that the representation was not a false pretence within the statute, being a mere mis-statement, or at the worst a naked lie, and Codrington's case, ante, p. 422, was cited; and, secondly, that the act did not extend to cases where the prosecutor had only lent, not parted with the property of the goods or money. Patteson, J. said, "The words of this act are very general, and I do not think I can withdraw the case from the jury. If they are satisfied that the prisoner fraudulently obtained the 300l. from the prosecutor by a deliberate falsehood, averring that he had all the funds required to take up the bill, except 300l., when in fact he knew that he had not, and meaning all the time to apply the 300l. to his own purposes, and not to take up the bill, it appears to me that the jury ought to convict the prisoner. In Rex v. Codrington, it does not appear that the prisoner did distinctly allege that he had a good title to the estate which he was selling. Then as to the money being advanced by the prosecutor only as a loan; the terms of the act of parliament embrace every mode of obtaining money by false pretences, by loan as well as by transfer." The jury acquitted the prisoner. Crossley's case, 2 Moody and Rob. 17. 2 Lew. C. C. 164. S. C.

What shall amount to-not necessary that words should be used.] The statute 33 Henry 8, c. 1, (now repealed) related to false pretences, by means of a false seal or token, and under the general words "false pretence," in the statute 30 Geo. 3, c. 24, it was held that the offence might be effected by other means than by words. The prisoner was indicted for unlawfully producing to A. B. &c., at the Nottingham post-office, a money order for the payment of one pound to one John Storer, and that he unlawfully pretended to the said A. B. that he was the person named in such order, with intent, &c., whereas, &c. It appeared in evidence, that the prisoner had gone to the post-office, and inquired for letters for John Story, whereupon by mistake, a letter for John Storer, containing the money order, was delivered to him. He remained a sufficient *time to read the [*424] letter, and then presented the order to A. B., who desired him to write his name upon it, which he did in his real name, John Story, and received the money. The terms of the letter clearly explained, that the order could not have been intended for the prisoner, who on being apprehended, denied that he had ever received the money, but afterwards assigned the want of cash as the reason of his conduct; Chambre, J., left it to the jury to find against the prisoner, if they were satisfied that he had, by his conduct, fraudulently assumed a character which did not belong to him, although he made no false assertions. The jury found him guilty. The judges held the conviction right, being of opinion, 1st, that the prisoner writing his own name on the order, did not amount to a forgery; and 2dly, that by presenting the order for payment, and signing it at the postoffice, he was guilty of obtaining money by a false pretence within the statute. Story's case, Russ. and Ry. 81 (a). See Freeth's case, Id. 127 (b), S. P. stated infra. So where a person at Oxford, who was not a member of the University, went for the purpose of fraud, wearing a commoner's gown and cap, and obtained goods; this was held a sufficient false pretence to satisfy the statute, though nothing passed in words. Barnard's case, 7 C. & P. 784 (c).

(a) 1 Eng. C. C. 81. (b) 1 Ibid. 127. (c) Eng. Com.L. Rep. xxxii. 736.

What shall amount to-goods obtained upon an instrument void in law.] Although the instrument by means of which the prisoner carries his intent to defraud into effect, may be on the face of it illegal, and of no value, yet if the prisoner fraudulently obtains the goods, &c., he may be convicted. The prisoner was indicted in one count, upon the statute 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, and in another, as for an offence at common law. It appeared in evidence, that the prisoner came to the prosecutor's shop, and asked for a loaf, which he served to him for five pence, that the prisoner then asked him for some tobacco, and the prosecutor served him with an ounce for three pence. The prisoner then threw down a note for ten shillings and sixpence, upon which the prosecutor said, he had no change, but in copper. The prisoner said copper would do. The prosecutor then gave him nine shillings and ten pence in copper, which the prisoner took with the loaf and tobacco, and went away. The note was forged. The same evening, and the following morning, the prisoner put off several similar forged notes. The notes purported to be made by Sparrow, who was a person of good credit, and whose notes under 20s. were generally circulated in the neighborhood. It was contended for the prisoner, that this was not within the statute, which was confined to cases of false suggestions, but it appeared to the learned judge, that the uttering the note as a genuine note was tantamount to a representation, that it was so. It was also objected that a note of this sort being void, and prohibited by law, it was no offence to forge such a note, or to obtain money upon it when forged, as the party taking it ought to be upon his guard. The learned judge, however, left the case to the jury, who found the prisoner guilty on [*425] both counts, and the case was reserved *for the opinion of the judges. All being present (except Rooke, J.,) the majority of them thought that the conviction was right, and that it was a false pretence, notwithstanding the note, upon the face of it, would have been good for nothing in point of law, if it had not been false. Lawrence, J., was of a different opinion, and thought that the shopkeeper was not cheated if he parted with his goods for a piece of paper, which he must be presumed in law to know was worth nothing, if true. Freeth's case, Russ. and Ry. 127 (a).

