had given circulation was true in fact and was not published or circulated with criminal intent. Another section provides that persons who either orally or in writing disseminate or attempt to disseminate obscene, seditious, or defamatory matter may be bound over and required to find sureties to be of good behavior for twelve months. The law was further amended so as to make cases of sedition and cognate offenses triable, not only in a court of sessions before a jury, as before, but also by magistrates with summary jurisdiction. Native members of the Legislative Council vigorously objected to the enactment of these new laws without a full discussion. The separation of judicial and executive functions was again asserted to be the only means of securing the efficient administration of justice in criminal cases.

Mohammedan Disturbances.-The unusual excitement in the world of Islam led to fresh outbreaks of the smoldering religious animosity always existing between the Mohammedan and Hindu communities. The Hindu Pandit Lekhi Ram, who had written a pamphlet violently attacking the Mohammedan religion and also Christianity, was murdered early in March at Lahore by a pretended convert from Mohammedanism. Some Hindus were assaulted at Peshawar, and notices were posted in different towns threatening the lives of Hindu and Sikh leaders. Mohammedan anger had been wrought up by English denunciations of the Sultan as an assassin, and when the commander of the faithful, whom the English people seemed bent on destroying because he represented the might of Islam, achieved a victory over Christian arms the spirit of unrest and disorder spread among the Mohammedans, from the usually loyal, but now sullenly resentful communities in Bombay and Calcutta to the untamed Pathan tribes on the Afghan border. On July 1 and 2 one third of the city of Calcutta was in possession of 5,000 determined anti-European Mohammedan rioters who had the passive sympathy of their Hindu fellowcitizens. The rioting arose in the suburb of Chitpur out of the demolition by the authorities of a building that the Mohammedans claimed was a mosque. In the night 150 workmen rebuilt the edifice, protected by 2.000 Mohammedans, who fought off the police. The troops were called out to disperse the mob, which quickly reassembled and was re-enforced from all quarters of Calcutta. The rioters, exasperated by being fired upon by the police patrols, who killed 11 and wounded a great many, attacked Europeans wherever they were found in the streets, stoning their carriages and dragging them from their horses. After the military had once cleared the streets the rioting broke out afresh, and when it was finally put down it was necessary to patrol the city constantly with cavalry until the original dispute was settled.

Frontier Wars.-The rising passions of the Indian Mussulmans and the triumphs of Mussulman arms in the West communicated a warlike spirit to the mountain tribes on the northwestern border, over whom the British have attempted gradually to extend a military control, partly with the object of absorbing as much as possible of Afghanistan and occupying the country in the northeast up to the very limit of the British sphere acknowledged in the Anglo-Russian agreement, partly in the hope of eventually converting these fierce and intrepid Pathans into material for the Indian army. After the last Afghan war the British retired from the frontier chosen by Lord Lytton's government, involving the retention of Kandahar and Jelalabad in Afghanistan, to the scientific frontier marked by the Khaibar and Kuram passes of the HinduKush and the advanced fortified post of Quetta in

Beluchistan, covering the railroad that preserved the strategic command of Kandahar and Kabul, and, before the last Russian advance, of Herat. The new forward policy was begun by the operations of Sir Robert Sandeman in 1886 and 1887 among the Beluchis. On the whole, it seemed to be more profitable in this quarter to reduce the tribes to military control and civilizing forces than to conduct periodical punitive expeditions against them when they tore up the railroad or attacked outposts. The Kuram pass was left in charge of the tribes of that region, who, being Sunnite Mohammedans, begged for British protection against the Shiite Afghans. By subsidizing one of the Mohmand chiefs and paying liberal allowances to the Afridis the British secured an agreement by which those tribes undertook to protect and keep open the two outlets of the Khaibar pass, while the Orakzais, dwelling south of the pass, were paid heavily to abstain from raids and outrages. The agreements made with these tribes acknowledged their full sovereignty over their country and the passes of the mountains. The Durand agreement of 1893 with the Ameer of Afghanistan drew a line through the country west of the Khaibar, placing a part of the Mohmand tribes in the British sphere, and even dividing individual clans in such a way that chiefs whose seats were in Afghanistan ruled over tribes whose country lay mostly within the new Indian frontier. Little has yet been done to give effect to this arrangement, but the rapid encroachments on Afghanistan left no doubt in the minds of these people of what their fate would be. The Indian Government has contemplated demarcating the new frontier, and has only been deterred by the hostile attitude of the Mohmands. The Pamir scare led to political activity of the British in Chitral, in the extreme northeast, beyond the independent states of Swat, Dir, and Bajaur.

