'On the Sunday before the murder, he drank freely, and was intoxicated, in which condition, as usual, he was quiet, dull, and disposed to lie in bed. Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday presented nothing special. On Wednesday evening he complained to a neighbor of feeling unwell, and asked his son's assistance in the performance of some necessary manual labor for his family. He seemed to the witness to be rational. During the night he slept none, and complained of cramp in his stomach. The next morning his family thought him crazy, but were not alarmed, as they were accustomed to such attacks. In the course of the day, he took an axe on the shoulder, and walked rapidly to the house of a neighbor, whom he desired to go home with him, saying they wanted to kill him; and about the same time he told another of the supposed conspirators, that he had overheard his wife and him that morning whispering about taking his (the witness') life. 'He spent the day at home in the midst of his family, apparently in agitation and terror, but said he would not hurt any one, and did not wish to be hurt. In addition to the axe, which he placed under the bed, where it was often kept, he provided a scythe, which he brought into the house. He manifested jealousy of his wife, and told her to act better, for she had already caused the death of thirty thousand men. He fancied that the persons of whom he was jealous, were in the loft manufacturing ropes to hang him, and going up, returned and said he had cut the ropes to pieces, and brought down the fragments with him, though he had nothing in his hands. In the course of the afternoon, he fastened both the doors of his house. At the usual time his wife went out to milk, and he barred the door after her. On her return he fastened it again. She was seated near the fire, and he was walking the room. At length he took the axe from under the bed, and suddenly gave the fatal blow, following it up with two others on the face. His oldest daughter caught the instrument, which he yielded up, and then seized the scythe, with which he attempted to strike her. She defended herself with a chair, till the smaller children having opened the door, she made her escape He took his youngest child in his arms, and sat down by the window. The child exclaimed, 'mamma bleeds!' which he said made him feel bad. When his neighbors arrived immediately afterwards, he gave himself up, acknowledged what he had done, said he knew he would be hung for it, but that he ought to have done it nine months sooner; and that if he had it to do again, he would strike two blows where he only struck one. Talked so rationally, that many of the witnesses could not believe him deranged. Evinced no dread of punishment for his crime, but was still in great apprehension from the persons who, he had believed, intended to kill him. Was glad that he had defeated their calculations. On his way to the city to be committed to

jail, talked rationally and composedly about his affairs, and on various subjects; but frequently asked the guard if they did not hear sweet sounds of different kinds, and on being answered in the negative, insisted that he could not be mistaken. After being committed he became regular, [rational?] and expressed his regret at what he had done." Western Journal, pp. 44-47.

After some remarks upon the nature of delirium tremens and insanity, Dr. Drake says,

'It must be shown, either that the culprit is insane on all subjects, to such a degree as to pervert his affections and destroy his estimate of right and wrong; or that his crime had some natural connexion with the subject of his hallucination. Submitting to these requirements, the subjects of Mania a potu seem fairly entitled to plead their alienation, when arraigned for crimes. As I have already said, they have disordered conceptions, of intense and bewildering vividness, which, it is true, they sometimes regard as delusions, but oftener mistake for realities, and act accordingly. Their passions, particularly those of fear, jealousy, and anger have an uncontrollable mobility; their desires and aversions are equally morbid, and their will displays a wild and sleepless energy of action. In this condition, they may still distinguish between right and wrong, on many subjects, provided their attention can be fixed, and the subjects have no connexion with the trains of thought with which they are incessantly occupied; but in reference to these, they judge and act on the conviction of their reality; that is, with a firm belief, and should not, therefore, be held accountable." Western Journal, p. 53.

Again he says,

'I appeal to the enlightened members of the profession every where, whether here are not all requisites of a case of monomania: Assumed and unreal premises,-deductions true to the principles of logic, but false in point of fact,-lastly, acts consistent with his conclusions. On other subjects he might have been regular enough, but on this he had gone astray; on others, he could judge between right and wrong; on this, his estimate of right and wrong took its character from his delusion. Had he killed, in a real dispute, some other person, not of the conspiracy, the act would have been foreign from his hallucination, and should not have been excused; but when he murdered one of the conspirators, he kept himself within the pale of that hallucination, and acted in accordance with his erroneous conceptions. Both the court and prosecutor admitted, that he labored under derangement; but because he manifested a perception of right and wrong on certain subjects, seemed disposed to argue, that he must have had a perception of right and wrong in reference to the subject

of his insanity! I would ask, whether if he had been equally insane on all other topics, they would have looked for manifestations of a correct estimate of right and wrong? I think they would not, and still, to be consistent, they should.

'It must not be forgotten, that it was admitted by all, that he was deranged. The difference of opinion related to its degree; the prosecutor and others, regarding it as insufficient to justify him, others as sufficient. But he did an act, felonious in its nature, directly connected with his erroneous opinions; and I would put to them the question, whether, if he performed a sane action, and for such only could he be held accountable, it would be one connected with his insanity? I think not. [The] non compos cannot be of sound mind on the subject of his derangement, though he may be on every other.

