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supreme administrative authority, and although you are left full discretion as to the manner in which your expedition is to be conducted, you will take special care to avoid any steps which might lead to a conflict of authority or disturb the current arrangements of the Administrations." On July 9th Major Ternan reported that the King, Mwanga, had flown from Mengo, the capital, and had gone to Buddu. The King had been implicated with the attempt of a chief, Mugassi Gabriel, to cause a rising, and had hoped that his sudden flight would disorganize the work of the Administration. It had become necessary, therefore, to concentrate as many troops as possible in Uganda, but Major Ternan did not anticipate that this would interfere with the supply of the force required by Major Macdonald. Major Ternan hoped to complete the military operations in Buddu against the King in time to give Macdonald the troops desired on the date fixed-at Njemps on September 18th; and he proposed, as Mwanga could no longer be considered King of Uganda, to proclaim his son Chua (a young child being baptized as a Protestant) as the King's successor, with a Regency during his minority. Mwanga took refuge in German East Africa, and was there taken prisoner and retained by the German authorities. Meanwhile various chiefs in Uganda had revolted, and military operations on a considerable scale had been employed, with more or less success, against them. On August 14th Prince Chua was publicly proclaimed King of Uganda, sixtynine chiefs having elected him. The chiefs appointed as Regents during his minority were Apollo Kagwa, Katikiro; Mugwanya, Katikiro; and Zachariah, Kangao. On September 26th, 1897, Mr. Jackson reported insubordination by Soudanese troops at the Ravine Station, detailed to join Major Macdonald's confederation. Companies 4, 7 and 9 of these troops had been employed in Buddu for the suppression of the native outbreak, having been marched there from the Shan districts. After their work in the Buddu region was accomplished they were sent by rapid marches to the Ravine Station. No. 9 Company had been unwilling to start with Major Macdonald, but that officer had overcome their objections; and on the 23rd the greater part of No. 3 Company left the camp, followed by three sections of No. 9 Company, which had deserted during the night. On learning this news Mabruk Effendi, a Soudanese captain, rushed off into the bush with the remaining men of the 3rd Company. Mr. Jackson was then about eight miles from the Ravine Station. With Major Macdonald and some troops he followed the deserters. Some were induced to return to discipline. On reaching the Ravine Station they found that firing had commenced between the deserters and the garrison. What followed is thus told :-" Shortly afterwards we were met by Captain Kirkpatrick, who, in spite of the fact that shots had been exchanged,

and the deserters were scattered in all directions, had very pluckily ridden back to inform us of the state of affairs. From him we learned that after an exchange of shots the deserters had marched off along the Uganda road and encamped about a mile from the fort. It appeared that Captain Kirkpatrick arrived at the fort halfan-hour before the deserters, and informed Lieutenant Feilding of what had happened. The latter went out to meet them on their approach, inquired into their reasons for returning, and asked the officers and principal non-commissioned officers to. come into the fort and state their grievances. On their declining to do so, he ordered them to come and camp near the fort. They, however, refused, saying they could camp at the foot of the hill and await the arrival of their comrades. Lieutenant Feilding then returned to the fort, and after a consultation with Captain Kirkpatrick, ordered the men to pile arms and come in. This they refused to do. The order was repeated, with the threat that they would be fired upon if they refused. To this they replied that they would not obey the order, and that they could fire away if they pleased. On this the garrison of half No. 6 company fired three volleys at the mutineers, who returned the fire, and then moved off to their camp, as already stated. Owing to heavy rain and flooded streams it was nearly sunset before I arrived at the fort with Major Macdonald and the advance party of No. 3 column, the rear portion of which, under Captain Woodward, with the waggons containing ammunition, did not arrive until 4 next morning. I may mention that owing to the heavy rain and extreme cold a porter, in full health, succumbed to exposure. Immediately after my arrival I sent a native officer of No. 6 Company and two non-commissioned officers to persuade the mutineers to return, but without effect. With my full concurrence Major Macdonald, as senior military officer present, issued an order to the garrison and No. 3 column that under no circumstances was any firing to take place, and this order was communicated to the mutineers in case they might otherwise be afraid to come in. On the following day, the 24th instant, I visited the camp of the mutineers about their grievances, which were briefly as follows:-1. That they were tired of being constantly marched about whilst other companies remained comfortably in stations. 2. That they were not allowed to take their women with them. 3. That they were going to a foodless and waterless country, where they would all die. 4. That they were underpaid and insufficiently fed. 5. That young and inexperienced officers were sent out to command them, who did not know their language, and would not listen to their complaints. 6. That it was through them that we were masters of the country, and yet they were treated like donkeys. 7. That they had

