in the night, conducted himself prudently in the adventure, and ridden straight by an unfrequented road to a distance, sold it, and taken a bill for the price, the defence was overruled. Henderson's case, Alison's Princ. Crim. Law Scotl. 655, 656,

Cases in which the prisoner has been held to be insane.] James Hadfield was tried in the Court of K. B. in the year 1800, on an indictment for high treason, in shooting at the king in Drury-lane theatre, and the [*877 ] defence made for the prisoner was, insanity. It was *proved that he had been a private soldier in a dragoon regiment, and, in the year 1793, received many severe wounds in battle, near Lisle, which had caused partial derangement of mind, and he had been dismissed from the army on account of insanity. Since his return to this country he had been annually out of his mind from the beginning of spring to the end of the dogdays, and had been under confinement as a lunatic. When affected by his disorder, he imagined himself to hold intercourse with God: sometimes called himself God, or Jesus Christ, and used other expressions of the most irreligious and blasphemous kind, and also committed acts of the greatest extravagance; but at other times he appeared to be rational, and discovered no symptom of mental incapacity or disorder. On the 14th May preceding the commission of the act in question, his mind was very much disordered, and he used many blasphemous expressions. At one or two o'clock on the following morning, he suddenly jumped out of bed, and, alluding to his child, a boy of eight months old, of whom he was usually remarkably fond, said he was about to dash his brains out against the bed-post, and that God had ordered him to do so; and, upon his wife screaming and his friends coming in, he ran into a cupboard and declared he would lie there, it should be his bed, and God had said so; and when doing this, having overset some water, he said he had lost a great deal of blood. On the same and the following day he used many incoherent and blasphemous expressions. On the morning of the 15th May he seemed worse, said that he had seen God in the night, that the coach was waiting, and that he had been to dine with the king. He spoke very highly of the king, the royal family, and particularly of the Duke of York. He then went to his master's workshop, whence he returned to dinner at two, but said that he stood in no need of meat and I could live without it. He asked for tea between three and four o'clock, and talked of being made a member of the society of odd fellows; and, after repeating his irreligious expressions, went out and repaired to the theatre. On the part of the crown it was proved that he had sat in his place in the theatre nearly three quarters of an hour before the king entered that, at the moment when the audience rose, on his Majesty's entering his box, he got up above the rest, and, presenting a pistol loaded with slugs, fired it at the king's person, and then let it drop; that, when he fired, his situation appeared favorable for taking aim, for he was standing upon the second seat from the orchestra, in the pit; and he took a deliberate aim, by looking down the barrel as a man usually does when taking aim. On his apprehension, amongst other expressions he said that he knew perfectly well his life was forfeited; that he was tired of life, and regretted nothing but the fate of a woman who was his wife, and would be his wife a few days longer, he supposed. These words he spoke calmly, and without any apparent derangement; and, with equal

calmness, repeated that he was tired of life, and said that his plan was to get rid of it by other means, he did not intend any thing against the life of the king, he knew the attempt only would answer his purpose.

*The counsel for the prisoner put the case as one of a species [*878] insanity in the nature of a morbid delusion of the intellect, and admitted that it was necessary for the jury to be satisfied that the act in question was the immediate unqualified offspring of the disease. Lord Kenyon, C. J., held, that as the prisoner was deranged immediately before the offence was committed, it was improbable that he had recovered his senses in the interim, and although, were they to run into nicety, proof might be demanded of his insanity at the precise moment when the act was committed, yet, there being no reason for believing the prisoner to have been at that period a rational and accountable being, he ought to be acquitted, and was acquitted accordingly. Hadfield's case, Collinson on Lunacy, 480, 1 Russell, 11.

The prisoner was indicted for setting fire to the cathedral church of York. The defence was that he was insane. It was proved that he was much under the influence of dreams, and in court he gave an incoherent account of a dream that had induced him to commit the act, a voice commanding him to destroy the cathedral on account of the misconduct of the clergy. Several medical witnesses stated their opinions that he was insane, and that, when laboring under his delusion, he could not distinguish right from wrong. One surgeon said that such persons, though incapable on a particular subject of distinguishing right from wrong, seek to avoid the danger consequent upon ther actions, and that they frequently run away and display great cunning in escaping punishment. The jury acquitted the prisoner on the ground of insanity. Martin's case, Shelford on Lunacy, 465; Annual Register, vol. 71, p. 301.