When the Government decided on the Chitral expedition in 1895 it issued a proclamation giving notice to the usurping chief to withdraw from Chitral, and stating that its sole object was to put an end to the present, and to prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory; that as soon as that object had been attained the force would be withdrawn; that the Government had no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which the troops passed or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and that it would scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility toward the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrained from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. On the strength of this pledge the Government obtained the permission and aid of the tribes of the Swat valley and other intervening tribes to open the road from Peshawar to Chitral, and was thus enabled to rescue the beleaguered English garrison and drive out the invaders. The Conservative Government that succeeded in England decided to perpetuate the occupation of Chitral, and consequently to establish a control over the intervening tribes whose independence their predecessors had promised to respect in order to keep open and maintain the road. The Liberal Government had been partly influenced in their intention of evacuating Chitral by a desire not to break faith with the people among whom the campaign had taken place. The Conservative Government eventually made agreements with the Sultan Khel and Painda Khel, two of the five tribes of Dir, for the construction of a permanent road over the Malakand pass and its defense by their levies, subsidizing the chief of these tribes, the Khan of Dir, who in addition to liberal money payments thus secured protection against a more powerful claimant for the throne,

Umra Khan, of Jandaul, who had dispossessed him, so that he only recovered his country in 1895, when the British drove Umra Khan out of Bajaur. No definite arrangement was made with the other clans of the Panjkora and Swat valleys, but large subsidies were paid to some of their chiefs to secure their quiescence. In May, 1897, the Ameer of Afghanistan, in ostensible loyalty to his treaty engagements, withdrew the officials and irregular troops that had been in occupation of the Mittai valley in Bajaur for more than a year in contravention of the Durand agreement, but the departure of the Afghans seemed to inflame the Mohmands, who feared that it would be followed by the occupation of their country by the British, to whom the Ameer had abandoned them.

The existing political conditions in India, the revival of the militant spirit of Islam everywhere, and not least in Afghanistan, whose ruler aspired to succeed the ruler of Bokhara as the political head of the Sunnite Mohammedans of Central Asia, and the timorous and vacillating policy of Great Britain toward Turkey indicating in the mind of the Asiaties inability to cope with the military power of the Ottoman Empire, the secret influences also emanating from Kabul, all tended to kindle the fires of fanatic Ghaziism and political patriotism among the warlike tribesmen of the border, who were incapable of any organized common political or military action, but who along the whole Afghan frontier felt the same impulse to put it to the test, at this favorable juncture, whether they could preserve their free and democratic institutions or were to pass under the yoke of the despotic Indian Government.

These tribes on the northwest were bound together by a sort of sympathetic freemasonry, so that those who were too remote from the scene of the British expedition to join in opposing them, nevertheless felt a jealous interest when they heard that the troops had permanently occupied any new tract. They had seen Hunza, Nagar, and Chitral one after another pass into the hands of the British, the Beluchis and Waziris reduced to subjection, and new military posts established all along the frontier, and they anticipated the absorption of the territories recently conceded by the Ameer of Afghanistan.

The advanced positions established among the mountain tribes beyond the settled frontier of the Punjab to overawe the surrounding country were held by about 12,000 British troops, not enough at any single point to deal with a rising of the tribes, and too remote from each other and from their military base for rapid concentration, scattered in detachments which, if surrounded, must be destroyed unless there is time to relieve them. The mullahs, or religious teachers among the hill tribes, had for some time been preaching that the British Raj was doomed, and appealing to the people to drive the invaders from their country. The head men and secular leaders, especially those who were in receipt of large gifts from the Indian Government, attempted in vain to stem the torrent, but were finally compelled to take part in the hostilities already begun under the lead of fanatical

mullahs.

On June 10 the Waziris attacked a British fortress in Waziristan. Mr. Gee, the political officer, was engaged in establishing a new outpost in the Tochi valley at Maizar and in collecting a fine from a turbulent village, when his force of 312 men were suddenly assailed by 500 Waziris incited by a fanatical priest, the mullah of Powindah, losing 7 officers and 54 men killed and wounded before re-enforcements arrived from Datta Khel. The mullah had before attempted to stir up a re

