is the subject, at the time, of another indictment, it is admissible in evidence, has been doubted; though upon principle there appears to be no objection to the reception of such evidence. In one case where such evidence was tendered, Vaughan, B., refused to receive it; Smith's case, 2 C. and P. 633 (a); but in another case where the objection was taken, Littledale, J., without hesitation overruled it, and the prisoner was convicted. Kirkwood's case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 103. Where the prisoner was indicted for uttering forged notes of the Edinburgh Bank, and it was proposed to give in evidence the uttering by the prisoner of certain forged notes of the Paisley Bank (which formed the subject of a separate prosecution), to show guilty knowledge, Hullock, B., said, that he had great doubts as to the admissibility of the evidence, observing, that if the prisoner had been indicted for uttering the Edinburgh notes only, there would have been no doubt. His own opinion was in favor of receiving the evidence, but many of the judges had great doubts about it. Hodgson's case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 103. And see Salisbury's case, Fursey's case, and Long's case, ante, p. 76, which seem to establish that such evidence is admissible.

The possession also of other forged notes by the prisoner is evidence of his guilty knowledge. The prisoner was indicted for uttering a bill of exchange upon Sir James Esdaile and Co., knowing it to be forged. It was proved, that when he was apprehended, there were found in his pocket-book three other forged bills, drawn upon the same parties; on a case reserved, the judges were all of opinion that these forged bills found upon the prisoner at his apprehension were evidence of his guilty knowledge. Hough's case, Russ. and Ry. 121 (b). In order however to render such evidence admissible, it must be proved that the other notes were forged, and they ought to be produced (1). Millard's case, Russ. and Ry. 245 (c), ante, p. 84; Cooke's case, 8 C. and P. 586 (d). In Phillip's case, supra, where the other note had been destroyed, Bayley, J., doubted whether any facts relating to it were admissible, but received the evidence. It would seem that presumptive evidence of forgery, as that the prisoner destroyed the note, ought to be received. Phill. Ev. 494, 8th ed.

On the trial of indictments for uttering or putting off counterfeit coin, knowing it to be counterfeit, it is the practice, as in cases of forgery, to receive proof of more than one uttering, committed by the party about the same time, though only one uttering be charged in the indictment. 1 Russ. 85; 2 Russ. 697. In Whiley's case, (see ante, p. 83,) it was stated by the counsel for the prisoner, in argument, that upon an indictment for uttering bad money, the *proof is always exclusively [*86] confined to the particular uttering charged in the indictment. Upon this Thompson, B., observed, "As to the case put by the prisoner's counsel of uttering bad money, I by no means agree in their conclusion, that the prosecutor cannot give evidence of another uttering on the same day, to prove the guilty knowledge. Such other uttering cannot be punished, until it has become the subject of a distinct and separate charge; but it affords strong evidence of the knowledge of the prisoner that the money was bad. If a man utter bad shilling, and fifty other bad shillings are found upon him, this would bring him within the description of a common

(I) The State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey, 37.

(a) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xii. 295 (b) 1 Eng. C. C. 121. (c) 1 lbid. 245. (d) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xxxiv. 538.

utterer; but if the indictment do not contain that charge, yet these circumstances may be given in evidence on any other charge of uttering, to show that he uttered the money with a knowledge of its being bad." 2 Leach, 986.

Also proof of the prisoner's conduct in such other utterings (as for example that he passed by different names) is for the same reason clearly admissible. See Tattershall's case, ante, p. 83; Phillip's case, ante, p. 85. Such evidence far from being foreign to the point in issue is extremely material, for the head of the offence charged upon the prisoner is, that he did the act with knowledge, and it would seldom be possible to ascertain under what circumstances the uttering took place (whether from ignorance or with an intention to commit fraud) without inquiring into the demeanor of the prisoner in the course of other transactions. Phill. Ev.

495, 8th ed.

It was held by Bayley, J., that evidence could not be given, of what the prisoner said at a time collateral to a former uttering, in order to show that what he said at the time of such former uttering was false. Phillip's case, ante, p. 85.

With regard to the guilty knowledge of a receiver of stolen goods, it is laid down, that buying the goods at a lower value than they are worth, is presumptive evidence that the buyer knew they were stolen. 1 Hale, P. C. 216; 2 East, P. C. 765. Where upon an indictment for receiving, it appeared that the articles had been stolen, and had come into the possession of the prisoner at several distinct times; the judge, after compelling the prosecutor to elect upon which act of receiving he would proceed, told the jury that they might take into their consideration the circumstance of the prisoner having the various articles of stolen property in her possession, and pledging, or otherwise disposing of them at various times, as an ingredient in coming to a determination, whether when she received the articles, for which the prosecutor elected to proceed, she knew them to have been stolen. Dunn's case, 1 Moo. C. C. 150 (a).

