HE NEW LAW RULES, with PRACTI. THE COURT OF CHANCERY (IRELAND) RE THE CAL COMMENTARY, CASES UPON, and FORMS ADAPTED TO, EACH RULE. By EDWARD JOHNSTONE, Esq., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. "Mr. Ferguson, in the very able and lucid work before us, has pre. sented the profession and the public with an accurate representation of the law as it now stands."-Dublin Evening Post. "The present treatise is deserving of the reputation which Mr. Fergu son has acquired by his previous works."-Saunders. Systematically compiled and arranged, most accurately and studiously noted, and fully elucidated by authorities."-Daily Express. "His views are entirely in unison with our own."-Irish Jurist. "The accuracy and fulness of the marginal notes of this edition, and the elaborate index, combine to afford all possible facility in studying and referring to the new statute, &c The novelty of issuing copies with blank interleaving, for the purpose of taking notes of cases, will be most accept. able to the legal profession."-Freeman's Journal. "Mr. Ferguson has rendered good service to the general public, as well as to the legal profession, by the lucid manner in which he has placed Mr. Whiteside's Reform Measure before them. The Publisher, Mr. Milliken, has not been wanting on his part. The volume, for neatness and clearness of type, is creditable to the Irish press."- Evening Mail. "The book is a very valuable one to both professions, for Mr. Ferguson may be safely relied on as guide to the new practice."-Freeman's Jour nal. Just published, price 5s.; by post 5s. 6d. THE NEW ECCLESIASTICAL CODE respecting the Residences and dilapidations; containing the United Church of England and Ireland Act, Churches and Chapels (Ireland) Act; Ecclesiastical Resi dences (Ireland) Act; with explanatory Summary, Contents, and Index. By WM. D. FERGUSON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. erection and endowment of Churches and Chapels, and Ecclesiastical Price 5s., by Post, 5s, 6d. THE JUSTICES MANUAL:-containing, THE JUSTICES PROTECTION ACT; THE SUMMARY JU. RISDICTION ACT, 1851; THE PETTY SESSIONS ACT, 1851; and THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT; with NOTES, COMMENTS, and COPIOUS INDEX. By EDWARD P. LEVINGE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. GULATION ACT, 1850, with PRACTICAL COMMENTS and Precedents THE Price 66, 6d., by post 78. PRACTICE OF THE CIVIL BILL COURTS in Ireland. As altered by the statute 14 & 15 Vic. c. 57, with an appendix of several statutes relating to the law between landlord and tenant, and to the law of evidence; with a Commentary, comprising the decisions and the analogous sections of the County Courts Acts, (England) with a upon the re-enacted sections of the previous Acts of the Civil Bill code, copious Index. And the Rules, Orders, and Regulations prepared by the Assistant Barristers, with Observations, &c. By JOHN BLACK. HAM, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. All communications for the IRISH JURIST are to be left, addressed to the Editor, with the Publisher, E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COLLEGE GREEN. Correspondents will please give the Name and Address, as the columns of the paper cannot be occupied with answers to Anonymous Communications-nor will the Editor be accountable for the return of Manuscripts, &c. Orders for the IRISH JURIST left with E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COL in Dublin, or its being forwarded to the Country, by Post, on the day of LEGE GREEN, or by letter (post-paid), will ensure its punctual delivery publication. TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION-(payable in advance): Yearly, 30s. Half-yearly, 17s. Quarterly, 983 Printed by THOMAS ISA AC WHITE, at his Printing Office, No. 15 FLEET STREET, in the Parish of St. Andrew, and published at la COLLEGE GREEN, in same Parish, by EDWARD JOHNSTON MILLIKEN, residing at the same place, all being in the County of the City of Dublin, Saturday, June 3, 1854. DUBLIN, JUNE 10, 1854. R. v. BRENNAN. Criminal law-Rescue-Evidence -1 & 2 Vic. c. 56.......... ......... that the damages to be given are those reasonably foreseen at the time of the contract, and that he wished that the rule was established, that damages A VERY important case has been recently decided must be confined to what the parties reason. in the English Court of Exchequer, in Hadley v. ably anticipated. He further observed, that "at Baxendale, (23 L. J. N. s. Ex. 179,) upon the diffi- present the question of damages was very wrongly calt subject of the "measure of damages." The left to the jury. In actions for not making out a particular question there debated was with reference good title, there is a conventional rule, that, in the to the extent of special damage recoverable for the absence of fraud, mere consequential damage canbreach of a contract to supply machinery for the not be recovered; just as if the vendor expressly plaintiffs' mill. The action was brought against the stipulated on the contract, in the event of my not defendant, a carrier, for delay in delivering two making out title, I am only to pay the