Proof of the false pretences.] The pretences, which must be distinctly set out in the indictment, 2 Russ. 309, must be proved as laid. Where, in the averment of the pretence, it was stated, "that the defendant pretended that he had paid a certain sum into the Bank of England," and the witness stated, that the words used were, "the money has been paid at the bank," Lord Ellenborough said, "In an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences, the pretences must be distinctly set out, and at the trial they must be proved as laid. An assertion, that money had been paid into the bank, is very different from an assertion, that it had been paid into the bank by a particular individual. The defendant must be acquitted." Plestow's case, 1 Campb. 494. But where the indictment charged, that the defendant having in his custody a certain parcel to be delivered, &c. for which he was to charge 6s., delivered a ticket for the sum of 9s. 10d. by means, &c., and it appeared in evidence that the parcel mentioned in the indictment was a basket of fish, it was objected that this was a variance, but Lord Ellenborough overruled the

(a) 1 Eng. C. C. 127.

objection, saying, that a basket answered the general description of a parcel well enough, but that if the indictment had been on the 39 Geo. 3, c. 58, (which enacts, that if any porter, or other person employed in the porterage, or delivery of boxes, baskets, packages, parcels, trusses, game or other things, shall take any greater sum, &c.) it would have been a fatal variance. Douglas's case, 1 Campb. 212.

The rule that the false pretences averred in the indictment must be proved as laid, is subject to the qualifications that all the pretences need not be proved, but that a single false pretence, proved as laid, though joined with others, is sufficient to support the indictment (1). The defendant was indicted under the 30 Geo. 2, for obtaining money under pretence of assisting two seamen to procure a pension, and it was alleged that he pretended that "two guineas must be sent up to the under clerks as fees, which they always expected, and that nothing could be done without it." The part of the pretences printed in italics was not proved, and it was objected that this was a fatal variance, but the defendant being convicted, the judges held the conviction right. Hill's case, Russ. and Ry. 190 (a). See also Perrott's case, 2 M. and S. 379.

But it must appear that the prosecutor parted with his property, by reason of the false pretences, or one of the false pretences charged. The prisoner was indicted for obtaining a filly, by the *false pretence [ *426 ] that he was a gentleman's servant, and had lived at Brecon, and had bought twenty horses in Brecon fair. It appeared that the prisoner bought the filly of the prosecutor, and made him this statement, which was false, and also told him that he would come down to the Cross Keys and pay him. The prosecutor stated that he parted with his filly because he believed that the prisoner would come to the Cross Keys and pay him, and not because he believed that the prisoner was a gentleman's servant, &c. It was held by Coleridge, J. that the prisoner must be acquitted. Dale's case, 7 C. and P. 351 (b).

Where the false pretences are contained in a letter, and such letter has been lost, the prisoner, after proof of the loss, may be convicted on parol evidence of its contents. Chadwick's case, 6 C. and P. 181 (c).

Proof of the falsity of the pretence.] The falsity of the pretence must clearly appear on the prosecutor's evidence, and must not be left to inference. The prisoner bought from the prosecutor at Rugeley fair a horse for £12, and tendered him in payment notes to that amount on the Oundle bank. On the prosecutor objecting to receive these notes, the prisoner assured him they were good notes, and upon this assurance the prosecutor parted with the horse. The prisoner was indicted for obtaining the horse by false pretences, viz. by delivering to the prosecutor certain papers purporting to be promissory notes, well knowing them to be of no value, &c. It appeared in evidence, that these notes had never been presented by the prosecutor at Oundle, or at Sir J. Esdaile's in London, where they were made payable. A witness stated, that he recollected Rickett's bank at Oundle stopping payment seven years before, but added,

(1) People v. Haynes, 11 Wend. 557. The pretences proved false need not be the only inducement to the credit or delivery: it is enough if without them, the credit would not have been given, or the delivery made. Ibid.

(a) 1 Eng. C. C. 190. (6) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xxxii. 539. (c) Id. xxv. 344.

that he knew nothing but what he saw in the papers, or heard from the people who had bills there. The notes appeared to have been exhibited under a commission of bankrupt against the Oundle bank. The words importing the memorandum of exhibit had been attempted to be obliterated, but the names of the commissioners remained on each of them. The jury found the prisoner guilty, and said, they were of opinion, that when the prisoner obtained the horse, he well knew that the notes were of no value, and that it was his intention to cheat the prosecutor. On a case reserved, the judges held the conviction wrong, and that the evidence was defective in not sufficiently proving that the notes were bad. No opinion was given, whether this would have been an indictable fraud, if the evidence had been sufficient. Flint's case, Russ. and Ry. 460 (a). The defendants were indicted for obtaining money under the false pretence of their being collectors of the property tax. It appeared in evidence, that they had in fact been appointed collectors by the commissioners, but that their appointment was informal. This was held not to be a false pretence within the statute, 30 Geo. 2, c. 24; Dobson's case, 7 East, 218. The defendant was indicted for obtaining money by falsely pretending that a note purporting to be the promissory note of Coleman, Smith, and [*427] Morris, *was a good and available note of C. S. and M., whereas it was not a good and available note. The defendant gave the note to the prosecutor in payment for meat. A witness proved that he had told the defendant that the Leominster Bank (from which the note issued) had stopped payment. It was also proved that the bank was shut up, and that Coleman and Morris had become bankrupts; but it appeared that Smith, the third partner, had not become bankrupt. Gaselee, J., said, that upon this evidence, the prisoner must be acquitted, because, as it appeared, that the note might ultimately be paid, it could not be said that the defendant was guilty of a fraud in passing it away. Spencer's case, 3 C. and P. 420 (b).

