prets them as they are there. They are wrought into it. All its discoveries act in like manner. They agree with the more solemn movements and deeper sympathies of the mind. It lays our whole being open, enforcing nothing that is alien to it, infusing nothing that is uncongenial with it. It causes it to understand, to muse, itself. "Do not its words do good?" "They are the words of eternal life." There is, then, this double parallelism: first, between the character of God and his revelation; afterwards, between that revelation and the character of man.

We are not unmindful of the probability that the first man was really treated in a similar manner with ourselves. A special communication was made to him by his Maker. Intercourse supposes it, and was itself a revelation. But not the less true is it, that "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." Not less true is it, that "that which may be known of God is made apparent among men, for God hath made it apparent to them." It was a distinguished favour, disturbing no previous constitution of things, a superadded benefit in perfect harmony with all which had before existed. The thesis is by no means confined to revelation. We totally disclaim the opinion that our exclusive business is to look for it within those inspired leaves. It requires anterior knowledge. It demands a more original foundation. Not only the

external world must teach, but its government; we must, also, look determinately into our mind. In the former we discover the footsteps of Deity, in the latter his face. This is the principal subject and source of moral science. Whatever belongs to man, every ingredient of his nature, falls most strictly within the province and under the functions of our reason. Because some may have exaggerated the force, and misdirected the use, of human intellect, it does not become us to derogate from it. Sin is its perversion, but not of necessity, its diminution. The unholy disposition which turns it aside, leaves it as strong in its present direction as it was in its proper course. It is not denied that this unholy disposition may lead to mental habits and to sensual indulgences which shall actually cloud and weaken it. This is not, however, necessary to the presumed case. filled with prejudices which shall when particular objects are presented to it; but the capacity of that judgment is the same whatever may be submitted, and whether or not those prejudices operate. "The first principle of religion," says Bacon, "is right reason." Reason is of its own nature concerned with facts and principles. We are not only permitted, but are bound, to investigate all the truths which involve our happiness or misery, all which bear upon our state as actually subsisting, or on any destiny reserved for us. It is reverent to address the eternal God in the manner of those who would learn, and who, that they may learn, enquire of him: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right ?" not in infer

The mind may be warp the judgment

ence that he will, but in protest that he should not. “Suffer me a little, and I will show thee that I have yet to speak on God's behalf. I will fetch my knowledge from afar, and will ascribe righteousness to my Maker.""

Righteous art thou, O Lord, when I plead with thee: yet let me reason the case with thee of thy judgments." There can be no piety in foregoing inquiry and refusing scrutiny into the rules of the Divine conduct. We cannot see that love to God should be indifferent to his character. We cannot honor that trust in him which is careless of every inducement to its exercise. We cannot applaud that jealousy of his glory which passes by every crimina tion of his justice and his goodness.

A revelation, indeed, can make nothing true. It is merely an attestation to truth. Truth has independent rank and place and subsistence. The attestation does not constitute the truth, but it can render that which is already true, sure and certain to our minds. The appeal of Scripture is, therefore, as commonly as confidently directed to our judgment. Why even of your own selves judge ye not that which is right ?” "Judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard." "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." Whatever the evidence, reason alone can appreciate it. Through reason alone can the mind receive the seal of correspondence from the image of truth.

He, who, from whatever motives, disparages reason as it now exists in man, reflects no reflects no honor upon revela

tion. To what is this remitted, if not to reason? When it unfolds its claims, what else can decide upon them? It seeks to produce conviction of its truth. An external proof seems first in natural order: but this consisting of various particulars must be subjected to an intelligent process. It is to be examined, sifted, collated, applied. More frequently, though not so naturally, the internal evidence first appeals to us. We hold back most firmly from the opinion that our understanding has nothing to do with this species of evidence. The substance of the volume is essential to the vindication of its authenticity.

Nothing could
Nothing could
We are

make it true, if it contradicted truth. make it reasonable, if it contradicted reason. asked: If you knew from foreign evidence that this was the Book of God, would you not be bound to acquiescence in all which it contained? But there is no foreign evidence which could do this, unless God himself gave it to every man. The case is necessarily that of mental research. Then do we affirm that no mental research into external evidence could be satisfactory, in blindness of what internal evidence includes. No rational being on presumptive evidence (though the highest that historical argument can admit and, in such instances, as convincing as demonstration itself) could thus commit his belief and all the issues of his existence. Reason is, likewise, concerned with interpretation, and not only with evidence. And these are not separable departments : interpretation belongs to evidence and must affect it, evidence mixes with interpretation and must impress it. Little do they

foresee, who talk so lightly of reason, whither their language tends. What mean they by prostrating it? Let it rise to revelation,-expanding to its greatness and soaring in its effulgence.

We are now in a condition, we have now reached the place, to inquire, independently of any revealed authority, into the true character of man. What is his nature? In what relations does he stand? What are his prospects of a future life and allotment? How is he constituted? What survives of him at death? In what manner shall he be dealt with in any period subsequent to death? How is he regarded? How is he treated? We speak of man as he now appears: we would describe him in his present being. We believe, at the same time, that he is what he always was, and always will be. With his circumstances and dilemmas we have now no question: we only ask, What is his proper being? The present disquisition is merely introductory. It concerns the true nature and condition of man. Until these be known, we cannot inquire into the manner of his treatment, or into what awaits him.

I. We cannot doubt that there is in us a twofold constitution; that we partake at once of material and spiritual properties, that we consist, in one person, of a body and of a soul. Man is only organised matter, or that organised matter is only a machine for what is not matter. To avoid the grossness of the first predicament, some assert that man is homogeneous, a monophysite, of an indivisible nature. Yet this opinion can only be entertained by the materialist, thus repre

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