all design by this supposition is excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to excite it..

But either of these (and still more both of them) being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness; and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose.

The same argument may be proposed in different terms, thus: Contrivance proves design; and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the designer. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances which we are acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists; but it is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then, is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it: or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a distinction. which well deserves to be attended to. In describing implements of husbandry, you would hardly say of a sickel, that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though from the construction of the instrument, and the manner of using it, this mischief often happens. But if you had occasion to describe instruments of torture or execution, this, you would say, is to extend the sinews; this to dislocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to scorch the soles of the feet. Here, pain and misery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now, nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this is to irritate; this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys; this gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout;" If by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is, that it is useless; no one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or torment. Since then God hath called forth his consummate wisdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been constituted with this design at first, so long as this constitution is upheld by him, we must in reason suppose the same design to con

tinue.

The contemplation of universal nature rather bewilders the

mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the prospect, upon which the eye rests; a single example, perhaps, by which each man finds himself more convinced than by all others put together. I seem, for my own part, to see the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very young chil dren, than in any thing in the world. The pleasures of grown persons may be reckoned partly of their own procuring; especially if there has been any industry, or contrivance, or pursuit, to come at them; or if they are founded, like music, painting, &c. upon any qualification of their own acquiring. But the pleasures of a healthy infant are so manifestly provided for it by another, and the benevolence of the provision is so unquestionable, that every child I see at its sport, affords to my mind a kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God, and of the disposition which directs it.

But the example which strikes each man most strongly, is the true example for him: and hardly two minds hit upon the same; which shows the abundance of such examples about us.

We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once establish-. ed, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, "that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning 66 any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tenden "cy of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness."

CHAPTER VI.

UTILITY.

So then actions are estimated by their tendency to promote happiness.* . Whatever is expedient, is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it.

But to all this, there seems a plain objection, viz. that many ac

*Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his design. Thus, if the question be, Whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong? we inquire into the tendency of such a conduct to the public advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whether a man remarkable for this sort of bounty is to be esteemed virtuous or vicious for that reason? we inquire into his design, Whether his liberality sprung from charity or from ostentation? It is evident that our concern is with actions in the abstract.

tions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions, in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful:-The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune to annoy, corrupt, or oppress all about him. His estate would devolve, by his death, to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to despatch such a one as soon as possible out of the way; as the neighbourhood would exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor. It may be useful to rob a miser, and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happiness, by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen distressed families, than, by continuing locked up in a miser's chest. It may be useful. to get possession of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a seat in Parliament, by bribery or false swearing; as by means of them we may serve the public more effectually than in our own private station. What then shall we say? Must we admit these actions to be right, which would be, to justify assassination, plunder, and perjury; or must we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility?

It is not necessary to do either.

The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right.

To see this point perfectly, it must be observed that the bad consequences of actions are twofold, particular and general. The particular bad consequence of an action, is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad consequence is, the vïolation of some necessary or useful general rule.

Thus, the particular bad consequence of the assassination above described, is the fright and pain which the deceased underwent ; the loss he suffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man as to a good one, or more so; the prejudice and affliction, of which his death was the occasion, to his family, friends, and dependants.

The general bad consequence is the violation of this necessary general rule, that no man be put to death for his crimes, but by public authority.

Although, therefore, such an action have no particular bad consequences, or greater particular good consequences, yet it is not useful, by reason of the general consequence, which is evil, and which is of more importance. And the same of the other two instances, and of a million more, which might be mentioned.

But as this solution supposes, that the moral government of the

world must proceed by general rules, it remains that we show the necessity of this.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES.

You cannot permit one action and forbid another, without showing a difference betwixt them. Therefore, the same sort of actions must be generally permitted, or generally forbidden.Where, therefore, the general permission of them would be pernicious, it becomes necessary to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids them.

Thus, to return once more to the case of the assassin. The assassin knocked the rich villain on the head, because he thought him better out of the way, than in it. If you allow this excuse in the present instance, you must allow it to all who act in the same manner, and from the same motive; that is, you must allow every man to kill any one he meets, whom he thinks noxious or useless; which, in the event, would be to commit every man's life and safety to the spleen, fury, and fanaticism of his neighbour; a disposition of affairs which would presently fill the world with misery and confusion; and ere long put an end to hụman society, if not to the human species.

The necessity of general rules in human goverments is apparent; but whether the same necessity subsists in the Divine economy, in that distribution of rewards and punishments to which a moralist looks forward, may be doubted.

I answer that general rules are necessary to every moral government; and by moral government I mean any dispensation, whose object is to influence the conduct of reasonable creaturės.

For if, of two actions perfectly similar, one be punished, and the other be rewarded or forgiven, which is the consequence of rejecting general rules, the subject of such a dispensation would no longer know, either what to expect or how to act. Rewards and punishments would cease to be such-would become accidents. Like the stroke of a thunderbolt, or the discovery of a mine, like a blank or a benefit ticket in a lottery, they would occasion pain or pleasure when they happened; but, following in no known order, from any particular course of action they could have no previous influence or effect upon the conduct.

An attention to general rules, therefore, is included in the very idea of reward and punishment. Consequently, whatever reason there is to expect future reward and punishment at the hand of God, there is the same reason to believe, that he will proceed in the distribution of it by gcneral rules.

Before we prosecute the consideration of general consequences any further, it may be proper to anticipate a reflection, which will be apt enough to suggest itself in the progress of our argu

ment.

As the general consequence of an action, upon which so much of the guilt of a bad action depends, consists in the example; it should seem, that if the action be done with perfect secrecy, so as to furnish no bad example, that part of the guilt drops off. In the case of suicide, for instance, if a man can so manage matters as to take away his own life, without being known or suspected to have done it, he is not chargeable with any mischief from the example; nor does his punishment seem necessary, in order to save the authority of any general rule.

In the first place, those who reason in this manner do not observe, that they are setting up a general rule, of all others the least to be endured; namely, that secrecy, whenever secrecy is practible, will justify any action.

Were such a rule admitted, for instance, in the case above produced, is there not reason to fear, that people would be disappearing perpetually?

In the next place, I would wish them to be well atisfied about the points proposed in the following queries:

1. Whether the Scriptures do not teach us to expect that at the general judgment of the world, the most secret actions will be brought to light?*

2. For what purpose can this be, but to make them the objects of reward and punishment?

3. Whether, being so brought to light, they will not fall under the operation of those equal and impartial rules, by which God will deal with his creatures?

They will then become examples, whatever they be now; and require the same treatment from the Judge and Governor of the moral world, as if they had been detected from the first.

"In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." Rom. xi. 16.-" Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who will "bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the coun sels of the heart." 1 Cor. iv. 5.