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possible consequences, the drunkard makes himself answerable for these consequences. 2. That the public welfare requires that he should be held thus answerable. We have then to consider the correctness of these principles in themselves, and their application to the case of delirium tremens.

'1. If it be true, then, that he who indulges in liquor makes. himself responsible for all its effects, the maniac a potu can no more claim immunity, than he who acts under the immediate influence of intoxication. We cannot escape this conclusion by saying, that the delirium in question is a remote and distinct effect of the indulgence; that it occurs as the sequel of long-continued and repeated excess; or that it often, nay generally, happens in consequence of withdrawing the very stimulus to which the drunkard is accustomed. It is still among the effects of this vice; an evil which subsists in virtue of intemperance, and which would not subsist without it. If, then, in the phrensy of his delirium, the unfortunate subject of it commits murder, this too was among those possible consequences of his original excess, for which he made himself responsible. But is it not obvious that this mode of reasoning proves too much? Suppose the drunkard to have passed through the successive paroxysms of ebriety, and even the short-lived mania of delirium tremens, without committing any serious act of violence on the persons of his fellowmen. A darker doom now awaits him. The repeated shocks which his reason has received have finally overpowered it. He becomes permanently insane, and while in this state, commits an outrage on the person, or takes the life, of some one unhappily exposed to his fury. Would it be said that the action was not excused by his insanity, because he brought that insanity on himself? Such an argument never could be listened to with patience, either within a court of justice or without it. By the late reports of madhouses in England, it will be seen, that a very considerable proportion of their inmates have become so from this indulgence. All these, then, are moral agents, and responsible for the crimes they perpetrate. Nor is this all. The victim of gaming, of debauchery, of unnatural crime, are equally in this sense the authors of their own misfortunes; and shall we add to this the imputation of guilt, when their phrensy has inspired them to the commission of acts, in their nature violent and unlawful? We freely confess that such a sentiment seems to us to violate the plainest dictates of humanity, and we are not aware that it is sanctioned by the laws of any civilized nation.

'2. Are the considerations of expediency, on which the drunken man is made responsible, equally applicable to the subject of Mania a potu? The reasons for the law, arising out of these considerations, are, as abovementioned, the ease with which drunkenness may be simulated, and the possibility of its being

induced for the sake of committing crime. Neither of these reasons has any application to the case of delirium tremens. With regard to the first, we venture to assert, that there is no form of mania, the counterfeiting of which is attended with more serious difficulty than the one in question. It is a disease induced by peculiar causes, and accompanied and marked by appropriate symptoms, some of which it is utterly impossible to simulate. It is a disease which comes on slowly, with gradually increasing violence, until it arrives at its acme, which often does not happen for many days. The task of one who should attempt to counterfeit its gradual progress and its eventual paroxysm, is beyond almost any effort of deception which the mind can conceive. To suppose, then, that it would be feigned by one intending to commit an outrage, as the most convenient means of doing so with impunity, is utterly extravagant. As respects the second reason, we hold it still less applicable to the case under consideration. This state could not be induced at the will of the intentional criminal; nor if it could, and the zeal of the individual was sufficient to induce him to hazard his life in such a project, could it be subjected to his control, and made subservient to his views. The notion of design, therefore, in its production, is entirely too absurd for serious refutation.

In re

'But if it is said we must prove the maniac a potu to have been actually insane, in order to entitle him to the consideration claimed, the demand is unquestionably reasonable and just. Whether the prisoner was or was not so, in any particular case, is matter of evidence, and must be decided by proper testimony. gard to this point, there is an important distinction, which has been often made, and which is laid down with sufficient precision by Dr. Drake. Unless it appear in evidence by the actions of the prisoner, that in regard to a particular subject or train of ideas, his reason was actually perverted, and farther, that the murder, or other outrage, was the consequence of this particular perversion, was committed in accordance with the false premises and erroneous notions thus adopted,-unless both these points were clearly made out, he should be held guilty. On all but the particular subjects of his phrensy, the maniac is a moral agent, and responsible to the laws; and if he perpetrates a criminal action, aware of its nature, and conscious of the outrage he commits, he makes himself a subject for the penalty of these laws.

'We would add one remark, which, though not essential to the argument, will tend to illustrate still more strongly the distinction between delirium tremens, and the paroxysm of intoxication. It has been said that drunkenness does not impair the judgment, except as it inflames the passions, and exhibits them in a true though stronger light. As, then, violent passion from moral causes furnishes no excuse for the actions committed under its

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influence, similar excitement from a physical cause ought to be viewed in the same light. "Ebrietas omne crimen incendit et detegit," and if the drunkard is only exhibiting his true character, stripped of the disguise which in his sober intervals he is able to throw over it, he is not the less a moral agent, and answerable for his conduct. Something like this is a strain of argument, adduced seriously, we presume, by the learned commentator on the Pandects before quoted. "Etsi vero tale propositum talisque machinatio præmeditata non est in illis qui impetu peccant, non tamen dolus in universum deest; nam et homicida impetu peccat, non modo cum justi sed et cum injusti doloris impetu, et sub iræ motu ad cædem procedit." (Voet xlviii. 10. 1.)