damages of pieces of iron, being the broken shaft of the mill of investigating the title.' In a contract to build a the plaintiffs, by reason of which delay the engineer mill, the builder knows that a delay on his part will to whom they were to be delivered was unable to result in the loss of business; but a carrier consupply a new shaft, and the mill of the plaintiffs tracting to convey a shaft or wheel, does not estiwas stopped, and the plaintiffs lost certain profits mate, in his mind, the consequential damages, by by the delay of their business, which was the spe- the loss of trade arising from the loss or damage of cial damage laid in the declaration. In support the article." It must be obvious where the practiof the plaintiffs' case, some early cases were cited, cal difficulty lies, in awarding damages in such cases. which, as was observed by Baron Parke, went far in It may be, and often is just, that a party should be his favour; but he added, that the sensible rule on answerable for the actual injury which his negli. the subject is that laid down in the Code Napoleon,gence has caused, even though that particular re sult could not be foreseen; but it is better that complete justice should not be done in every case, than a risk of doing a positive injustice should be incurred, as would surely be the consequence of attempting to redress every possible injury which may be supposed to have resulted from a breach of contract. The line must be drawn somewhere. If it be not, imagination will usurp the place of reality, and a jury will be called upon to give compensation for the loss of mere speculative profits, and to attribute to the particular accident a series of infinitesimal, if not improbable, results. In fact, as was suggested by one of the judges, the legitimate consequence of such a rule would be, that for a breach of warranty of a chain cable the value of a lost ship might be awarded. On the part of the defendant, the maxim of Lord Bacon, "In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur," was commented on, and it was observed that the same rule prevailed in the civil law; and it was forcibly argued that the damage complained of was not the necessary and foreseen consequence of the act complained of. The court took time to consider their judgment which was subsequently delivered by Mr. Baron Alderson, and the principal part of which we make no apology for laying before our readers, extracting it from the columns of the admirable legal journal which we have above cited, (p. 182): "We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this; where two parties have made a contract, which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract are either such as may fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under the special circumstances, so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these circumstances were wholly unknown to the party making the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally; and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have been specially provided for by the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case, and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them. The above principles are those by which we think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract. It is said that other cases, such as breaches of contract in the non-payment of money, or in the not making a good title to lands, are not to be treated as exceptions from this and are governed by a conventional rule. But, as in such cases, both parties must be supposed to be cognizant of that well-known rule, these cases may, we think, be more properly classed under the rule above enunciated as to cases under special circumstances, because there both parties may reasonably be presumed to contemplate the estimation of the amount of damages according to the conventional rule. "Now, in the present case, if we are to apply the principles above laid down, we find that the only circumstance ever communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant at the time the contract was made, was, that the article to be carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and that the plaintiff was the miller of that mill. But how do these circumstances reasonably show that the profits of the mill must be stopped by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the carrier to the third person? Suppose the plaintiff had another shaft in his possession put up, or putting up, at the time, and that having wished to send back the broken shaft to the engineer who made it, it is clear that this would be quite consistent with the above circumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay in the delivery would have no effect upon the intermediate profits of the mill. Or, again, suppose that at the time of delivery to the carrier the machinery of the mill had been in other respects defective, then also the same results will follow. Here it is true that the shaft was actually sent back to serve as a model for a new one, and that the want of a new one was the only cause of the stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of