where no such motion is made, it is not a good ground for a subsequent motion for a new trial. Willard v. Wetherbee, 1

N. H. Cas. 118.

NOTICE.

Notice by a committed debtor to the creditor of an intention to take the poor debtor's oath, left at the office of the creditor's attorney, who was absent, but whose office was in the chamber over the store occupied by the person with whom the attorney boarded, is not sufficient, under the statute requiring 'notice to the creditor or his agent or attorney.' Madison v. Rano, 1 N. H. Cas. 79.

PAROL EVIDENCE. See CONTRACT.

PARTNERSHIP.

A B and C D were partners in the business of buying and selling pork, each of them also carrying on a separate business. B was the active partner. By their articles of copartnership, it was agreed that the money for the partnership should be borrowed on D's note endorsed by B, or in any other way which might be suitable. The money of the partnership was deposited in the banks under B's name, with his own money. No style of partnership was agreed on in the articles; but the partnership was generally known and called by the name of B and D, and they advertised and transacted business under that style, and the books of the partnership were kept in their joint names. When the partnership was dissolved, B became bound to pay the debts of the firm, and afterwards B drew a bill in his own name, by negotiating which he raised money to pay a debt due from the firm, and applied the proceeds of the bill for that purpose. It was held, that an action against B and D on this bill, declaring on it as having been drawn by the trading partners under the name of A B, could not be maintained. Le Roy v. Johnson, 2 Pet. 186.

PARTIES. See CHANCERY AND CHANCERY PRACTICE.

PATENT.

1. If the discoverer of a new invention suffers it to be used by others, he cannot afterwards secure it to himself by a patent. Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 3.

2. It seems, that if one person should discover an invention, and another person should afterwards discover the same invention, and bring it into public use before any patent taken out by the first inventor, the first inventor would lose his right to take out a patent. Ib.

PEDIGREE. See EVIDENCE, 3.

PEW.

By the grant of pews, a parish does not lose the right to remove the meeting-house in pursuance of a regular vote for the purpose. Fisher v. Glover 1 N. H. Cas. 180.

PIOUS USES.

No specific grantee capable of holding land, is necessary, in order to support a gift of land for public and pious uses. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566.

PLEADING.

1. Where non assumpsit was pleaded at the first term, and a plea of accord and satisfaction made after the commencement of the suit was pleaded at a subsequent term, as a bar to the further maintenance of the action, the court intimated an opinion that the latter plea, though not in form puis darrein continuance, was yet substantially of the same character, and was a waiver of or substitute for the general issue. Bank of the United States v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543.

2. A plea by the tenant, of non-tenure, to a writ of entry, beginning, 'And the said B comes and defends when, &c. and prays judgment of the said writ,' and concluding, and 'this she is ready to verify,' &c. 'wherefore' &c. is bad on demurrer, for not adding she prays judgment of the said writ,' &c. Pike v. Bagley, 1 N. H. Cas. 76.

PRACTICE.

1. Where the declaration contained counts on sixty-seven bank notes, instead of sixty-eight, one having been omitted by accident, and the verdict and judgment were for a sum including the whole sixty-eight; on error to the Supreme Court of the United States, the court allowed the original plaintiff to enter a remittitur of the sum recovered on account of the omitted note, on payment of costs, if the writ of error should be prosecuted no further after the amendment, and affirmed the judgment of the court below deducting that amount. Bank of Kentucky v. Ashley, 2 Pet. 327.

2. Where a party to a suit died after the commencement of the term, and the court decided the case after argument, without hearing of his decease, the court ordered the decree to be entered as of the first day of the term. Bank of the United States v. Weisiger, 2 Pet. 481.

3. Where an appeal from a Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, was prayed by a number of defendants, and one only executed the proper appeal bond; an objection to the proceeding must be taken by preliminary motion to dismiss the appeal for irregularity, on account of the failure to give the proper appeal bond. It cannot be made on the argument of the case. Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Pet. 482. 4. A statute passed by a state to regulate proceedings in suits, cannot change the mode of proceeding in the courts of the United States; thus it cannot compel the courts of the United States to appoint commissioners for the decision of questions which a court of common law must submit to a jury. Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492.

See JURISDICTION. 4, 6, 8.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See AGENT.

PROHIBITION.

See JURISDICTION, 3.