Evidence of facts subsequent to the offence charged-how far admissible to prove guilty knowledge.]. It may be thought that collateral evidence of facts, occurring soon after the offence with which a prisoner is charged, may sometimes afford as reasonable a presumption of guilty knowledge as when the facts occurred at some time before the offence; Phill. Ev. 495, 8th ed.; but it would seem from the cases that where evidence is given [*87 of collateral circumstances to *show the prisoner's guilty knowledge, it must, in general, appear that those circumstances occurred previously to the commission of the offence with which he is charged. Thus, on an indictment for forging a bank note, a letter purporting to come from the prisoner's brother, and left by the postman, pursuant to the direction, at the prisoner's lodgings, after he was apprehended, and during his confinement, but never actually in his custody, cannot be read in evidence against him. Huet's case, 2 Leach, 820. So on an indictment for uttering a forged bank note, to show the guilty knowledge, the prosecutors offered to prove the uttering of another forged note five weeks after the uttering, which was the subject of the indictment; but the court (Ellenborough, C. J., Thompson, C. B., and Lawrence, J.,) held that the evidence was

(a) Eng. C. C. 150.

not admissible, unless the latter uttering was in some way connected with the principal case, or unless it could be shown that the notes were of the same manufacture. Taverner's case, Carr. Sup. 195, 1st ed. 4 C. and P. 413 (a), (n.) S. C. Where on an indictment for uttering a bill with a forged acceptance, knowing it to be forged, it being proposed, for the purpose of proving the guilty knowledge, to give in evidence other forged bills of exchange precisely similar, with the same drawers' and acceptors' names, uttered by the prisoner, about a month after the uttering of the bill mentioned in the indictment, Mr. Justice Gaselee, after consulting Alexander, C. B., was disposed to allow the evidence to be received; but said that he would reserve the point for the opinion of the judges; upon which the counsel for the prosecution declined to press the evidence. Smith's case, 4 C. and P. 411 (b).

Cases where evidence of other transactions is admissible when referable to the point in issue-questions of intent.] As evidence of other facts is admissible when those facts tend to prove the point in issue, as to show the identity, or to establish the proximity of the prisoner at the time in question, (vide supra ;) so where the intent of the prisoner forms part of the matter in issue, evidence may be given of other acts, not in issue, provided they tend to establish the intent of the prisoner in committing the act in question. Thus on an indictment for maliciously shooting, evidence was given that the prisoner, about a quarter of an hour before the shooting with which he was charged, intentionally shot at the prosecutor. It was suggested that this was evidence of two distinct felonies; but Mr. Justice Burrough said it was unavoidable in this case, as it seemed to him to be one continued transaction in the prosecution of the malicious intent of the prisoner; and the judges held that the evidence was rightly admitted (1). Voke's case, Russ. and Ry. 531 (c).

So on a charge of sending a threatening letter, other letters written by the prisoner, both before and after that in question, may be read in evidence as serving to explain the letter upon which he is indicted. Robinson's case, 2 East, P. C. 1110; 2 Leach, 749, S. C. So subsequent declarations by the prisoner of the meaning of the letter are admissible. Tucker's case, 1 Moo. C. C. 134 (d). So on an indictment for threatening to accuse a person of an abominable *crime, if the expressions [*88] used are equivocal, the jury may connect them with what was said afterwards by the prisoners when taken into custody. Per Park, J., Kain's case, 8 C. and P. 187 (e). Upon the same principle in actions for libels words, evidence of other libels or words may be given to show the animus of the defendant, whether the words be spoken before or after those in question. Charlton v. Barrett, Peake, 22; Rustell v. Macquister, 1 Camp. 49 (n); Stuart v. Lovell, 2 Stark. 95 (f); where Lord Ellenbo rough, C. J., observed, that subsequent publications would be admissible in the case of an indictment to show the intent of the party.

or.

So the declarations of a prisoner made at a former time are admissible, where they tend to prove the intent of the party at the time of the com

(1) In treason, where defendant had enlisted under the enemy, proof was admitted, that he had attempted to prevail on another to enlist, to show the quo animo. Resp. v. Malin, 1 Dall. 33.

(a) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xix. 449. (b) Id. xix. 448. (c) 1 Eng. C. C. 531. (d) 2 Ibid. 134. (e) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xxxiv. 347. (f) Id. iii. 261.

mission of the offence. Thus on an indictment for murder, evidence of former grudges and antecedent menaces may be given to show the prisoner's malice against the deceased. Phill. Ev. 498, 8th ed. So in treason, what was said by the prisoner with respect to what was passing at the time of the transaction laid as the overt act, may be received in evidence to explain his conduct, and to show the nature and object of the transaction. Watson's case, 2 Stark. 134 (a).

