of wages, they also are liable to be punished for a conspiracy. See Hammond's case, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 720 (1).

Formerly various statutes existed for repressing the practice of combination amongst workmen ; but these were repealed by the 5 Geo. 4, c. 95, and other provisions substituted. The latter statute, however, being found ineffectual for the purposes intended, it was repealed by the 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, s. 1, which continues the repeal of the former statutes, and enacts the following provisions with regard to the combination of work

men.

By s. 3, "if any person shall, by violence to the person or property, or by threats or intimidation, or by molesting, or in any way *ob- [*369 ] structing another, force, or endeavor to force, any journeyman, manufacturer, workman, or other person hired, or employed in any manufacture, trade, or business, to depart from his hiring, employment, or work, or to return his work before the same shall be finished; or prevent, or endeavor to prevent, any journeyman, manufacturer, workman, or other person not being hired or employed, from hiring himself to, or from accepting work or employment from any person or persons; or if any person shall use or employ violence to the person or property of another, or threats, or intimidation, or shall molest or in any way obstruct another, for the purpose of forcing or inducing such person to belong to any club or association, or to contribute to any common fund, or to pay any fine. or penalty, or on account of his not belonging to any particular club or association, or not having contributed, or having refused to contribute to any common fund, or to pay any fine or penalty, or on account of his not having complied, or of his refusing to comply, with any rules, orders, resolutions, or regulations, made to obtain an advance or to reduce the rate of wages, or to lessen or alter the hours of working, or to decrease or alter the quantity of work, or to regulate the mode of carrying on any manufacture, trade, or business, or the management thereof; or if any person shall, by violence to the person or property of another, or by threats or intimidation, or by molesting, or in any way obstructing another, force, or endeavor to force, any manufacturer or person carrying on any trade or business, to make any alteration in his mode of regulating, managing, conducting, or carrying on such manufacture, trade, or business, or to limit the number of his apprentices, or the number or description of his journeymen, workmen, or servants; every person so offending, or aiding, abetting, or assisting, therein, being convicted thereof, in manner hereinafter mentioned, shall be imprisoned only, or shall and may be imprisoned and kept to hard labor, for any time not exceeding three calendar months."

The fourth section enacts, "that this act shall not extend to subject any persons to punishment, who shall meet together for the sole purpose of consulting upon and determining the rate of wages or prices, which the persons present at such meeting, or any of them, shall require or demand for his or their work, or the hours or time for which he or they shall work in any manufacture, trade, or business, or who shall enter into any agreement, verbal, or written, among themselves, for the purpose of fixing the

(1) Every association is criminal, whose object it is to raise or depress the price of labor, beyond what it would bring were it left without artificial excitement. Comm. v. Carlisle, 1 Journal of Jurisp. 225. See The Trials of the Journeymen Cordwainers, Philadelphia, 1806New York, 1810-Pittsburg, 1816. Pamphlets.

rate of wages or prices which the parties entering into such agreement, or any of them, shall require or demand for his or their work, or the hours of time for which he or they will work, in any manufacture, trade, or business; and that persons so meeting for the purposes aforesaid, or entering into such agreement as aforesaid, shall not be liable to any prosecution, &c."

The fifth section provides and enacts, "that this act shall not extend to subject any persons to punishment, who shall meet together for the sole purpose of consulting upon and determining the rate of wages or prices [*370] which the persons present at such meeting, or any of them, shall pay to his or their journeymen, workmen, or servants, for their work, or the hours of the time of working in any manufacture, trade, or business; or who shall enter into any agreement, verbal or written, among themselves, for the purpose of fixing the rate of wages or prices, which the parties entering into such agreement, or any of them, shall pay to his or their journeymen, workmen, or servants, for their work, or the hours or time of working, in any manufacture, trade, or business; and that persons so meeting for the purposes aforesaid, or entering into any such agreement as aforesaid, shall not be liable to any prosecution," &c.

The statute also provides, that offenders shall be obliged to give evidence, and shall be indemnified.

Proof of nature of conspiracy-to extort money from individuals.] A conspiracy to extort money from an individual is punishable, as conspiring to charge him with being the father of a bastard child. Kimberty's case, 1 Lev. 62, vide ante, p. 343. And it is an indictable offence, even without an intent to extort money, for at all events it is a conspiracy to charge a man with fornication. Best's case, 2 Lord Raym. 1167. See also Hollingberry's case, 4 B. and C. 329 (a), ante, p. 365.