bellion, and was therefore banished by the English, and had since been plotting in Afghanistan. The Waziris, whose country lies between the Kurram valley and Beluchistan, are industriously engaged in agriculture and transport when not stirred by religious or political excitement to warlike acts, in which case they can muster 40,000 fighting men. Waziristan was first incorporated in India in 1894, and the annexation was little more than nominal. Lieut.-Col. Gray was at once dispatched to the Tochi valley to succeed Col. Bunny, who was killed, taking large re-enforcements, sufficient to overawe the Waziris before the rebellion spread beyond the Darwesh Khels, the clan that made the attack, which had been so successful because the troops were surprised while resting. Later MajorGen. Corrie Bird followed with a punitive expedition of 6,000 men and devastated the country, destroying villages and property by wholesale. In the latter part of July the whole population of the Swat valley rose in arms against the British. The construction of military forts and the presence of large bodies of troops in their own and neighboring districts filled them with a passionate fear of annexation, and they denied that the British had any right to maintain a road through their country. They attacked a fortified post on the road. The extent and character of this attack were of such a nature that two brigades, one containing four and the other three regiments, with three mountain batteries, were sent forward to support the garrison. After five days of fighting Sir Bindon Blood's force of 5,000 men effectually defeated the Swatis. By this rapid march and successful action the loss of the Malakand fort, the principal fort on the road, was averted, the besieging army of 6,000 Swatis withdrawing. The rising was started by the preaching of a priest known as the Mad Mullah, who appeared at the head of a band of 300 men at the village of Thana, in the lower Swat valley, where his following was rapidly increased by his proclamation of a religious war against the English. On July 26 he led his followers toward Malakand, attacking the fortified post at Chakdara on the way, and in the evening attempted to surprise the garrison of 3,000 men at Malakand, which, however, had been informed of the intended attack by the tribal levies, who fled before the Mad Mullah. Resolute attacks on the fort were made again on the three following nights. Re-enforcements had meanwhile begun to arrive, but these night assaults, prolonged till dawn, so exhausted the garrison that they were unable to take the offensive during the day. The disproportionate number of British officers killed by the Pathans gave proof of their marksmanship. The troops in the Swat valley numbered 3,000 men, but Col. Meiklejohn, who had been forced to abandon his camp and retire to the protection of his guns on the heights when first attacked, remained entirely on the defensive, the garrison being, moreover, short of ammunition, till Gen. Sir Bindon Blood brought up large re-enforcements. He then relieved Chakdara, which the Pathans could not take, having no artillery. The Mad Mullah mustered a force of 40,000 warriors, practically the whole fighting strength of the valley. The Swatis had offered a formidable resistance to the British force that stormed the Malakand pass two years before, and had then subsided into peaceful habits, though the sons of the old Akhund, who formerly exercised a remarkable religious influence over them, had endeavored to stir up rebellion. The British punitive operations in the Tochi valley now roused them to a final effort to preserve their independence. The Bonerwals joined with the Swatis in the rising, and large numbers of British

subjects living near the border crossed over and took part in the fighting. The Swatis lost 700 killed in their attacks on Malakand, 2,000 in the siege of Chakdara, and 500 when that fort was relieved. The British lost 230 killed and wounded. Sir Bindon Blood advanced later toward the upper Swat valley, dispersing with shell and mountain batteries 3,000 tribesmen at Landikai on Aug. 17. He disarmed the inhabitants of the upper Swat valley, and then turned his attention to the Bonerwals.

A mullah of Hadda possessing a great influence over the Mohmands in Afghanistan, and also in Bajaur and the Utman Khel country, and standing in intimate relations with the Ameer Abdurrahman, began preaching against the British Government, as he had before during the Chitral campaign. He collected several thousand men, and crossed over into the British sphere to join in the attack upon Malakand fort, but was too late. Early in August he attacked Shabkadr fort, a small post 18 miles north of Peshawar, and burned a village. When a force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery marched out from Peshawar a party of Afghan raiders recrossed the frontier. The rest, numbering 6,000, were engaged by Col. Woon with 1,200 men on Aug. 9. When the Mohmands threatened to outflank the Indian troops the latter began to retreat, but rallied when Gen. Elles appeared with re-enforcements, and by a hot fire of artillery, followed by a cavalry charge, drove the Afghans from the field, killing over 300. The force led by the Hadda mullah was mainly composed of Afghans from Jalalabad and the Kunar valley and Mohmands of Lalpura. Gen. Gholam Haidar, the Ameer's commander in chief at Asmar, was believed to be in constant communication with the Hadda mullah, who raised the invading force without any effort being made by the Afghan officials to restrain him. Regular Afghan soldiers were recognized among the raiders. The Governor General addressed a serious remonstrance to the Ameer, who in his character of King of Islam had issued proclamations couched in a fanatical Mussulman spirit, and written a book on the duties of Mohammedans when engaged in a holy war, but had left it to mullahs to declare a jehad against unbelievers, not wishing to risk his throne in a struggle against the power of Great Britain. He read in public the Viceroy's letter, and swore that he had never induced his subjects or sepoys to take hostile action against the British. He issued orders forbidding the Afghans to have any share in the disturbances. Abdurrahman was in a difficult position between the Afghans, who were everywhere in sympathy with their brothers in their struggle for independence, and the British, whose railroad has pierced the Kojak pass like a sword thrust into his entrails, as he expressed it, and whose subsidy of 16 lakhs a year was indispensable. He went as far as he dared, and the Indian Government dreaded a rupture as much as he did, taking no action when he recalled his agents from Simla, Calcutta, and Bombay. The rumors published about Turkish emissaries in India and Afghanistan drew from the Sublime Porte a denial that any understanding existed between the Sultan and the Ameer of Afghanistan for the purpose of fomenting insurrection in India and preaching a jehad against the English. Signs of unrest next appeared among the Orakzais, whose country is north of Kohat and south of the Khaibar, and is overlooked by Fort Lockhart in the Sumana range. This powerful tribe numbers 29,500 fighting men, while the neighboring Mohmands can turn out 16,000, and the Afridis, occupying the mountains and valleys to the south of the Kabul river, have a strength of 27,000 men. The Indian Government