PROPRIETORS OF COMMON UNDIVIDED LANDS. See CONVEYANCE.

RETROSPECTIVE LAW. See CONSTITUTION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

RELEASE. See AGREEMENT NOT TO SUE.

SALE OF CHATTELS.

A, being in debt, delivered goods to B, one of his creditors to whom he was indebted in a greater sum than the value of the goods, with a bill of parcels describing the goods and the prices, and stating that the same were bought by B, and that A had received payment. It was at the same time agreed that the goods should be sold by B and the proceeds applied to the payment of the debt due to B, and if any thing remained, B should account for it with A. It was held that this agreement was a fraud which rendered the sale void with respect to creditors. Parker v. Pattee, 1 N. H. Cas. 176.

SET-OFF.

A note not negotiable being assigned, the maker having orally promised, after it became due, to pay it to the assignee, has no right after this, in an action in the name of the payee for the benefit of his assignee, to set-off any demand he has against the original payee. Wiggin v. Damrell, 1 N. H. Cas. 69. SLANDER.

In an action for slander it is not competent to a jury to infer that there was no malice in uttering the slanderous words merely from the circumstances that they were spoken only once and stated as common report. Mason v. Mason, 1 N. H. Cas. 110. SLAVE.

The law of Maryland of 1796, c. 47, s. 13, provides that no manumission by will shall be effectual to give freedom to a slave, unless the slave 'be under the age of forty-five years, and able to work and gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood at the time the freedom given shall commence. Held that the emancipation of a boy by will, who was between the age of ten and eleven at the testator's death and able to support himself by his labor, was valid. Le Grand v. Darnall, 2 Pet. 664. STATUTE.

A statute of a state ratifying and confirming a void deed, will have the effect of passing a good title to the purchaser in the deed if such be the obvious intention of the legislature; the technical rule as to the confirmation of a void deed by a private person not applying to a legislative act. Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627.

See CONSTITUTION OF THE United States.

SUIT. See JURISDICTION, 3.

TENDER.

To satisfy and discharge a written agreement for the delivery of specific articles, it is not enough to offer them on condition that the agreement be given up; they must be offered absolutely and unconditionally. Robinson v. Batchelder, 1 N. H. Cas. 40. TREATIES. See LANDS AND LAND TITLES.

TRESPASS FOR MESNE PROFITS. See EVIDENCE, 2. TRUSTEE PROCESS. See ASSIGNMENT.

TRUSTEES. See MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.

USURY.

A loan was made of depreciated bank notes, which were then current at less than their nominal value; and a note taken for the nominal amount of the bills payable with interest. Held that the contract was usurious. Bank of the United States v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527.

2. The act incorporating the bank of the United States provides 'that it shall not take more than at the rate of six

per centum per annum upon its loans or discounts;' held that a note on which a larger rate of interest than six per cent. had been reserved by the bank, was void; and that not even the money actually loaned could be recovered on it. Ib.

WILL. See MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.

WITNESS.

In an action commenced against A and B as partners alleging a joint promise, the process not having been served on A, and the action consequently abating as it regards him, A, if B release him, becomes a good witness for B. Le Roy v. Johnson, 2 Pet.

186.

WILL.

A testatrix in her will directed her executors to invest certain funds, and then continued, it is my desire that the interest thereof shall be applied to the proper education' of her nephews, A, B, and C, 'so that they may be severally fitted in some useful trade; and to each of them who shall have lived to finish his education, or to reach the age of twenty-one years, I give and bequeath one hundred pounds to set him up in his trade.' Held that A, B, and C were not entitled to the whole interest on the funds, whatever might be its amount, but only to enough to provide for their education, for a useful trade, not for a profession, but that the allowance for this purpose should be liberal if the fund would admit of it. Dandridge v. Washington's Executors, 2 Pet. 370.

VERDICT.

In trespass de bonis asportatis the defendant pleaded, first, not guilty, upon which issue was joined; and secondly, in bar, that he took the goods as the property of a third person by virtue

of a writ of attachment and issue was joined on the plaintiff's property in the goods. The jury found, that the goods were the property of the plaintiff at the time of the taking, and assessed the damage, whereupon judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of error being brought, the verdict was held to be imperfect and the judgment was reversed for that cause. Holman v. Kingsbury, 1 Ñ. H. Cas. 104.