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been fired upon when they only returned to lay their grievances before me; and finally threatened to go over to the Germans, or build a fort of their own and raid the surrounding country." Mr. Jackson wrote that the complaints regarding the women and insufficient food did not refer to the arrangements made by Major Macdonald after the troops had joined that officer, "excepting that he declined to halt here (the Ravine Station) for a month whilst some of their women left behind at Kampala and Lubwa's joined them, and until other companies were sent to relieve them-a demand which your Lordship will understand was quite out of the question." Notwithstanding every effort made by Mr. Jackson and the military officers the mutineers marched off in the direction of Nandi. Measures were taken by which it was hoped that the mutineers would be confined to outlying districts and the Protectorate, where want of food would compel them to surrender without bloodshed. On September 29th Major Macdonald reported these incidents. He had been joined by two-thirds of the Soudanese required for his expedition, but "they were much fatigued by the work they had been through." He added that the men advanced no complaints of their treatment at his hands. They "appeared quite in the dark as to any arrangements for the support of their wives and families"-arrangements which Lord Salisbury had directed should be made. In consequence of the mutiny and fighting in Buddu, his Soudanese force had been reduced to 70 men. "In the circumstances I have been reluctantly compelled to abandon, for the present, my proposed operations north of Lake Rudolf, and the region of the Upper Juba." On November 20th Sir Arthur Hardinge reported that the Soudanese garrison at Lubwa's (60 strong) had joined the mutineers, and the total force, with 150 Mahommedan Wagandu, had attacked Mr. Jackson and Major Macdonald on October 19th, at Lubwa's. The mutineers, after several hours' fighting, were defeated, losing 100 killed and wounded. The despatch continues:-"We had wounded slightly, including Dr. Macpherson, twelve man; severely wounded, including Mr. Jackson, eighteen men; killed, including Lieutenant Feilding, sixteen men. The mutineers, who had made prisoners of Mr. N. A. Wilson and Mr. Scott (of the Port Alice steam-launch), and Major Thruston, proceeded to murder them. Major Macdonald writes saying that the Wasogo, with an army of Waganda, under the Sekibobo, have joined him. His letter, dated the 22nd ultimo, says further that he is investing Lubwa's, and if the remaining garrisons and Buddu remain loyal, he hopes to quell the mutiny in a few weeks. The latest news reports Uganda Proper quiet, and that the garrisons at Eutebe and Kampala have laid down their arms. Major Macdonald asks for 300 to 500 Indian troops. It seems to me better to have them sent from India

than to make use of our own, who are now in Jubaland. I would prefer that they were not withdrawn. I propose to send Captain Harrison with 95 men and a Maxim, and 12,000 rounds of ammunition to support him, if upon arrival at the Ravine we can make provision towards holding out with Swahili troops. I intend to make use of the Ravine and Naivasha garrisons, who, although they are discontented, are still outwardly obedient, in this Protectorate during the absence of our own troops in Uganda. The communications with Uganda are now restored. No action will be taken by me regarding the Indian contingent, until such time as I shall have received your Lordship's reply to this telegram. If required, 150 men can start on the 21st instant. Should delay be made, transport arrangements will be put out of order." Lord Salisbury telegraphed that the Indian Government had been asked for a regiment from Bombay. Meanwhile, from railhead in the East African Protectorate, 150 men of the Indian Contingent, with a Maxim were sent up country. On November 13th Major Macdonald was still blockading Lubwa's, notwithstanding the defeat of the mutineers on October 19th. He had not enough ammunition to storm the place. The Soudanese garrisons in Umjoro, Toru, and Buddu professed loyalty, "but although the spread of the mutiny is thus checked, any reverse to our arms might revive it." There had been two fights and several skirmishes since October 19th, which had reduced the enemy's strength from 450 to 300 men. Early in January news serious fighting, in which Lieutenant Macdonald (brother of Major Macdonald), and Mr. Pilkington, of the Church Missionary Society, were killed, was received at Zanzibar. Communications with Uganda were interrupted a month or more before this. On December 19th Sir A. Hardinge reported that Major Macdonald, with 200 armed men, was to leave for Buddu, the Soudanese there having intended to join the Chief Gabriel. Captain Woodward was still besieging Lubwa's, but the food supply of the rebels was practically destroyed. On February 4th, 1898, Sir Arthur Hardinge telegraphed from Zanzibar, whither he had returned after making arrangements for the despatch from Mombasa of the Indian reinforcements, that the mutineers had, on the night of January 9th, escaped from the fort at Lubwa's. By means of a large dhow and several canoes they had "withdrawn their whole force across a bay of the Lake. Captain Woodward had employed canoes to blockade the fort on the Lake side, but without effect, as the boatmen declined to come near the dhow. Captain Harrison, accompanied by 200 men, two Maxims, and 1,000 Waganda, has left with a view to prevent the mutineers from crossing the Nile. It is probable that they may try to reach Unyoro, and raise the garrisons there." Gabriel had been defeated by Lieutenant Hobart with the Buddu Sou