profits really arose from not sending down the new shaft in the proper time, and that this arose from the delay in delivering the broken one to serve as a model. But it is obvious that in the great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to third persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences would not, in all probability, have occurred, and these special circumstances were never communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant. It follows, therefore, that the loss of profit here cannot reasonably be considered such a consequence of a breach of contract as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both these parties when they made this contract; for such loss would neither have followed naturally from breach of this contract in the great multitude of cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which perhaps would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the defendant. The judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury that, upon the facts then before them, they ought not to take the loss of profit into consideration at all in estimating the damages." This is a most important decision; and we think that the learned judges of the Court of Exchequer in England have deserved well of their country for the excellent and explicit rule which they have thus laid down. We can hardly anticipate that this well-considered judgment will be overruled, asserting as it does a rule, which while it will ensure an ample measure of protection to parties complaining of the breach of the engagements of others, will on the other assign a definite limit, beyond which the imagination of juries will not be allowed to travel in quest of injuries supposed to have been occasioned by the defendant's default. When we consider the multiplicity of causes which may lead to a non-fulfilment of contract, and for which a contractor may be legally responsible, though morally free from blame, the allowance of speculative damages in such cases would make any one tremble for himself, and such modification as that referred to ought therefore to be hailed with satisfaction. THE EOLIAN ... ... MANTLE. BROWNE and PAYNE beg to call the attention of their Patrons and the Public to their new Overcoat, which has been designed by them. selves, and is certainly the most stylish garment ever introduced. It can be worn as a Coat or Cape; its external appearance is only conspicuous for unassuming plainness, the characteristic of a gentleman's attire and from its durability and exquisite finish it is daily becoming a general fa vourite; it recommends itself particularly for travelling or driving purposes As there is a great demand there are several made up for immediate use. BROWNE and PAYNE, Tailors to his Excelleney the Earl St. Germains, Among the many novelties lately introduced in gentlemen's dress we have noticed a new garment designated the 'Eolian Mantle,' designed by Messrs, Browne and Payne, of Sackville-street. It is decidedly one of the most stylish and useful garments ever introduced to the public: it is so constructed as to be worn as a coat or cloak. It reflects the highest credit on that respectable firm; and we are sure their efforts in the cause of fashion will meet that success they so justly deserve."-Evening Mail, November 2. Just Published, price 7s. 6d., by Post, Ss. HE LAW OF JUDGMENTS AND EXETHE CUTIONS, together with the DUTIES and OFFICE OF SHE. RIFFS, in relation to WRITS of EXECUTION and INTERPLEADER; with INDEX, NOTES, and CASES. THE By ROBERT W. OSBORNE, Esq., Barrister-at-law. Just Published, price 8s. 6d. Free by Post, Solicitor. T. Ball. Kift & Co. J. L. Gaussen. M. Driscoll. W. Dalton. O'Brien Dillon. W. Barrett. Dwyer & Lalor. T. Crozier. F. Hamilton. James Perry. J. Campbell. W. Brophy. W. Parker. R. J. T. Orpen. M. Dawson. A. Durdin. T. Chatterton. H. Wallace. J. Vincent. N. Werheim. K. Scott. Cartan and Moriarty. R. and A. T. Walker. F. T. O'Connell. Harper. All communications for the IRISH JURIST are to be left, addressed GREEN. Correspondents will please give the Name and Address, as the to the Editor, with the Publisher, E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COLLEGE columns of the paper cannot be occupied with answers to Anonymous Communications-nor will the Editor be accountable for the return of Manuscripts, &c. Orders for the IRISH JURIST left with E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COLLEGE GREEN, or by letter (post-paid), will ensure its punctual delivery in Dublin, or its being forwarded to the Country, by Post, on the day of publication. TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION-(payable in advance): Yearly, 308. Half-yearly, 17s. Quarterly, 98. Printed by THOMAS ISA AC WHITE, at his Printing Office, No. 45 COLLEGE GREEN, in same Parish, by EDWARD JOHNSTON MILLIKEN, residing at the same place, all being in the County of the City of Dublin, Saturday, June 10, 1854 HE NEW LAW RULES, with PRACTI-FLEET-STREET, in the Parish of St. Andrew, and published at la CAL COMMENTARY, CASES UPON, and FORMS ADAPTED TO, EACH RULE. By EDWARD JOHNSTONE, Esq., M. A., Barrister-at-Law, |