6 Whatever may be thought of the soundness of this philosophy in view of the ebrious paroxysm, it is evident that it does not at all apply to the subject of delirium tremens. He exhibits nothing of that exaggerated state of the passions, of that boisterous violence which marks the drunken man; he is timid, watchful, and jealous; and much more disposed to apprehend injury from others, than wantonly to inflict it on them. Such was the state of the individual in the case alluded to, and surely there is none which renders a man more truly and deservedly an object of compassion.

'Judging of the case, then, on these principles, we have no hesitation in saying, that the act of the prisoner was the act of a madman. The idea which constantly presented itself to his mind, was that of a plot formed against his life, which placed him in continual and imminent danger. Under this delusion, he threatened his wife with a speedy punishment, if she did not desist from her purpose. From these premises he drew the conclusion, that the destruction of his supposed enemies was an act of self-defence, and on this conclusion he acted. No case of mania could be more perfect in all its parts, or present a stronger claim to forbearance and mercy.

'We conclude, then, that the law which makes the drunken man responsible for his actions is, both in its principle and its policy, wholly inapplicable to the case of the maniac a potu; and that the latter is entitled to all the privileges which madness, under any circumstances, can confer on its unhappy subject. We would add what we consider an equally important inference, that the treatment of this form of mania ought to be regulated on the same principles as that of any other. The case above cited is a melancholy proof that maniacs of this description require the constant vigilance of friends, to prevent them from doing mischief to themselves or those near them. We are satisfied that the amount of care bestowed is in many instances wholly insufficient, and that great hazards are frequently incurred from indulging the notion that the subjects of this delirium are altogether harmless.

There are two rules in regard to persons in this situation, which ought to be rigidly adhered to; one, that they be never suffered to go abroad alone; and secondly, that they should never be left in the care of female relatives. That both these precautions are often neglected with impunity, we are well aware; but this by no means disproves the existence of the danger; and the occurrence, in a single instance, of the horrible consequences above related, affords a warning which we hope will not be disregarded.' Boston Med. and Surg. Jour. pp. 568-572.

ART. II.-TESTIMONY OF PERSONS INTERESTED IN A SUIT.

Whether persons interested in the event of a cause, ought not to be rendered competent witnesses on the trial thereof before a jury.

THE discovery of truth is admitted by all to be of the highest importance in every department of science and every pursuit of life. The noblest efforts of the human mind have been exerted in innumerable modes to obtain it; and those who have been most successful in their researches, may justly be considered the greatest intellectual benefactors of mankind. The fountain of truth is always pure; the essential difficulty is to find those streams which are least polluted by the thousand channels through which it is conducted to the mind. All channels, however, should be examined for the purpose of finding the treasure of which we are in pursuit; the gold must be separated from the surrounding substance and impurity; and the labor will not be in vain.

Perhaps no department of the law presents a greater variety of questions, often difficult and perplexing, than that which has relation to the competency of witnesses, against whom the objection of interest in the event of the depending suit has been made; and yet new cases are constantly presented for decision; every new volume which appears furnishes new distinctions and refinements; and we seem to be now as far from certainty as we were in the year 1789, when the important and leading case of Bent v. Baker was decided, reported in 1 Durnford & East. That case firmly established a distinction, which different judges often gladly admitted before in

advancement of justice, between an interest in the question in controversy and an interest in the event of the cause. According to the principle of that case, a witness is admissible, although interested in the question, if he is not interested in the event of the cause. Since that decision, the practice has generally been in conformity to it. Still the question is continually recurring, whether a witness who is offered, is, in the peculiar circumstances in which he stands, interested in the event of the suit.

In examining the question at the head of this article, we must remember that witnesses, like all other persons, are under the influence of feelings, wishes, passions, prejudices, principles, education, and respect for themselves and the cause of truth and justice, in a greater or less degree. Some have an exalted sense of religious obligation and are ever disposed to act conscientiously under the influence of virtuous feelings and principles; and as far as in their power, promoting the interests of truth and justice; while others are governed by motives, passions, and principles, which endanger the rights of others and even expose them to ruin, when placed within their control. How far the influence of virtuous or vicious dispositions and principles is felt by a witness, and how far he governs himself by their dictates, is always a question to be settled by a consideration of all attending circumstances; and not by any one uniform and unbending rule of law, however wise in itself or however carefully applied. It is not pretended that in the administration of justice, general principles and rules must not be adopted and applied in a great variety of instances, though sometimes operating severely on individual cases and interests: the true reason is, because the advantages resulting to the community from the establishment of the principles or rules, are superior to, and of more importance than any individual injury which they will occasion.

As, in the investigation of facts, the great object in view is to discover the truth, that process which is best adapted for the purpose must be acknowledged by all to be the most judicious and eligible. Experience has proved that the principle. established in Bent v. Baker, is a wise and salutary one. The cause of truth has been promoted by it; and the light which, under its operation, has been permitted to lay open to view many interesting facts in the trial of a cause, has rendered the decision of that cause more conformable to the soundest princi

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