Proof of intent to cheat or defraud.] It must appear that the defendant obtained the money, &c., with intent to cheat or defraud some person of the same. Thus, where in an indictment for obtaining money under false pretences, the allegation of the obtaining the money did not state that it was with intent, &c., the judges, on the point being reserved for their consideration, were of opinion that the indictment was bad. Rushworth's case, Russ. and Ry. 317 (c); 1 Stark. 396 (d).

The primary intent must be to cheat or defraud. Thus, where the prisoner was indicted for having procured from the overseer of a parish, from which he received parochial relief, a pair of shoes, by falsely pretending that he could not go to work because he had no shoes, when he had really a sufficient pair of shoes; and it appeared in evidence, that on the overseer bidding him to go to work, he said he could not, because he had no shoes, upon which the overseer supplied him with a pair of shoes, whereas the prisoner had a pair before; the prisoner being convicted, the case was considered by the judges, who held that it was not within the act, (30 Geo. 3, c. 24,) the statement made by the prisoner being rather a false excuse for not working, than a false pretence to obtain goods. Wakeling's case, Russ. and Ry. 504 (e).

(a) 1 Eng. C. C. 460. (b) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xiv. 376. (c) 1 Eng. C. C. 317. (d) Eng. Com. L. Rep. ii. 442. (e) 1 Eng. C. C. 504.

A. owed B. a debt, of which B. could not obtain payment. C., a servant of B., went to A.'s wife, and got two sacks of malt from her, saying that B. had bought them of A., which he knew to be false, and took the malt to his master, in order to enable him to pay himself; it was held by Coleridge, J., that if C. did not intend to defraud A., but only to put it in his master's power to compel A. to pay him a just debt, he could not be convicted of obtaining the malt by false pretences. Williams' case, 7 C. and P. 354 (a).

Proof of the obtaining some challel, money, or valuable security.] Ju order to render it an offence within the statute, the property obtained Inust come within the description of "chattel, money, or valuable security." An unstamped order for the payment of money, which ought to be stamped under 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, is not a valuable security within the statute. Yates' case, 1 Moody, C. C. 170 (b).

Obtaining credit with a banker by false pretences, and thus procuring him to pay drafts to third persons, is not an obtaining money, chat- [*428] tel, or valuable security within the 7 and 8 Geo. 4, c. 29. The defendant was indicted for obtaining money under false pretences. The first count stated the false pretences by which the defendant procured the prosecutors to cash a check in favor of one Jacob, and concluded thus, "and obtained from them the amount of the check to be paid to the said Jacob, and further advances to him to answer other checks drawn by him on the prosecutors, viz. &c., with intent," &c. In the second count it was alleged, that the defendant by means, &c., obtained a large sum of money, to wit, &c., from the prosecutors, and also the check mentioned to be paid to the said Jacob, with intent, &c. It appeared in evidence, that in order to induce the prosecutors, who were the defendant's bankers, to give him credit, and honor his checks, he delivered to them a bill drawn by him upon a person with whom he had no account, and which had no chance of being paid. The prosecutors paid the amount of the check to Jacob. The defendant was convicted, and on a case reserved for the opinion of the judges, they were of opinion that the prisoner could not be said to have obtained any specific sum on the bill; all that was obtained was credit on account, and they therefore held the conviction wrong. Wavell's case, 1 Moody, C. C. 224 (c).

Obtaining money by way of loan, by means of false pretences, is within the statute. See Crossley's case, ante, p. 423.

It is sufficient for the prosecutor to prove that some part of the goods, &c., stated in the indictment, (for the rule in this respect is the same as in larceny, see that title,) were obtained from him by the false pretences used.

Proof of the ownership of the property.] The property obtained by means of the false pretences, must be proved to be the property of the party mentioned in the indictment. The prisoner was indicted for obtaining the sum of 3s. 4d. of the monies of the Countess of Ilchester. It appeared in evidence, that the prisoner brought a basket of fish, which he delivered to the servant of the countess, with a false ticket, charging 3s. 4d. too much for the carriage. The servant paid him the full amount,

(a) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xxxii. 540. (b) 2 Eng. C. C. 170. (c) 2 Id. 224.