Proof of nature of conspiracy-to defraud individuals.] Frauds practised by swindlers upon individuals, may sometimes be indictable as conspiracies. 2 Russell, 561. As where three persons conspired, that one should write his acceptance on a pretended bill of exchange, in order that the second might, by means of his acceptance, and of the indorsement of the third, negotiate it as a good bill, and thereby procure goods from the prosecutor. Hevey's case, 2 East, P. C. 858. (n.) So an indictment may be maintained for a conspiracy by the defendants, to cause themselves to be believed persons of considerable property, for the purpose of defrauding a tradesman. Robert's case, 1 Campb. 399. If a man and a woman marry, the man in the name of another, for the purpose of raising a spurious title to the estate of the person whose name is assumed, it is indictable as a conspiracy, and in such case it was held not to be necessary to show an immediate injury, but that it was for the jury to say, whether the parties did not intend a future injury. Robinson's case, 1 Leach, 37, 2 East, P. C. 1010. The following case has generally been regarded as that of a conspiracy to defraud an individual. The indictment charged, that the defendants, M. and F., falsely intending to defraud T. C. of divers goods, together deceitfully bargained with him to barter, sell, and exchange a certain quantity of pretended wine as good and true new

(a) Eng. Com. Law Rep. x. 346.

Portugal wine of him the said F., for a certain quantity of hats of him, the said T. C., and upon such bartering, &c. the said F., &c., pretended to be a merchant of London, and to trade as such in Portugal wines, when, in fact, he was no such merchant, nor traded as such in wines, and the said M., on such bartering, &c. pretended to be a broker of London, when, in fact, he was not; and that T. C. giving credit to the [*371] said fictitious assumption, personating, and deceits, did barter, sell, and exchange to F., and did deliver to M., as the broker between T. C. and F. a certain quantity of hats, of such a value, for so many hogsheads of the pretended new Portugal wine, and that M. and F. on such bartering, &c. affirmed, that it was true new Lisbon wine of Portugal, and was the wine of F., when, in fact, it was not Portugal wine, nor was it drinkable or wholesome, nor did it belong to F.; to the great deceit and damage of the said T. C. and against the peace, &c. The indictment, which was for a cheat at common law, did not charge that the defendants conspired eo nomine, yet charged that they together, &c. did the acts imputed to them, which might be considered to be tantamount; but it was regarded as a case of doubt and difficulty. It does not clearly appear from the reports how the case was decided, but on referring to the roll, it was found that judgment had been entered for the crown. The true ground of that judgment is thought by Mr. East, to be given by Mr. Justice Dennison in Wheatley's case, (MS. Dunning, vide 2 Burr. 1129; 6 Mod. 302,) viz. that it was a conspiracy. Macarty's case, 2 Lord Raym. 1179; 3 Id. 487; 2 East, P. C. 823; 2 Russell, 562.

Proof of nature of conspiracy-to injure individuals in their trade or profession.] A combination to injure any particular individual in his trade or profession, is indictable as a conspiracy, as in Eccle's case, 1 Leach, 274, already cited, ante, p. 367, and in Lee's case, 2 M'Nally on Ev. 634; post, p. 374.

Proof of nature of conspiracy-to commit a civil trespass, &c.] A conspiracy to commit an act, which amounts merely to a civil trespass, has been held not to be indictable, as where several persons combined to go into a preserve to snare hares, though it was alleged that they went in the night time, and that they were armed with offensive weapons, for the purpose of opposing resistance to any endeavors to apprehend them. Turner's case, 13 East, 228. See Deacon on the Game Laws, 175.

In the following case, the acts charged as a conspiracy were ruled to amount merely to a breach of contract. The defendants were indicted for conspiring to defraud Gen. Maclean, by selling him an unsound horse. The defendant Pywell advertised the sale, undertaking to warrant. Budgery, another defendant, stated to Gen. Maclean, that he had lived with the owner of the horse, and knew him to be perfectly sound. Gen. Maclean purchased the horse with a warranty, and soon after found that the animal was nearly worthless. The prosecutor was proceeding to give evidence of the steps taken to return the horse, when Lord Ellenborough intimated, that the case did not assume the shape of a conspiracy and that the evidence did not warrant any proceeding beyond an action on the warranty for the breach of a civil contract. He said, that if

this were to be considered an indictable offence, then instead of all the actions which had been brought on warranties, the defendants *ought to have been indicted as cheats; and that no indictment in a case like this could be maintained without evidence of concert between the parties, to effectuate a fraud. Pywell's case, 1 Stark. N. P. C. 402 (a). It is not to be concluded from this case, that an indictment for a conspiracy may not be sustained against parties who combine together to defraud another, by selling as a sound horse one that is unsound; but merely that under the circumstances above stated, there was no evidence of a conspiracy.

An indictment cannot be supported for a conspiracy to deprive a man of the office of secretary to an illegal unincorporated trading company, with transferable shares. Lord Ellenborough said, that as the society was illegal, to deprive an individual of an office in it, could not be considered a crime. Stratton's case, I Campb. 549 (n.)

