of these emotions, it is previously necessary to investigate the nature of those trains of thought that are produced by objects of sublimity and beauty, and their difference from those ordinary trains, which are unaccompanied with such pleasure.

As far as I am able to judge, this difference consists in two things. 1st, In the nature of the ideas or conceptions which compose such trains: and, 2dly, in the nature or law of their succession.

I.

In our ordinary trains of thought, every man must be conscious that the ideas which compose them, are very frequently of a kind which excite no emotions either of pleasure or pain. There is an infinite variety of our ideas, as well as of our sensations, that may be termed indifferent, which are perceived without any sentiment either of pain or pleasure, and which pass as it were before the mind, without making any farther impression than simply exciting the consciousness of their existence. That such ideas compose a great part, and perhaps the greatest part, of our ordinary trains of thought, is apparent from the single consideration, that such trains are seldom. attended with emotion of any kind.

The

The trains of thought which are suggested by external objects, are very frequently of a similar kind. greater part of such objects are simply indifferent, or at least are regarded as indifferent in our common hours either of occupation or amusement: the conceptions which they produce, by the laws of association, partake of the nature or character of the object which originally excited them, and the whole train passes through our mind without leaving any farther emotion, than perhaps that general emotion of pleasure which accompanies the

exercise of our faculties. It is scarcely possible for us to pass an hour of our lives without experiencing some train of thought of this kind, suggested by some of the external objects which happen to surround us. The indifference with which such trains are either pursued or deserted, is a sufficient evidence, that the ideas of which they are composed are in general of a kind unfitted to produce any emotion, either of pleasure or pain.

In the case of those trains of thought, on the contrary, which are suggested by objects either of sublimity or beauty, I apprehend it will be found, that they are in all cases composed of ideas capable of exciting some affection or emotion; and that not only the whole succession is accompanied with that peculiar emotion, which we call the emotion of beauty or sublimity, but that every individual idea of such a succession is in itself productive of some simple emotion or other. Thus the ideas suggested by the scenery of spring, are ideas productive of emotions of cheerfulness, of gladness, and of tender. ness. The images suggested by the prospect of ruins, are images belonging to pity, to melancholy, and to ad. miration. The ideas, in the same manner, awakened by the view of the ocean in a storm, are ideas of power, of majesty, and of terror. In every case where the emoand of t tions of taste are felt, I conceive it will be found, that the train of thought which is excited, is distinguished by some character of emotion, and that it is by this means distinguished from our common or ordinary successions of thought. To prevent a very tedious and unnecessary circumlocution, such ideas may perhaps, without any impropriety, be termed ideas of emotion; and I shall beg leave therefore to use the expression in this sense.

The first circumstance, then, which seems to distin guish those trains of thought which are produced by ob.

jects either of sublimity or beauty, is, that the ideas or conceptions of which they are composed, are ideas of emotion.

II.

In our ordinary trains of thought, there seldom appears any general principle of connexion among the ideas which compose them. Each idea, indeed, is related, by an established law of our nature, to that which immediately preceded and that which immediately follows it, but in the whole series there is no predominant relation or bond of connexion. This want of general connexion is so strong, that even that most general of all relations, the relation either of pleasure or pain, is frequently violated. Images both of the one kind and the other, succeed each other in the course of the train; and when we put an end to it, we are often at a loss to say, whether the whole series was pleasant or painful. Of this irregularity, I think every man will be convinced, who chooses to attend to it.

In those trains, on the contrary, which are suggested by objects of sublimity or beauty, however slight the connexion between individual thoughts may be, I believe it will be found, that there is always some general principle of connexion which pervades the whole, and gives them some certain and definite character. They are either gay, or pathetic, or melancholy, or solemn, or awful, or elevating, &c. according to the nature of the emotion which is first excited. Thus the prospect of a serene evening in summer, produces first an emotion of peacefulness and tranquillity, and then suggests a variety of ima ges corresponding to this primary impression. The sight of a torrent, or a storm, in the same manner, impresses us first with sentiments of awe, or solemnity, or terror, and then awakens in our minds a series of concep

tions allied to this peculiar emotion. Whatever may be the character of the original emotion, the images which succeed seem all to have a relation to this character; and if we trace them back, we shall discover not only a connexion between the individual thoughts of the train, but also a general relation among the whole, and a conformity to that peculiar emotion which first excited them.

The train of thought, therefore, which takes place in the mind, upon the prospect of objects of sublimity and beauty, may be considered as consisting in a regular or consistent train of ideas of emotion, and as distinguished from our ordinary trains of thought. 1st. In respect of the nature of the ideas of which it is composed, by their being ideas productive of emotion: and, 2dly, In respect of their succession, by their being distinguished by some general principle of connexion, which subsists through the whole extent of the train.

The truth of the account which I have now given of the nature of that train of thought which attends the emotions of sublimity and beauty, must undoubtedly at last be determined by its conformity to general experience and observation. There are some considerations, however, of a very obvious and familiar kind, which it may be useful to suggest to the reader, for the purpose of affording him a method of investigating with accuracy the truth of this account.

If it is true that the ideas which compose that train of thought, which attends the emotions of taste, are uniformly ideas of emotion, then it ought in fact to be found that no objects or qualities are experienced to be beautiful or sublime, but such as are productive of some simple emotion.

If it is true that such trains of thought are uniformly distinguished by some general principle of connexion,

then it ought also to be found, that no composition of ob jects or qualities produces such emotions, in which this unity of character or of emotion is not preserved.

I shall endeavour, at some length, to illustrate that truth of both these propositions.

SECTION II.

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That no objects, or qualities in objects, are, in facie felt either as beautiful or sublime, but such as are productive of some simple emotion, seems evident from the following familiar considerations.

I.

Wherever the emotions of sublimity or beauty are felt, I believe it will be found, that some affection is uniformly excited, by the presence of the object, before the more complex emotion of beauty is felt; and that if no such affection is excited, no emotion of beauty or sublimity is produced. The truth of this observation may be illustrated, both from common language, and common experience.

1. If any man were to assert, that some object, though positively indifferent or uninteresting, was yet beautiful or sublime, every one would consider it as asserting an absurdity. If, on the other hand, he were to assert, that the object had neither beauty nor sublimity to him, because there was no quality in it which could give him any emotion, I apprehend we should not only clearly understand his meaning, but very readily allow his reason; and if the object were such as appeared to us in the light either of sublimity or beauty, and we wished to make him sensible of it, the way that we should naturally take would be to point out to him some affecting or interesting