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danese; but ex-King Mwanga, who had escaped from the Germans, had become a Mahommedan, and was on the southern frontier of Buddu. Seven hundred Mahommedan Waganda had joined him from German territory, and also the Chief of Kiziba, who had revolted against the Germans. Major Macdonald had taken a force to attack Mwanga. "Captain Woodward and Mr. Wilson are both of opinion that the situation is very critical. I propose, therefore, to send on two more companies of the Indian regiment; there will thus be five at the front in all." In August Papers in continuation were issued (Africa, No. VII.) On Feb. 23rd, Captain Harrison who had pursued the mutineers after their evacuation of Lubwa's came up with them at a double stockade at Kabagambi, a place to the south of Mruti. He attacked and captured the stockade after severe fighting. enemy left 50 to 60 dead, and 200 Soudanese women were captured. The remaining mutineers, with 100 wounded, took refuge in the swamps of Lake Kioga. The British loss was 10 killed and 20 wounded, among the latter being Lieutenant Osborne and Captain Moloney (who afterwards died). King Mwanga, with 3,000 guns, was then in the south-west of the Protectorate. On January 15th Major Macdonald gained a complete victory over Mwanga's army to the southeast of Kazibra. The German authorities, by the timely despatch of ammunition, co-operated with the British in dealing with Mwanga. It was now apparent that Lieutenant Scott's contingent acting in Unyoro had prevented the Soudanese from Lubwa's drawing the Soudanese garrisons in Unyoro into the revolt. The fighting

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completely relieved the anxiety in the country as to the security of the position and has entirely justified the confidence which was inspired by the vigorous action taken by Major Macdonald in pursuit of the mutineers." The position at the end of February was that the disastrous consequences of the escape of the mutineers from Lubwa's had been averted and the fidelity of the Unyoro garrisons retained, and that Mwanga had been crushed in the south-west of the Protectorate. By March 16th Major Macdonald was able to announce "the termination of the war against the mutineers and their dispersal and flight into Ukeddi." The Acting Commissioner, Mr. G. Wilson, wrote as follows: "When the mutineers succeeded in crossing the Nile into Uganda, after extensively pillaging that part of Usoga through which they had passed, the outlook was one of extreme peril to the Protectorate. To the country generally, as I have previously observed to your Lordship, the mutineers appeared to have scored a success. That this view was taken has been manifested particularly by the Usoga and Unyoro peoples in their immediate vicinity, both having hitherto been loyal, but they have since thought it

politic to extend assistance to the mutineers in various ways. The Mahommedans throughout the whole of the country became restless, the disarmed Soudanese most obviously anxious. Notwithstanding the great efforts of Lieutenant Dugmore and his assistants news came in from day to day of serious doubts as to the attitude of the Unyoro garrisons, on whose fidelity, or at least passiveness, practically rested our chance of the immediate suppression of the mutiny. It was clearly necessary that strong and instant action should be taken to preserve our prestige, which had been endangered by the recent unobstructed movements of the mutineers. As the position was therefore one requiring the presence of the Commandant himself, I urged the immediate return of Major Macdonald, after he had achieved his victory in Buddu, to retrieve the situation. When he left the capital for the field of operations, all who understood the position had the conviction that it would require all his well-tried experience, and a full quota of good fortune, to secure success. The history of the following month's activity against the mutineers will remain long in the memory of these people. The mutineers vainly tried several crossings of the great swamp, which presumably divided them from their objective. The first feeling of relief came when the time thus gained by our army was utilized by Lieutenant Scott's being detached with his force to save Unyoro. The news of his skilful and successful management, so well aided by his officers and men, was hailed throughout the country with enthusiasm, and I most sincerely concur with Major Macdonald's statement that the greatest value of the success, for all reasons, lies in its having been attained without resort to actual fighting. We then heard of Major Macdonald's engagement with the mutineers at Kijembi, which resulted in their being deprived of the defence of their fort, and in their flight into Kabagambi's. This did much to revive the spirit of the troops, especially of the native levies. In following up the pursuit, the crossing of the great swamp was a magnificent movement, as it completely outwitted the mutineers, who had, as I have previously stated, repeatedly tried and failed to do so, despite their desperate position. As they were positive that a mixed force like ours would be unable to succeed where they had failed, it was thus they were surprised, and Captain Harrison was enabled to achieve his brilliant and decisive victory, which routed the enemy and terminated the mutiny, so far as the safety of the Protectorate is concerned. This battle has conclusively confirmed the impression received by the natives of the country at the opening of the campaign at Lubwa's Hill as to the great superiority of regular troops and the true value of European leadership, and has most thoroughly re-established our prestige with those directly affected by the mutiny. In

