THE NEW JAPAN 149 of those foreigners she had retained, in order that she might benefit by their instruction, which is the manifestation of the present policy of "Japan for the Japanese," has not tended to strengthen the feelings of amity which undoubtedly exist between her and the Powers of Europe and America; and the very marked ability she displayed in her conduct of the war in 1894-5 served to make her neighbours ponder as to where that sort of thing might end. While ready to lend a helping hand for the development of Japan, the Powers had no intention of contributing to the building up of a military and naval power rival to themselves; and the question as to the limitations of Japanese ambition became raised somewhat anxiously. And above all it was realised that the Japanese are orientals, and as such capable of all that duplicity and far-sighted persistence which renders such people intractable opponents. Thus it comes about that the new Japan has never been accepted with that enthusiasm which was accorded the reorganisation of the Balkan States; and the Powers, while recognising the undoubted progress going on, have come to wonder how future developments are likely to affect European interests. The question of future possibilities indeed opens up a vista of prospects staggering in their immensity. Supposing that Japan succeeded in inoculating China with her progressive spirit, what in such a contingency would be the situation? With a united population comprising nearly one-third of the people of the entire world united in their competition with Western civilisation, and the aim of conquest sown among them, come the seeds of an Armageddon terrible to contemplate, and sufficient to justify well nigh any counter action possible to human ingenuity. But the trend of recent events does not lie in this direction; and the perils of the yellow danger need not occupy the serious attention of the present generation. CHAPTER VIII THE SITUATION Factors in the balance of power-Influence of force-Superiority of Great Britain-Her resources-Her neglect of opportunitiesStatus of Japan and Russia-Relative strength of the Powers in the Far East-Preponderance of British interests-Hong KongIts defences-Wei Hai Wei-Kiao Chau-Vladivostok-Port Arthur-China's weakness-Her navy-Her army-The Korean army-Japan-Her armaments-Her navy-Her arsenals-Her army-Rival aims in the Far East-The policy of Japan-The limits of Russian action-Conflict in method-England's gullibilityMuscovite insistence-Its success-Responsibility for crisis in China-How to check Russia-The partition of China-Difficulty of agreement Chances of the struggle-British action-The role of Japan-The alliance of France-The crisis bound to come-The only hope for China. THE political situation in the Far East is comprised in the relations between the two sets of Powers: the one moribund, lacking in energy, and conservative; and the other able, active, and ambitious. The balance between these is further complicated by the circumstance that the dominant factors, consisting of the capable and aggressive forces, are divided among themselves as to their aims and methods; and any arrangement as to a united course of action is impossible. The controlling principle in this, as in all other political questions, is that of force. But, here again, the situation is ill defined, inasmuch as the capacity for selfassertion is so evenly distributed as to render the result of an appeal to arms an open question. Any attempt to gauge the relative strength of the Powers in the Far East must be guided as much by the consideration of SUPERIORITY OF GREAT BRITAIN 151 opportunity as by that of force. For purposes of active interference in Eastern Asia, the advantage remains not with the nation which is the strongest, but with that which has the greatest available strength on the spot, and although the subsequent arrival of an army, or a fleet, may considerably modify the status quo, the gain derivable from early, immediate, and prompt action must remain evident. Any comparisons between the European Powers possessing interests in the Far East must result in the recognition of the ultimate superiority of Great Britain alike in strength and resources. No probable combination of the navies of the world would be superior to that of this country; and the wealth possessed by us is so inexhaustible as to ensure our being able to hold out long after the time when any other Power's resources would be exhausted. But a review of the handling of our power in the Far East during recent years leads to the conclusion that we have by no means made the best use either of our influence or our opportunities; and alike by the exhibition of a weakness in policy, and a lack of determination in action, we have allowed that influence which should be ours by right to revert to other hands. It is only necessary to glance at our spheres of influence in the Far East, and contrast them with those of other Powers, to arrive at an appreciation of this fact. Our defences are deficient, often antiquated, and in some cases entirely lacking; while every Russian, French and German station bristles with powerful guns, sheltered behind earthworks of the most modern kind. The reply given to these strictures is generally an appeal to the strength of the British fleet, which, it is urged, would deal with any enemy before she approaches our territory; but in order to do this it is necessary to have a superior fleet on the spot to that maintained by any other Power; and it is open to question whether we have this. A strong squadron in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean would avail us little in the event of an attack on Hong Kong; and the loss of time involved in sum |