F. (page 67.) "I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient Stoic philosophers held concerning fate, in order to determine what is truth; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems that they differed among themselves; and probably the doctrine of fate, as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please; I utterly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue, and vice; I disclaim any such thing, and think that I have demonstrated, that the scheme I maintain is no such thing. If the Stoics, by fate, meant anything of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of advantage and benefit of in use of means and endeavours, or would make it less worth while for men to desire and seek after anything wherein their virtue and happiness consists; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever; and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingence; as has been shown. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege, or benefit, or anything desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed, with any liberty that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of fate, as is inconsistent with the world being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides-not as the soul of the world, but as the Sovereign Lord of the universe, governing all things by proper will, choice, and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of anything before, above, or without himself; I wholly renounce any such doctrine."-Edwards on the Freedom of the Will. Part iv. section 6. Such is the protest of this mighty man against certain consequences charged upon his system. If they be justly imputable to his system, it must bear them: he is acquitted from every intention, every consciousness, of entertaining them. "And binding nature fast in fate, Left free the human will." There is little meaning in these lines of Pope. Perhaps he intended what is the constituted state of material things by "nature," expressing thus their uniformity, while he conceded to the will a "freedom"-without which it could not be will. It seems, however, to be borrowed from a more noble bard; Shakspeare says :— "The fated sky Gives us free scope."-All's well, &c. G. (page 71.) That Aristotle, especially in the Nicomachean Ethics, should, from occasional expressions, be misconceived on the subject of this immortality of the soul, does not surprise; but his belief of it, if his whole writings be examined, must be admitted. The passage in the 11th chap. of the first book, which is quoted against this conclusion, when well considered, strongly fortifes it. “ Μᾶλλον δ ̓ ἴσως τε διαπορεῖσθαι περι τους κεκμηκότας, εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἤ των ἀντικειμενων, κ.τ.λ. For rather may be properly doubted concerning the state of the departed, whether they can partake of good or of calamity. For it seems certain, that if anything did reach them, whether favorable or adverse, it is impotent and trivial considered in itself, and especially to them. For such could not be of sufficient power, and of a proper kind, to make those happy who are not so, or to snatch the blessedness from those who are." The argument does not make light of earthly events; only, they are considered indifferent to the departed. But why? Because these are in a state of reward or punishment, so solemnly engrossing, that earthly good or evil would come alike to them, since they could not augment the one or relieve the other. A stronger testimony could not be borne to the immateriality, the immortality, and the accountableness, of the separate soul. In the same manner the Stagirite seems to have been misunderstood in his book, De Anima. Some of his arguments would at first point to the conclusion, that the soul depended, for its existence and exercise, upon the body. But he thus often seems to love a conclusion which opposes his main one. He is not without a vanity in adroitly meeting and overthrowing his own reasonings. The word which he employs concerning the soul, in the first chapter of the second book, just at its close, is, Xwporn, separable, that which can exist in itself. His argument is, that it is not the 'Evreλéxela, the organ or the perfection of any body. He, like many others, divides the soul as into parts-theoretic and sensitive. But his whole aim is, to show that the higher soul has its own operations and affections. And thus in the fifth chapter of the third book, he speaks in this sort :-— “ Οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγὴς, καὶ ἀπαθὴς, τῇ ουσιᾳ ὤν ἔνεργεια : This soul, self-existible, and unmixed, and impassive, being in its nature active." He adds, "TovTo μóvov áðávatov kaì aïdiov, This alone is deathless and eternal." The authority of Cicero may be considered inversely to his opinions. He is the declaimer against the public creed. All his objections tend to confirm its existence. He endeavoured in vain to overturn it. The doctrine of the soul's immortality he so attacks, that we must be convinced it was popularly held. Even his scornful, unwincing stoicism, is not always consistent with itself. "Sed ut illa secunda moderate tulimus, sic hanc non solum adversam, sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debemus, ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contemnere debebamus, propterea quod nullum sensum esset habitura, nunc sic affecti, non modo contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare." Epistolæ ad Familiares: Mescinio, lib. v. So again, in the sixth book of these epistles, he writes to Torquatus, after a similar idea :— "Sed hæc consolatio levis est; illa gravior, qua te uti spero, ego certe utor: nec enim, dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: et, si non ero, sensu omnino carebo." These passages may simply refer to the insensateness of death, as we speak of it, who fully believe that the spirit is living still. They certainly betray some apprehension and suspense. The bravado ill conceals the cowardice which is at heart. "The dread of something after death, Puzzles the will." But it is not difficult to set him at variance with himself. The phlegm of the philosopher ill accords with the ardor of the orator, and the amiableness of the man. "Quod si omnium consensus, naturæ vox est : omnesque, qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid, quod ad eos pertineat, qui e vita cesserint ; nobis quoque idem existimandum est. Et si, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur, quia natura optima sunt, cernere naturæ vim maxime: verisimile est, cum optimus quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid, cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus."-Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 15. In lamenting the death of Hortensius, he exclaims :-"Summam ejus felicitatem non satis grato animo interpretamur." "O præclarum diem, cum ad illud divinum animorum concilium cætumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam! Proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi; sed etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate præstantior: cujus a me corpus crematum est; quod contra decuit ab illo meum. Animus vero non me deserens, sed respectans, in ea profecto loca discessit, quo mihi ipsi cernebat esse veniendum. Quem ego meum casum fortiter ferre visus sum: non quod æquo animo ferrem; sed me ipse consolabar, existimans, non longinquum inter nos digressum et discessum fore."-Cicero, De Senectute: ad fin. Φυχαὶ γαρ μίμνουσιν ἀκήριοι εν φθιμενοισι. Πνευμα γάρ ἐστι Θεου χρῆσις θνητοῖσι καὶ εἰκὼν. Πάντες ἴσοι νεκυες ̇ Φυχῶν δὲ Θεὸς βασιλέυει. Phocylides: Poëtæ Minores Græci. "Souls uncorrupted live, howe'er we die,— From earth we come, our bodies turn to nought, The soul, undying, towers beyond decay!" Lanctantius argues the eternity of the soul. In his De Divino Præmio which is the seventh book of his Divine Institutions-chap. 9, he argues from many proofs, its indissolubleness. In the thirteenth chapter, he says "Declaravi (ut opinor) animam non esse solubilem: superest, citare testes, quorum authoritate argumenta firmentur. Neque nunc prophetas in testimonium vocabo, quorum ratio et divinatio in hoc solo posita est, ut ad cultum Dei, et ad immortalitatem ab eo accipiendam creari hominem doceant; sed eos potius, quibus istos qui respuunt veritatem, credere sit necesse." H. (page 129.) "In verisimilibus, et in propriis rerum notis posita est tota (conjectura.) Sed appellemus docendi gratia verisimile, quod plerumque ita fiat. . . . Verisimilia reperiuntur ex partibus, et quasi membris narrationis. Ea sunt in personis, in locis, in temporibus, in factis, in eventis, in rerum ipsarum negotiorumque naturis. In personis naturæ primum spectantur, valetudinis, figuræ, virium, ætatis, marium, fœminarum ; atque hæc quidem in corpore: animi autem, aut quemadmodum affecti sunt, virtutibus, vitiis, artibus, inertiis; aut quemadmodum commoti, cupiditate, metu, voluptate, molestia. Atque hæc quidem in natura spectantur. In fortuna, genus, amicitiæ, liberi, propinqui, affines, opes, honores, potestates, divitiæ, libertas, et ea, quæ sunt iis contraria. Verisimilia autem partim singula movent suo pondere: partim, etiam si videntur esse exigua per se, multum tamen, cum sunt coacervata, proficiunt. Atque in his verisimilibus insunt nonnunquam etiam certæ rerum et propriæ Maximam autem facit fidem ad similitudinem veri, primum exemplum; deinde introducta rei similitudo; fabula etiam nonnunquam, etsi sit incredibilis, tamen homines commovet." Cicero: Oratoria Partitiones, cap. 10, 11. notæ. It is plain that analogy to our minds intends far more than verisimilitude so eloquently described in the above passages. The reason, however, is, that we apply it to a theme which Tully could not understand. He beheld but one system, the great physical one,-he knew not that system of revelation which, by an extension of his principles, we bring into comparison with the previous order of things, relieving it of all peculiar difficulties by resting it upon universal grounds. In the same manner the Magister propounds his purpose in the Tusculan Questions: "Geram tibi morem, et ea quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo: nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa, quæ dixero set ut homunculus unus e multis, probabilia conjectura sequens. Ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut veri videam similia, non habeo."-Lib. i. cap. 9. : |