the foregoing I trust I have made clear to your Lordship the value to the country generally of the work done by Capain Harrison and Lieutenant Scott and the forces under their respective commands in so successfully giving effect to Major Macdonald's plans." Lieutenant Dugmore, who, amid great difficulties, maintained the fealty of the Soudanese in Unyoro; Captain Sitwell, in Toru;

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and Mr. Grant, in Buddu, are, among others, complimented upon their work. Major Macdonald suggested the issue of a special medal and clasps-Uganda, 1897-8, and Lubwa's. "The second of these clasps would cover the operations against the Soudanese, while the first would apply to the lesser engagements elsewhere, and the troops not engaged against the Soudanese." This recommendation was sanctioned by Lord Salisbury, and submitted to the War Office for approval. The latest despatch throwing light upon the condition of the country is dated Kampala, April 21st. It showed that though all the great Chiefs in Uganda were loyal to the Administration operations were still going on against Mwanga's people, Mwanga being practically a prisoner in the hands of his principal supporters. The remnants of the Soudanese mutineers, very short of ammunition, are making their way northwards, through the Ukeddi country, towards the Shuli country. Apart from one or two minor collisions with Ukeddi natives, they have been practically inactive since their defeat and dispersal by Captain Harrison, and it may confidently be assumed that they have ceased to constitute any real danger." Authentic reports had stated that Kabareza (Unyoro) had died. But his young successor had been accepted, though some of Kabareza's adherents, in the northern part of Unyoro, had been giving some trouble. The continuance of Mwanga's rebellion was described as 66 more annoying than dangerous." The Indian regiment from Bombay had arrived, but the Sikh contingent from the East African Protectorate had suffered from the climate. Writing on May 16th, from Kampala, Mr. Ernest J. L. Berkeley, Her Majesty's Commissioner at Uganda, sent a full Report (Africa, No. X. Presented August, 1898) on the Mutiny of the Soudanese Troops in the Protectorate. On the actual causes of the mutiny Mr. Berkeley writes that grievances among the troops, or grievances they considered themselves to have, had bred a spirit of dissatisfaction, which was certain sooner or later to find some sort of expression. Already imbued with the general spirit of discontent, they "feel still further aggrieved by a sense of individual overwork, and by doubts as to how matters would be arranged with regard to their families." In the case of Companies 4, 7 and 9, which had been told off to accompany Major Macdonald, "it can scarcely be doubted that on their return from the operations in Buddu, to assemble at the rendezvous near Baringo,

they had practically decided among themselves, or at least their officers had, that they would not carry out their orders." The Report proceeds "I do not doubt myself that, when No. 1 Column marched off on the 21st September, its Soudanese escort was aware that the signal for desertion would be given at some near moment, and were prepared to comply with it. It is probable that, at that time, the men had not contemplated or discussed more than practical, if dangerous, means of venting their grievances; but, having once adopted those means-namely, disobedience of orders and desertion, they at once entered into a condition of considerable excitement. Although it would be, in my opinion, a mistake to suppose that the pseudo-collision, which occurred immediately afterwards at the Ravine Station, actually was the determining cause that changed disobedient men into mutineers full of a desperate purpose, it cannot possibly be doubted that the action of the officer, who ordered the men to pile their arms under the threat of firing into them, and eventually did so fire, however well meant, and quite explicable by his necessarily incomplete knowledge of matters which it is one of the purposes of this Report to investigate, was, nevertheless, one that contributed, at least, to heighten the excitement and angry passions of the men, and perhaps removed what chance there remained at that time of a peaceable solution. But the latter, had there been no collision, would undoubtedly have had to include the reconstitution of the escort out of other companies. The collision, however, having once taken place, and the men having reached a high state of excitement and mutinous spirit, it is easy to realize now how they went from bad to worse. Being in open mutiny themselves, they began to take steps to secure all the support available among their comrades. Their leader sent off messengers to meet the other detachments, and to prepare for the capture of Lubwa's station, whence, undoubtedly, they intended to get into touch with the Uganda and Unyoro garrisons. In passing at Nandi they did not hesitate to seize and loot the station, after having obtained entrance by craft; but they did not actually harm the European in charge, nor any of his people, however near they may have been to doing so. Proceeding from Nandi they loot the country and murder natives; they abandon their first idea of taking Mumia's by assault, because they probably realized that it would entail a disadvantageous waste of time, and because a pursuing party was close on their heels, so they push on for Lubwa's, where, discovering that their treacherous plans have succeeded, and that the Commandant and two other Europeans are prisoners, they find themselves at last in open conflict with the authorities, and proceed to all extremities." A brief sketch is given of the history of the Soudanese force, which had been with Emin Pasha in the Equatorial Provinces since the rise of the Mahdi, and were