"I will here take occasion to say, that of the various forms of mental alienation, monomania, or partial insanity,* is not only the most dangerous to the peace of society, but by far most difficult to establish to the satisfaction of an ordinary jury. The broad and hideous features of general madness, or mania proper, cannot be mistaken by the most ignorant; but such madmen are generally harmless. They may give an unlucky blow, but they have no design, no plan, no perseverance, no concealment. Not so with the monomaniac. On some subject, or group of subjects, his conceptions are wrong, and his assumptions false. The error lies in his premises, more than his conclusions; you may reason him into a modification of the latter, by correcting his logic; but no argument, persuasion, or authority, can drive him from the former. The spirit of his delusion cannot be exorcised. It governs him with despotic power, but its jurisdiction is limited. He has, as it were, two cotemporary states of intellectual being, with alternate manifestations; one in common with those around him; the other peculiar to himself. In the former, he feels, and thinks, and acts, in consonance and sympathy with his race; in the latter, he contemplates nothing but the objects embraced in his delusion; and regardless of consequences, looks only to their accomplishment. In this morbid state, we may often see much of his original character. If mild, timid, and benevolent, his insanity is less to be dreaded-if suspicious, he becomes jealous-if proud, haughty and impetuous-if ill-natured, ferocious and revengeful. Hence, men of bad passions are most likely, when insane, to commit outrages, and are least likely to receive the commiseration of society, or the courts of justice, which seems to have been

* It may not be amiss for us to recollect, that a partial insanity is not an alienation slight in degree, but limited in the extent of its objects. Under this view a derangement may be on a single point only, and still have a character of most terrific energy.'

the character and fate of the convict Birdsell. But whatever may have been the natural disposition of the monomaniac, or the nature of his delusion, it can never be pronounced absolutely safe, to allow him unrestrained liberty. His hallucination may continue the same, but the actions which it originates, may vary from day to day. He may alter his plan of operations, while his objects remain unchanged. Passions the most opposite may possess him in successive hours. The flame which lights them up is not from without, but lies smouldering in the recesses of his own bosom. Hence his conduct cannot be foretold. He sets prediction at defiance, and at the moment when the watchmen around him cry "all's well," he may be meditating outrages of the bloodiest die.' Western Journal, pp. 57-59.

He farther observes,

'If this variety of mental alienation cannot constitute a valid defence, it can only be from the character of its remote cause. But I would ask, whether the court and jury have a right to travel behind the testimony which establishes the insanity, to inquire into its causes, and estimate the culpability of [the] non compos, not by the degree of his alienation, but the criminality of those causes? I think they have no such right. But if it is correct for them to do it in one case, it is equally so in all others; and whenever insanity is offered in defence, its causes should be ascertained and made to determine the guilt of the accused. This, I apprehend, would be a new principle in jurisprudence. Let us look at the practice to which it would lead Mania a potu is, sometimes, the consequence of the use of opium; and frequently results from daily stimulation with ardent spirits, without their being ever taken to the extent of intoxication. Now all the acts of a non compos from either of these causes must be pardoned, because there is nothing criminal in such use of stimulants. Moreover, drunkenness itself is not unlawful, and cannot, therefore, impart a character of criminality to the actions of him in whom it may excite insanity. There are, however, many other causes of this malady which are criminal, such as gambling, duelling, and prostitution, all of which should be inquired into, and when found real, must, if the principle is adhered to, be made to impart criminality to the actions of [the] non compos; while he would be exempt from punishment, if his derangement arose from causes not immoral. But this, I venture to assert, was never done in any country. The truth is, that the immunity from punishment, results from the insanity itself, and not from the nature of the causes which produced it. Further, although Mania a potu is essentially a temporary disease, it often happens, where there is a predisposition, that insanity is permanently established by intemperance. Now, in such a case, referring to its exciting cause,

the individual should be held responsible, throughout the whole of his after life; but the law expressly exempts him from all punishment, save the confinement which his own personal safety, not less than that of society, imperiously requires.' pp. 61, 62. We subjoin the following views of a writer in the 'Boston Medical and Surgical Journal,' relating to the same case.

'The law which holds the madman exempt from the punishment of crimes committed under the influence of his derangement, is obviously founded in reason and humanity. This immunity, however, does not, according to the common law, extend to the drunken man who commits a crime while under the excitement of liquor. There are several reasons for the severity of the law on this point, some of which respect the criminality of the evil doer, and others have a principal reference to the security of the public. We will endeavor to present these to our readers in a distinct form :

'1. Drunkenness is itself a crime, and he who alleges it as an excuse, attempts to take advantage of his own wrong. "The law," says Blackstone, "will not suffer any man to privilege one crime by another." The language of Lord Coke on this point is still stronger. "The drunkard," says he, "is voluntarius dæmon, and whatever ill he doth, his drunkenness shall aggravate it. Nam omne crimen ebrietas et incendit et detegit."

2. The drunkard deprives himself of reason, knowing that when so deprived, he is liable to commit violence on the persons of others. The first crime, therefore, includes the consequences which result from it. Such is the language of the Roman law : "Culpâ non carent, quod inebriari se passi sint." And again: "Quid quod nec dolo careant," they cannot even be acquitted of evil intention; "si non simpliciter ebrii, id est tales qui præter consuetudinem vino capti sunt, dum suas aut vini vires ignorabant, aut inviti compellebantur cum strenuis paria bibendo facere; sed vel ebriosi qui ignari non sunt quo ruere soleant vino victi, vel etiam insolentes qui hanc ob causam largius bibunt, ut audentius in injuriam eant." (Voet in Pandectas, xlviii. 10. 1.)

'3. If the law were otherwise, drunkenness might be pretended, in order to commit crime with impunity, and a fraud of this nature could not, without great difficulty, be detected.

'4. The same state might voluntarily be incurred, for the double purpose of exciting the courage to commit a crime, and of escaping its penalties; and thus the hardened villain would be furnished with direct means to elude justice. Such is the character of the wretches described by the author above quoted; "insolentes qui hanc ob causam largius bibunt, ut audacius in injuriam eant.” 'Two general propositions, then, are involved in the law on this subject: 1. That in using liquor to excess, knowing its