Cases of insanity caused by intoxication.] Intoxication is no excuse for the commission of crime. The prisoner, after a paroxysm of drunkenness, rose in the middle of the night, and cut the throats of his father and mother, ravished the servant-maid in her sleep, and afterwards murdered her. Notwithstanding the fact of his drunkenness he was tried and executed for these offences. Dey's case, 3 Paris and Fonbl. M. J. 140 (n.) There are many men, it is said in an able work on Medical Jurisprudence, soldiers who have been severely wounded in the head, especially, who well know that excess makes them mad; but if such persons wilfully deprive themselves of reason, they ought not to be excused one crime by the voluntary perpetration of another. 3 Paris and Fonbl. M. J. 140. But if, by the long practice of intoxication, an habitual or fixed insanity is caused, although this madness was contracted voluntarily, yet the party is in the same situation with regard to crimes, as if it had been contracted involuntarily at first, and is not punishable (1). 1 Hale, P. C. 32. Though voluntary drunkenness cannot excuse from the commission of crime, yet where, as upon a charge of murder, the question is, whether an act was premeditated, or done only from sudden heat and impulse, the fact of the party being intoxicated has been held to be a circumstance

(1) U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28. 3 American Jurist, 5. Burnet v. State, Mason and Yerger, 133. Cornwell v. The State, Id. 147.

proper to be taken into consideration (1). Per Holroyd, J., Grindley's case, 1 Russell, 8. But see Carroll's case; also Meakin's case, and Thomas's case, ante, p. 628; Pearson's case, 2 Lew. 144.

COERCION BY HUSBAND.

In certain cases a married woman is privileged from punishment, upon the ground of the actual or presumed command and coercion of her husband compelling her to the commission of the offence. But this is only a presumption of law, and if it appears, upon the evidence, that she did not in fact commit the offence under compulsion, but was herself a principal actor and inciter in it, she must be found guilty. I Hale, P. C. 516. In one case it appears to have been held by all the judges, upon an indictment against a married woman for falsely swearing herself to be next of kin, and procuring administration, that she was guilty of the offence, though her husband was with her when she took the oath. Dick's case, 1 Russell, 16. Upon an indictment against a man and his wife for putting off forged notes, where it appeared that they went together to a public-house to meet the person to whom the notes were to be put off, and that the woman had some of them in her pocket, she was held entitled to an acquittal. Atkinson's case, 1 Russell, 20.

Evidence of reputation and cohabitation is in these cases sufficient evidence of marriage. Ibid. But where the woman is not described in the indictment as the wife of the man, the onus of proving that she is so, rests upon her. Jones's case, Kel. 37, 1 Russell, 20.

But where, on the trial of a man and woman, it appeared by the evidence that they addressed each other as husband and wife, and passed as such, and were so spoken of by the witnesses for the prosecution; Patteson, J., held that it was for the jury to say whether they were satisfied that they were in fact husband and wife, even though the woman had pleaded to the indictment, which described her as a "single woman.” The learned judge said she ought not have been so described. Woodward's case, 8 C. & P. 561 (a).

The presumption of coercion on the part of the husband does not arise unless it appear that he was present at the time of the offence committed. 1 Hale, P. C. 45. Thus, where a wife by her husband's order and procurement, but in his absence, knowingly uttered a forged order and certificate for the payment of prize-money, all the judges held that the presumption of coercion at the time of uttering did not arise, and that the wife was properly convicted of uttering, and the husband of procuring. Morris's case, Russ. and Ry. 270 (b).

So where the husband delivered a threatening letter ignorantly, as [ *880] *the agent of the wife, she alone was held to be punishable. Hammond's case, 1 Leach, 447.

(1) Penn. v. M'Fall, Addis. 257.

(a) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xxxiv. 524. (b) 1 Eng. C. C. 270.