Proof of nature of conspiracy-legal associations.] Associations to prosecute felons, and even to put the laws in force against political offenders, are lawful. Murray's case, coram Abbott, C. J., Matthews' Dig. C. L. 90.

Proof of the existence of a conspiracy in general.] It is a question of some difficulty, how far it is competent for the prosecutor to show, in the first instance, the existence of a conspiracy, amongst other persons than the defendants, without showing, at the same time, the knowledge or concurrence of the defendants, but leaving that part of the case to be subsequently proved. The rule laid down by Mr. East is as follows:-"The conspiracy or agreement amongst several, to act in concert for a particular end, must be established by proof, before any evidence can be given of the acts of any person not in the presence of the prisoner; and this must, generally speaking, be done by evidence of the party's own act, and cannot be collected from the acts of the others, independent of his own, as by express evidence of the fact of a previous conspiracy together, or of a concurrent knowledge and approbation of each other's acts." 1 East, P. C. 96. But it is observed by Mr. Starkie, that in some peculiar instances in which it would be difficult to establish the defendant's privity, without first proving the existence of a conspiracy, a deviation has been made from the general rule, and evidence of the acts and conduct of others has been admitted to prove the existence of a conspiracy previous to the proof of the defendant's privity. 2 Stark. Ev. 234, 2d ed. So it seems to have been considered by Mr. Justice Buller, that evidence might be, in the first instance, given of a conspiracy, without proof of the defendant's participation in it. "In indictments of this kind," he says, "there are two things to be considered; first, whether any conspiracy exists, and next, what share the prisoner took in the conspiracy." He afterwards proceeds, "Before the evidence (of the conspiracy) can affect the prisoner materially, it is necessary to make out another point, viz. that he consented to the extent that the others did." Hardy's case, Gurney's ed. vol. i. p. 360, 369; 2 Stark, Ev. 234, 2d ed. So in the course of the same trial, *373] it was said by Eyre, C. J., *that in the case of a conspiracy,

(a) Eng. Com L. Rep. ii. 444.

general evidence of the thing conspired is received, and then the party before the Court is to be affected for his share of it. Id. Upon a prosecution for a conspiracy to raise the rate of wages, proof was given of an association of persons for that purpose, of meetings, of rules being printed, and of mutual subscriptions, &c. It was objected that evidence could not be given of these facts without first bringing them home to the defendants, and making them parties to the combination; but Lord Kenyon permitted a person who was a member of the society to prove the printed regulations and rules, and that he and others acted under them, in execution of the conspiracy charged upon the defendants, as evidence introductory to the proof that they were members of this society, and equally concerned, but added, that it would not be evidence to affect the defendants until they were made parties to the same conspiracy. Hammond's case, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 720. So in many important cases evidence has been given of a general conspiracy, before any proof of the particular part which the accused parties have taken, 2 Russell, 572, citing Lord Stafford's case, 7 St. Tr. 1218; Lord W. Russell's case, 9 St. Tr. 578; Lord Lovat's case, 18 St. Tr. 530; Hardy's case, 24 St. Tr. 199; Horne Took's case. 25 St. Tr. 1. The point may be considered as settled ultimately in The Queen's case, 2 Brod. and Bing. 310 (a); where the following rules were laid down by the judges, "We are of opinion, that on the prosecution of a crime to be proved by conspiracy, general evidence of an existing conspiracy may, in the first instance, be received as a preliminary step to that more particular evidence, by which it is to be shown, that the individual defendants were guilty participators in such conspiracy. This is often necessary to render the particular evidence intelligible, and to show the true meaning and character of the acts of the individual defendants, and on that account, we presume it is permitted. But it is to be observed, that, in such cases, the general nature of the whole evidence intended to be adduced is previously opened to the Court, whereby the judge is enabled to form an opinion as to the probability of affecting the individual defendants by particular proof applicable to them, and connecting them with the general evidence of the alleged conspiracy; and if upon such opening, it should appear manifest, that no particular proof sufficient to affect the defendants is intended to be adduced, it would become the duty of the judge to stop the case in limine, and not to allow the general evidence to be received, which, even if attended with no other bad effect, such as exciting an unreasonable prejudice, would certainly be an useless waste of time."

The rule, says Mr. Starkie, that one man is not to be affected by the acts and declarations of a stranger, rests on the principles of the purest justice; and although the Courts, in cases of conspiracy, have, out of convenience, and on account of the difficulty in otherwise proving the guilt of the parties, admitted the acts and declarations of strangers to be given in evidence, in order to establish the fact of a conspiracy, it is to be remembered that this is an inversion of the usual order, for the [*374] sake of convenience, and that such evidence is, in the result, material so far only as the assent of the accused to what has been done by others is proved. 2 Stark. Ev. 235, 2d ed.

Upon an indictment for à conspiracy the evidence is either direct, of a

(a) Eng. Com. L. Rep. vi. 128.