poured troops into the country, until by the middle of August the forces had increased to 37,000 men. The whole border seemed to be in a ferment, and through the mountain district, 600 miles long by 200 miles broad, the tribes were all up against the British, or were ready to rise. The Afridis, to whom the guardianship of the Khaibar pass had been intrusted for sixteen years, and who were supposed to be thoroughly devoted to the Government, next caught the infection. They entered into an alliance with the Orakzais and agreed to attack Jamrud if the latter would attack the Kohat border. As the hostile Afridis advanced to the Khaibar pass Fort Maude and Jehangera were evacuated. They captured Ali Mesjid, a small post at the entrance of the pass, which was held by Khaibar rifles or tribal levies, who still formed the bulk of the armed force in this region, although the British had long since departed from their agreement not to station Indian troops there. The Afridi levies soon began to desert to the rebels, taking their Martini rifles and plenty of ammunition with them. The Afridis had indeed been already supplied with a large number of rifles stolen from the Government. The Orakzais advanced through the Kuram valley, where the British abandoned their outposts and fell back on Fort Lockhart and Parachinar. The Tochi valley became again the scene of disturbances, the Powindah mullah having incited the Mahsuds to invade the district. The Afridis captured the fort of Landi Kotal, after a sharp fight with those who remained loyal of the garrison of 500 men. They now held the whole Khaibar pass, and the Indian troops would not venture to attack them in their positions in the hills. They proposed terms on which they would return to their homes, which were the withdrawal of British troops from Swat and the Samana range, the giving up of Afridi women living within the Indian border, and the revision of the salt regulations. The alarm of the authorities at the conflagration that now seemed to envelop the whole frontier was so great that they arrested three of the principal chiefs of Beluchistan. The Khaibar rifles in the garrison at Jamrud were disarmed. The Daulatzai Afridis raided the country about Kohat, and attacked posts in the Samana mountains. Beluchi tribesmen began to assemble on the hills overlooking the Bolan Railroad. The people of Pishin began to migrate into Afghanistan. The Orakzais appeared in great force at Gulistan, which was evacuated. They advanced to attack Shinawari, which also was evacuated. They blockaded Kohat pass. The garrisons at Jamrud and other posts were subject to the "sniping" of the stealthy Pathans, who crept close up to the walls in the dark and picked off the officers with their rifles or stabbed the sentinels.

The English were not ready to assume the offensive before September. When the Hadda mullah gathered 4,000 tribesmen, with the intention of attacking the Khan of Dir and cutting the Chitral road, it was decided to send Gen. Elles from Peshawar with a large field force into the Mohmand country. The Kuram valley was cleared of Orakzai raiders by a flying column under Col. Richardson. There were still 17,000 tribesmen threatening Samana. An expedition was prepared to ascend the Khanki river from Kohat, for the invasion of Tirah, the district north of the Samana range, where the Afridis pasture their flocks. Sir William Lockhart went from England to assume the chief command on the frontier and to direct the Afridi campaign. Imperial service troops of the Punjab were engaged for the campaign. The Mohmand gathering dissolved on seeing the fresh prospect of a British invasion. Gen. Blood moved forward from the Panjkora river to Nawagai, in Bajaur. The