Obituary Notice of the Hon. Bushrod Washington, late one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the U. Trial of a Deaf and Dumb Person Legislative Decrees of Divorce Summary process against tenants to compel a surrender 1. The Probate Laws of Massachusetts, digested and arranged; comprising the subjects of Wills, Devi- ses, Legacies, Dower, Descents, and Distributions, &c. With an Appendix of Forms. By William 2. The Probate Directory, or a Complete System of Forms for the use of Probate Courts; together with Directions for Proceedings in the various stages of administering and settling Estates, according to the existing laws of New Hampshire, and containing the substance of the Probate Laws of Massachusetts and the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in 1826 and 1827. By Thomas Harris and Richard 2. Connecticut Reports. Vol. VII. Part I. Or Vol. II. Part I. of New Series. Containing Rights of Slave Holders, in the states in which slavery AMERICAN JURIST. No. V. JANUARY, 1830. ART. I.-INSANITY PRODUCED BY INTEMPERANCE. THE subject of medical jurisprudence has not, until within a few years, received the attention to which it is entitled as a branch of legal study. Previous to Dr. Beck's 'Elements of Medical Jurisprudence,' there was no systematic work in our language, which could be recommended to the student at law as containing a clear and comprehensive view of what has been well defined 'the science which applies the principles and practice of the different branches of medicine to the elucidation of doubtful questions in courts of justice.' In most cases where knowledge of this kind is to be applied, great reliance is placed upon the opinions of medical men, whose information and experience best enable them to form a correct judgment. But as these opinions are to be drawn from them upon their examination as witnesses, it must be admitted that some acquaintance with this science is necessary to enable the court to estimate the extent of the witness's knowledge, to weigh the force of his evidence, and to judge of the correctness of his conclusions. It is indeed essential to the right administration of justice in criminal cases. In questions of homicide, for instance, a little experience in courts of justice will show how requisite it is for the jurist to have some acquaintance with the nature of diseases, the effects of violence upon the human system, and the vast variety of causes which produce death. What is an adequate cause of death? did it happen in the course of nature, or by accident? was it occasioned by violence or hastened by cruel treatment? are often material points of inquiry. In questions of insanity, which form a most im portant class, how indispensible it is to become acquainted with the variety of cases in which the mysterious operations of this subtile disease have been traced; to ascertain the various forms in which it appears; to know how difficult it sometimes is to detect its secret influence, and the impossibility of finding out in what it consists, so as to define it with certainty; to be able to distinguish between a feigned insanity and that which is real; between that which is the effect of irregular habits and voluntary indulgence, and that which is secretly lurking about and may be considered as inherent in the constitution. A full collection of the cases which have been judicially decided, methodically arranged and classified under proper heads, with a summary of the evidence, elucidated by the results of medical observation and experience, together with a clear exposition of the principles of law as applied to each particular case, is a work yet wanting. No principle in criminal law is more universally admitted than that the insane man is not responsible for his acts; that guilt does not attach to the individual who is unconscious of his deeds; that it is the criminal mind, the wicked intent, which makes him the subject of punishment. And yet this principle must be received with some qualification. Voluntary insanity, brought on by indulgence and excess, is no excuse for crime. A homicide, committed in the phrensy of intoxication, subjects the offender to punishment. And here insanity and its cause must not be confounded. The law discriminates between the delirium of intoxication and the insanity which it sometimes produces. While the drunkenness continues, the person under its influence is responsible as a moral agent, though reason in the meantime has lost her dominion; but when the intoxication ceases, if insanity immediately follow as a consequence of the vice, he is, in the eye of criminal justice, no longer amenable for his acts. This legal distinction in the criminality of acts in relation to insanity and its causes, is exemplified in cases of delirium tremens, a species of madness which often deprives the sufferer of the power of distinguishing between right and wrong, and which medical writers attribute to frequent intoxication, or the sudden cessation from habitual drinking, or to the combined effect of both upon the system. But, however just the distinction, it does not appear to have been judicially settled before the decision of Justices Story and Davis, in a late case, which it is the design of these few preliminary remarks to introduce. |