settled in Uganda in 1891, '92 and '93 under circumstances described by Captain Lugard in these years. Local conditions are also passed in review, the latter unpropitious events having" brought about a crisis which would certainly not have otherwise arisen." It was beyond doubt "that the men had reached a dangerous frame of mind, but it was equally certain that the fact was not apparent until they began to desert from the expedition." Mr. Berkeley did not consider it would be just to throw blame upon any quarter or incident. "The mutiny was the immediate result of a series of untoward circumstances which aggravated and brought to a head, among a limited number of men, grievances which might otherwise have found more general or peaceable expression from the whole body of troops, and have been adjusted like so many other difficulties that beset the path of administration in Africa." After describing the murder of the three officers at Fort Lubwa's-Major Thruston, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Scott-the Report proceeds to describe the effect of the native rising led by Mwanga at a time when Uganda was also menaced by mutineers to the east, and disaffected garrisons to the north and south. Great credit is given to Mr. George Wilson, who was in charge at Kampala, and became Acting Commissioner at this time, for the coolness he displayed and the ability with which he dealt with so dangerous a situation. Of Major Macdonald's work (which had been sharply criticized in some quarters in England), Mr. Berkeley reported as follows:-" Intrusted by your Lordship with a special and important mission, Major Macdonald entered this Protectorate to find himself at once confronted with difficulties that he had had no share in creating, and which crippled the progress of his own work. His anxiety on this point was very shortly coupled with the great responsibility attending military operations, on the result of which hung the most serious issues. That these were, notwithstanding all their complications, conducted to a successful end is already well known to your Lordship. And I consider it only just to draw attention to the fact that the anxieties which bore upon him, both as regards the operations themselves and the prosecution of his own mission, when these should be finished, were not in any way lightened by the knowledge, which he soon gained, that he was credited in various quarters at home with having been himself the original cause of the mutiny that had interrupted his own work. And to Major Macdonald has been so frequently attributed blame in public print, whenever the absence of details made any point obscure at home, that I think it is only fair to ask that it may be remembered that much of the information which has since found, and is finding, its way home, was not available at the time when events were reported in their first bare outlines. Simultaneous with the

first fight at Lubwa's, and the murder of the English prisoners, Mr. Jackson was dangerously wounded, the Acting Commissionership devolved on another official, 60 miles away, and Major Macdonald, harassed by all the cares of a most dangerous and difficult position, had but leisure to briefly report matters home. That, in the midst of so much anxiety and so many difficulties, he planned and conducted every military operation with which he was associated with such skill and success is, I venture to submit, deserving of the highest credit." Lord Salisbury, in acknowledging the report, expressed the gratification with which Her Majesty's Government had seen how, in circumstances of very great and exceptional difficulty, the officials of the Uganda Administration had displayed so much fortitude, courage and discretion, and have so maintained the best traditions of their countrymen. British Losses.-A paper in continuation of the above was issued in January. Major Macdonald reports on the military operations in Uganda during 1897-98, and gives a list of officers and men whom he specially mentions for the favourable consideration of the Home authorities. Included in this list are some thirteen loyal Waganda chiefs and others. Major Macdonald also pays a tribute to the memory of Mr. G. Pilkington, the Church Missionary Society's missionary, who, while he was in charge of the Uganda working parties, was killed. According to a tabulated list of the losses sustained during the operations reported on by Major Macdonald, the casualties of the Government forces amounted to 280 killed and 555 wounded, a total of 835. The enemy, on the other hand, lost 570 killed and 549 wounded, with 181 prisoners, a total of 1,300. Of the enemy killed 230 were Soudanese mutineers, and 340 disloyal Waganda and other natives, while of the wounded 235 were Soudanese, and 314 Waganda, &c. An analysis of our losses shows that of the killed 31 were regular troops and Europeans, 25 Swahili Rifles, 185 Waganda Irregulars, and 39 Wasoga and others. Of the wounded, 53 were regulars, 71 Swahili Rifles, 341 Waganda Irregulars, and 90 Wasoga.

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