DIGEST OF RECENT DECISIONS. THIS number contains a digest of the principal cases in DAY'S CONNECTICUT REPORTS, Vol. VII. Part 1. ACTION. 1. A promise by a debtor to his creditor to pay his debt to a third person, will not enable such person to maintain an action at law, in his own name, for its recovery. Owings's Ex'rs. v. Owings, 1 Har. & Gill, 484. 2. Where one person pays money to another for the use of a third person, or where a person, having ready money belonging to another, agrees with that other to pay it over to a third person, in both these cases an action may be brought in the names of the persons beneficially interested. Ib. 3. A promise to one to pay a sum of money to several other persons in equal portions, where it was not the intention of the contracting parties, that such other persons should receive or recover by law, the entire sum, and then divide it among themselves, if the foundation of an action at all, it will confer a right to maintain a separate action for each part. Ib. See ASSUMPSIT 5, 6. ADVANCEMENT. AGREEMENT. APPRENTICE. ALIEN. See DEVISE, 3, 4, 5. See CONSIDERATION; SHIPPING ARTICLES. An alien may purchase lands, and hold them against every one, (except the State,) until office found, or until the government shall exercise its authority over them; but by the common law a feme covert, being an alien, is not entitled to be endowed, nor to inherit lands. (a) Buchanan v. Deshon, et al. 1 Har. & Gill, 280. APPEAL. The setting aside a judgment against the casual ejector, on motion of the landlord of the tenant in possession, awarding restitution of the premises, and ordering the action to be tried, is but an interlocutory proceeding, from which an appeal will not lie; (a) By the Maryland Statute of 1813, c. 100, an alien widow, resident in the United States during her coveture, is entitled to dower. and the refusal of the court below to reconsider such proceedings, does not alter the case. Gover v. Cooley, 1 Har. & Gill, 7. APPEARANCE. See PRACTICE, 3, 4. APPRAISER under Statute. See EXECUTION, 2, 3. 1. Arbitrators cannot reserve to themselves the authority to act judicially upon the subject submitted, after their powers are put an end to by making an award; neither can they delegate to another any part of their judicial authority, which is personal to themselves, nor refer to another, the decision of a point on which they find a difficulty to decide themselves, and much less to the parties to the submission, or either of them. Archer v. Williamson, 2 Har. and Gill, 62. 2. The reservation or delegation in an award of a power over the thing submitted, shows the award not to be final, and consequently void; unless, indeed, it relates only to some merely ministerial act. Ib. 3. Where the subject referred to arbitrators was one undivided matter, specifically brought to their notice, and on which they professed to act, and the purpose of the parties was to have a final determination of the whole matter submitted;—an award comprehending a part only of the matter submitted, was held to be void. Ib. ASSIGNMENT. See ACTION. ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION; DEPOSIT. BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES. 2. In an action on a promissory note, drawn in favor of C. & R. and endorsed by R. in their names, to P., the writ was against R. as surviving partner of C., but the declaration was not. It was proved that C. died before the making of the note. Judgment was rendered against R. without stating as surviving partner. On appeal-Judgment affirmed. Ib. 3. A drew a promissory note dated at Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, and there payable sixty days after date, in favor of B, or order, who endorsed it to the plaintiffs, by whom it was discounted. On the first day, after the third day of grace, payment was demanded of this note of A, who not paying it, notice of its dishonor was sent by post to Baltimore, in Maryland, to B, who did not then, nor when he endorsed the note, reside at Georgetown, in the District of Columbia. It appeared that it had been the universal practice of banks and merchants in the District of Columbia, for twenty years, to present negotiable notes due and unpaid, to the drawer for the payment, on the fourth day of grace; that such usage was of public notoriety, and that the demand and notice abovementioned, were in conformity thereto. Held, that B's contract was to be considered as made in reference to this usage; that both he and the drawer looked to the place where the money was to be paid, and the contract performed, and must be presumed to have known this usage, and he was, therefore, liable as endorser. The Bank of Columbia v. Fitzhugh, 1 Har. & Gill, 239. 4. A blank endorsement, by A, of the promissory note of B, payable to C, or order, does not imply a valuable consideration from C to A, and an engagement by A, that B was of ability to pay, and should pay, such note. Wylie v. Lewis, 7 Con. 301. See USURY. BOND. Where the legislature prescribes the substance of a bond, and it is so drawn as to include every obligation imposed by law, and to afford every defence given to it, it will be sufficient, notwithstanding it may be slightly variant from the literal form set out. Per Archer, J. Waters's Representatives v. Riley's Adm'r. 2 Har. & Gill, 305. See CORPORATION. BOOK DEBT. In an action of book debt, the plaintiff is not a competent witness to prove an acknowledgment and promise of the defendant, to take the case out of the statute of limitations. Weed v. Bishop, 7 Con. 128. CASE STATED. See PRACTICE, 1, 2. CHANCERY. 