The prisoner, Martha Hughes, was indicted for forging and uttering Bank of England notes. The witness stated that he went to the shop of the prisoner's husband, where she took him into an inner room, and sold him the notes; that while he was putting them into his pocket, the husband put his head in and said, "Get on with you." "Get on with you." On returning to the shop he saw the husband, who, as well as the wife, desired him to be careful. It was objected, that the offence was committed under coercion, but Thompson, B., thought otherwise. He said, the law out of tenderness to the wife, if a felony be committed in the presence of her husband, raises a presumption, prima facie, and prima facie only, as is clearly laid down by Lord Hale, that it was done under his coercion, but it is absolutely necessary in such case that the husband should be actually present, and taking a part in the transaction. Here it is entirely the act of the wife; it is, indeed, in consequence of a previous communication with the hus-. band that the witness applies to the wife, but she is ready to deal, and has on her person, the articles which she delivers to the witness. There was a putting off before the husband came, and it is sufficient if, before that time, she did that which was necessary to complete the crime. The coercion must be at the time of the act done; but when the crime has been completed in his absence, no subsequent act of his (though it might possibly make him an accessary to the felony of the wife), can be referred to what was done in his absence. Hughes's case, 1 Russell, 18, 2 Lew. C. C. 229. But where, on an indictment against a woman for uttering counterfeit coin, it appeared, that the husband accompanied her each time to the door of the shop, but did not go in, Bayley, J., thought it a case of coercion. Conolly's case, 2 Lew. C. C. 229; Anon. Math. Dig. C. L. 262, S. C.

Where husband and wife were convicted on a joint indictment for receiving stolen goods, it was held that the conviction of the wife was bad, it not having been left to the jury to say whether she received the goods in the absence of her husband. Archer's case, 1 Moody, C. C. 143 (a),

ante.

There are various crimes, from the punishment of which the wife shall not be privileged on the ground of coercion, such as those which are mala in se, as treason and murder. 1 Hale, P. C. 44, 45. "Some of the books also except robbery." Per Patteson, J., Cruse's case, 8 C. and P. 545 (b), infra. The learned judge afterwards said, "it may be, that in cases of felony, committed with violence, the doctrine of coercion does not apply."

In the above case, where a husband and wife were indicted under the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2, for the capital offence of inflicting an injury dangerous to life; Patteson, J., seemed of opinion that as the wife took an active part in the transaction, she might be found guilty of the offence with her husband, but said he would reserve the point, if, upon further consideration, he thought it necessary. The prisoners, however, were acquitted of the felony and convicted of an assault. See ante, p. 731, and post.

*And in offences relating to domestic matters and the govern- [ *881 ] ment of the house, in which the wife may be supposed to have a principal share, the rule with regard to coercion does not exist, as upon an indict

(a) 2 Eng. C. C. 143. (b) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xxxiv. 522.

ment for keeping a disorderly house, Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 1, s. 12, ante, p. 744, or gaming house. Dixon's case, 10 Mod. 336.

And the prevailing opinion is said to be that the wife may be found guilty with the husband in all misdemeanors, Arch. C. L. 15, 7th ed. 4 Bl. Com. by Ryland, 29, (n.) Ingram's case, 1 Salk. 384.

But where a husband and wife were jointly indicted for a misdemeanor, in uttering counterfeit coin, and it appeared that the wife uttered the base money in the presence of her husband; Mirehouse, C. S. (after consulting Bosanquet and Coltman, JJ.) held that she was entitled to an acquittal. Price's case, 8 C. and P. 19 (a). And see Conolly's case, ante, p. 880,' which was also a case of misdemeanor. See also 8 C. and P. 21 n. (b). However, in Cruse's case, ante p. 808, where the jury convicted a husband and wife of an assault, under the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11; the judges, on a case reserved, affirmed the conviction, being unanimously of opinion, that the point with respect to the coercion of the wife did not arise, as the ultimate result of the case was a conviction for misdemeanor.

Where the wife is to be considered as merely the servant of her husband, she will not be answerable for the consequences of his breach of duty, however fatal, though she may be privy to his conduct. Thus, where the husband and wife were indicted for the murder of an apprentice of the husband, who had died for want of proper nourishment, Lawrence, J., held that the wife could not be convicted, for, though equally guilty, in foro conscientiæ, yet, in point of law, she could not be guilty of not providing the apprentice with sufficient food. Squire's case, 1 Russell, 16. See further ante, p. 666.

A woman cannot be indicted as an accessary by rescuing her husband. 1 Hale, P. C. 47. Nor can she be guilty of larceny in stealing her husband's goods, 1 Hale, P. C. 514, ante, p. 540. But if she and a stranger steal the goods, the stranger is liable. Tolfree's case, 1 Moody, C. C. 243 (b), ante, p. 541. So it has been held that she was not guilty of arson within the 7 and 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 2, by setting her husband's house on fire. March's case, 1 Moody C. C. 182 (c), ante, p. 253.

(a) Eng. Com. L. Rep. xxxiv. 277. (b) 2 Eng. C. C. 243. (c) Id. 182.