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port the motives of the actors, however base or mean. In a poetical representation of such events, no such confusion is permitted to appear. A representation destined by its nature to affect, must not only be founded upon some great or interesting subject, but, in the management of this subject, such means only must be employed as are fitted to preserve, and to promote the interest and the sympathy of the reader. The historian who should relate the voyage of Æneas, and the foundation of Rome, must of necessity relate many trifling and uninteresting events, which could be valuable only from their being true. The poet who should attempt this subject, must introduce only pathetic or sublime events-must unfold their connexion with greater clearness-must point out their consequences as of greater moment-and must spread over all that tone and character of dignity which we both expect and demand in a composition, des. tined to excite the sensibility, and to awaken the admiration of mankind. Even that species of poem which has been called by the critics the historical epic, and which is only a poetical narration of real events, is yet in some measure subjected to the same rule; and though we do not expect from it the sublime machinery, or the artful conduct of the real epic, we yet demand a more uniform tone of elevation, and a purer and more dignified selection of incidents, than from the strict narrative of real history. In both, the poet assumes the character of a person deeply impressed with the magnitude or the interest of the story he relates. To impress his reader with similar sentiments, is the end and object of his work; and he can no otherwise do this, than by presenting to his mind only such incidents as accord with these great emotions, by leaving out whatever in the real history of the event may be mean or uninteresting, and by the in

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vention of every circumstance that, while it is consistent with probability, may raise the subject of his work into greater importance in his esteem. That it is by this rule accordingly the conduct of the epic poem is determined, is too obvious to require any illustration.

The same unity of emotion is demanded in dramatic poetry, at least in the highest and noblest species of it, tragedy; and in the conduct of the drama, this unity of character is fully as essential as any of those three unities, of which every book of criticism is so full. If it is painful to us, when we are deeply engaged in some great interest, to turn our minds to the consideration of some other event, it is fully as painful to us, in the midst of our admiration or our sympathy, and while our hearts are swelling with tender or with elevated emotions, to descend to the consideration of minute, or mean, or unimportant incidents, however naturally they may be connected with the story, or however much we may be convinced that they actually took place. The envy which Elizabeth entertained of the beauty of Mary of Scotland, was certainly one cause, and probably a great cause of the distresses of that most unfortunate Queen; but if a poet, in a tragedy founded upon her pathetic story, should introduce the scene which Melville describes in his memoirs, and in which the weakness of Elizabeth is so apparent, we should consider it both as degrading to the dignity of tragedy, and unsuited to the nature of the emotion which the story is fitted to raise. It is hence that tragi-comedy is utterly indefensible, after all that has been said in its defence. If it is painful to us in such cases to descend to the consideration of indifferent incidents, it is a thousand times more painful to be forced to attend to those that are ludicrous; and there is no man of the most common sensibility, who does not feel his

mind revolt, and his indignation kindle at the absurdity of the poet, who can thus break in upon the sacred retirement of his sorrow, with the intolerable noise of vulgar mirth. Had the taste of Shakspeare been equal to his genius, or had his knowledge of the laws of the drama corresponded to his knowledge of the human heart, the effect of his compositions would not only have been greater than it now is, but greater perhaps than we can well imagine; and had he attempted to produce, through a whole composition, that powerful and uniform interest which he can raise in a single scene, nothing of that perfection would have been wanting, of which we may conceive this sublime art to be capable.

Of the necessity of this unity of emotion, Corneille is the first tragedian of modern Europe who seems to have been sensible; and I know not whether the faults of this poet have not been exaggerated by English' critics, from their inattention to the end which he seems to have prescribed to himself in his works. To present a faithful picture of human life, or of human passions, seems not to have been his conception of the intention of tragedy. His object, on the contrary, seems to have been, to exalt and to elevate the imagination; to awaken only the greatest and noblest passions of the human mind; and, by presenting such scenes and such events alone, as could most powerfully promote this end, to render the theatre a school of sublime instruction, rather than an imitation of common life. To effect this purpose, he was early led to see the necessity, or disposed by the greatness of his own mind to the observation, of an uniform character of dignity; to disregard whatever of common, of trivial, or even of pathetic in the originals from which he copied, might serve to interrupt this liar flow of emotion; and instead of giving a simple copy

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of nature, to adorn the events he represented, with all that eloquence and poetry could afford. He maintains, accordingly, in all his best plays, amid much exaggeration, and much of the false eloquence of his time, a tone of commanding, and even of fascinating dignity, which disposes us almost to believe, that we are conversing with Beings of an higher order than our own; and which blinds us, at least for a time, to all the faults and all the imperfections of his composition. I am far from being disposed to defend his opinions of tragedy, and still less to excuse his extravagance and bombast; but I conceive, that no person can feel his beauties, or do justice to his merits, who does not regard his tragedies in this view; and I think that some allowance ought to be made for the faults of a poet, who first shewed to his country the example of regular tragedy, and whose works the great Prince of Condé called "The Breviary of kings."

In the former section, I have endeavoured to show, that no objects are in themselves fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, which are not productive of some simple emotion. In this, I have attempted to show, that no composition of objects or qualities is in fact productive of such emotions, in which an unity of character is not preserved. The slight illustrations which I have now offered, are probably sufficient to point out the truth of the general principle; but the application of it to the different arts of taste, and the explanation of the great rules of composition from this constitution of our nature, are objects far beyond the limits of these Essays. I must satisfy myself, therefore, with observing in general, that, in all the fine arts, that composition is most excellent, in which the different parts most fully unite in the production of one unmingled emotion, and that taste the most perfect, where the per

ception of this relation of objects, in point of expression, is most delicate and precise.

CONCLUSION.

I.

THE illustrations in the first chapter of this Essay are intended to show, that whenever the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt, that exercise of imagination is produced which consists in the prosecution of a train of thought.

The illustrations in the second chapter are intended to point out the distinction between such trains, and our ordinary trains of thought, and to show, that this difference consists, 1st, In the ideas which compose them, being in all cases ideas of emotion; and 2dly, In their possessing an uniform principle of connexion through the whole of the train. The effect, therefore, which is produced upon the mind, by objects of taste, may be considered as consisting in the production of a regular or consistent train of ideas of emotion.

II.

The account which I have now given of this effect, may perhaps serve to point out an important distinction between the emotions of taste, and all our different emotions of simple pleasure. In the case of these last emotions, no additional train of thought is necessary. The pleasurable feeling follows immediately the presence of the object or quality, and has no dependence upon any thing for its perfection, but the sound state of the sense by which it is received. The emotions of joy, pity, benevolence, gratitude, utility, propriety, novelty, &c. might undoubtedly be felt, although we had no such

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