Evidence of the character of the prosecutor.] Where the prosecutor appears as one of the witnesses, evidence of his character, with regard to veracity, will be admitted as in the case of other witnesses. Vide post. And in some particular cases, where the character of the prosecutor is mingled with the transaction in question, it forms a point material to the issue, and may consequently be inquired into. Thus in the case of an indictment for a rape, evidence that the woman had a bad character previously to the commission of the offence, is admissible; and the same principles apply with regard to an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a rape. Clarke's case, 2 Stark. 244 (b); Phill. Ev. 489, 8th ed. But in these cases general evidence of character only is admissible, and not evidence of particular facts. Id. Thus where, on an indictment for rape, the prosecutrix was asked whether she had not before had connexion with other persons, and with a particular person named? The judges beld that the witness was not bound to answer these questions, as they tended to criminate and disgrace herself; and evidence having been offered to prove that the prosecutrix had had connexion with a man before this charge, the judges also determined that this evidence was properly rejected. Hodgson's case, Russ. and Ry. 211 (c). But evidence is admissible that the prosecutrix had formerly been connected with the prisoner. 2 Stark. Ev. 216, 2d edit., citing Hodgson's case, supra; and a case, cor. Wood, B., York Summer Assizes, 1812.

Where, on the trial of an indictment for an assault, with intent to commit a rape, the prosecutrix was asked, on cross-examination, whether she had not been twice in the House of Correction many years ago, and she admitted that she had, it was held by Holroyd, J., that a witness might be examined on behalf of the prosecution as to her situation and conduct [*89] since, in order to repel the inference *which might be drawn from her former misconduct. Clarke's case, 2 Stark. 241 (d).

Evidence of the character of the prisoner.] In trials for high treason, for felony, and for misdemeanors (where the direct object of the prosecution is to punish the offence), the prisoner is always permitted to call witnesses to his general character; and in every case of doubt, proof of good character will be entitled to great weight (1). Phill. Ev. 490, 8th ed. The rule does not extend to actions or informations for penalties, as to an information for keeping false weights. Attorney General v. Bowman, 2 Bos. and Pul. 532, (n). To admit such evidence in that case would be contrary to the true line of distinction, which is this, that in a direct prosecution for a crime it is admissible, but where the prosecution is not directly for the crime, but for the penalty, it is not. If evidence of charac

(1) Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 317.

(a) Eng Com. L. Rep. iii. 282. (b) Id. iii. 334. (c) 1 Eng. C. C. 211. (d) Id. iii. 333.

ter were admissible in such case as this, it would be necessary to try character in every charge of fraud upon the excise and custom-house laws. Per Eyre, C. J., Ibid. The inquiry as to the prisoner's general character ought manifestly to bear some analogy and reference to the charge against him. On a charge for stealing, it would be irrelevant and absurd to inquire into the prisoner's loyalty or humanity; on a charge of high treason, it would be equally absurd to inquire into his honesty and punctuality in private dealings. Such evidence relates to principles of moral conduct, which, however they might operate on other occasions, would not be likely to operate on that which alone is the subject of inquiry; it would not afford the least presumption that the prisoner might not have been tempted to commit the crime for which he is tried, and is therefore totally inapplicable to the point in question. The inquiry must also be as to the general character, for it is the general character alone which can afford any test of general conduct, or raise a presumption that the person who had maintained a fair reputation down to a certain period, would not then begin to act a dishonest, unworthy part. Phill. Ev. 490, 8th ed. It frequently happens that witnesses, speaking of the general opinion of the prisoner's character, state their own personal experience and opinion of his honesty; but when this statement is admitted, it is rather from favor to the prisoner than strictly as evidence of general character. Id.

It has been usual, says a very sensible writer, to treat the good character of the party accused as evidence to be taken in consideration only in doubtful cases. Juries have generally been told that where the facts proved are such as to satisfy their minds of the guilt of the prisoner, character, however excellent, is no subject for their consideration; but that when they entertain any doubt of the guilt of the party, they may properly turn their attention to the good character which he has received. It is, however, submitted with deference, that the good character of the party accused, satisfactorily established by competent witnesses, is an ingredient which ought always to be submitted to the consideration of the jury, together with the other facts and circumstances of the case. The nature of the charge, and the evidence by which it is supported, [ *90 ] will often render such ingredient of little or no avail; but the more correct course seems to be, not in any case to withdraw it from consideration, but to leave the jury to form their conclusion upon the whole of the evidence, whether an individual, whose character was previously unblemished, has or has not committed the particular crime for which he has been called upon to answer. 2 Russ. 703 (1).

The prosecutor cannot enter into evidence of the defendant's bad character, unless the latter enable him to do so, by calling witnesses in support of his good character, and even then the prosecutor cannot examine as to particular facts. B. N. P. 296. Hurd v. Martin, Cowp. 331.

It is not usual to cross-examine witnesses to the character of a prisoner, unless the counsel have some definite charge to which to cross-examine them. Hodgkiss's case, 7 C. and P. 298 (a). See further post, title, Practice.

(1) Good character in a clear case will be of no avail. Freeland's case, 1 Rogers' Rec. 82. People v. Kirby, 1 Wheaton's C. C. 64. The State v. Wells, 1 Coxe, 424. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 317.

(a) Eng. Com. Law. Rep. xxxii. 515.