1. Where funds are in the court of chancery, and a party petitions to have them applied in discharge of his claim, it has long been the uniform practice of that court in this state, to receive the papers on which the claim is founded as prima facie evidence, and the chancellor acts on them accordingly, unless the testimony is put in issue, and full proof required by the opposite party. Maccubbin v. Cromwell, 2 Har. & Gill, 443. 2. Where the remedy at law is gone, chancery will not revive it, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake. Waters's Representatives v. Riley's Ad'mr. 2 Har. & Hill, 305. 3. Where a creditor has a right to resort to the joint and several funds of two debtors for the payment of his claim, the court of chancery has no authority to limit that right, and to decree, that if the funds of one of the debtors shall not be sufficient to discharge one half the debt, the creditor shall not look to the other for the deficiency. Hoye v. Penn, 2 Har. & Gill, 473. 4. The lands of which G. F. died seized, on the application of his heirs and representatives, were sold under an order of the court of chancery, by a trustee appointed for that purpose, to J. & C. B., and the sale was ratified. The purchasers, being creditors of J. F., one of the heirs, filed a petition setting forth their claim, the death of J. F., that his children, who were minors, resided out of the state, and praying an order of publication against them, and payment of the debt due to them. The petition did not state that the personal estate of J. F. was insufficient to pay his debts. The chancellor, without granting an order of publication, dismissed the petition. On appeal, it was held, that creditors may, by way of petition, instead of pursuing the accustomed course of an original bill, affect funds under the control of the court of chancery upon the same terms that they might by bill; and that notwithstanding the defect. in the petition in this case, the chancellor erred in deciding the merits of the petition without publication, or without an answer, and without setting it down for hearing; as the right existed, the petition might have been amended, and the defect cured, if the proceedings had proceeded to a hearing. And to enable the petitioners to subject the funds in question to the payment of debts, they must show, either that no personal fund existed applicable to the extinguishment of their claim, or that they are insufficient for that purpose; and must, in addition, establish their claim in the customary method. Baltzell v. Foss, 1 Har. & Gill, 504. See DEVISE, 6; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; TRUST AND TRUsTEES, 1. CHOSE IN ACTION; See ACTION. COMPETENCY OF WITNESS; See EVIDENCE, 9, 10. 1. A mere written contract is upon the footing of a parol contract, and requires a consideration to support it Cook v. Bradley, 7 Con. 57. 2. A subsisting legal obligation to do a thing, is a sufficient consideration for a promise to do that thing. Ib. 3. A son of sufficient ability is under no legal obligation to pay for past expenditures, made for the relief of an indigent parent. Ib. 4. A moral obligation is available as a consideration for an express promise, in those cases, and in those only, where a prior legal obligation has existed, which by reason of some statute, or stubborn rule of law, cannot now be enforced. Ib. 5. Therefore, where A had furnished necessaries to B, who was indigent, and in need of relief, and C, the son of B, who was of sufficient ability, signed and delivered to A a writing in these words: This may certify, that the debt now due from my father B, to A, I acknowledge to be for necessaries of life, and of such a nature, that I consider myself hereby obligated to pay A sixty dollars towards said debt now due, provided my father does not settle with A in his life-time ;' it was held, that this contract was void, for want of consideration, and consequently, that no action could be supported on it. lb. See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See JURISDICTION; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. CONTRACT. See CONSIDERATION; DELIVERY OF CHATTel. CORPORATION. 1. To render the vote of an incorporated company valid as the act of the corporation, the meeting at which it was passed must have been warned, in the mode prescribed by the charter or by-laws, or, in the absence of any such provision, by personal notice to the members. Stow v. Wyse, 7 Con. 217. 2. The general agent of a manufacturing company is not authorized, without a special power, to transfer, by deed, the real estate of the company. Ib. 3. A party who has executed a deed, is thereby estopped from disputing not only the deed itself, but every fact which it recites. Ib. 4. Therefore, where a person executed a deed in behalf of a manufacturing company, and therein declared, that he was empowered, by a vote of the company, to execute such deed; it was held, that he was thereby estopped to deny that he was thus empowered. Ib. 5. All persons claiming under and through the party estopped by a deed, are bound by the estoppel. Ib. 6. In the trial of an action of assumpsit by a chartered company, under the general issue, the plaintiff having given a charter in evidence, by which it appeared that the duration of the company was limited to a period subsequent to the commencement of the suit, yet anterior to the time of trial, the defendant cannot |