O. (page 383.)

The original stands thus, “ Καὶ ἀπελεύσονται οὗτοι εἰς κόλασιν αἰώνιον οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον.”—Matt. xxv. 46. To every one who reads these words without prejudice, they must declare the equal duration of both awards. Yet an objection has been raised, founded upon the conjunction, dè. It is urged that this establishes a difference in the duration. But while a difference is supposed, it is not in the predicate, which is one, but in the respective subjects. The Kóλaσis and the ¿wn, are the differences expressed. The canon must be, not that a common predicate be disturbed, but that opposite subjects, such as the case supposes, fully meet the difference, punishment in contrast with life. Had the order of the sentence been inverted, would this criticism apply? There is this inversion in Daniel : "And the multitude that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Is the "everlasting," in the first instance, to be considered as less than in the second? It may be said, that nothing in this sentence answers to the force of the dè. To this the reply is simple, I often has this sense; and not only as a copulative, it answers to that idea of the contrary, the alternative, which we express by, but. Nor can we conceive a better exposition than that of Augustine. "Si utrumque æternum, profecto aut utrumque cum fine diuturnum, aut utrumque sine fine perpetuum debet intelligi. Par pari enim relata sunt, hinc supplicium æternum, inde vita æterna. Dicere autem in hoc uno eodemque sensu, Vita æterna sine fine erit, supplicium æternum finem habebit, multum absurdum est. Unde, quia vita æterna sanctorum sine fine erit, supplicium quoque æternum quibus erit finem procul dubio non habebit."—De Civit. Dei, lib. xxi. cap. 17.

To this agrees the remark of Chrysostom in his Twenty-fifth Homily on Romans. “Οτι τὰ ἐκεῖ ληξιν οὐκ ἕξει ποτέ, ἀκουσιν αὐτοῦ tà ekeî λÉYOVTOS, K.T.λ. And that these future things can never reach an end, listen to Christ while he speaks: These shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into everlasting life." To this he subjoins the comment : “ Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, καὶ ἡ κόλασις alovios. If, therefore, the life be everlasting, everlasting must be αἰώνιος. the punishment."

"Formula Tup Tò alovov est imago pœnæ et miseriæ extremæ : Matt. vii. 13, ad significandas poenas post mortem futuras adhibetur

anwλeta, cui v. 14, opponitur (wǹ, et hoc loco v. 46 prolegitur koλaois, hoc est, supplicium, pœna (Maccab. iv. 38. Elian. His. Var. 13. 2.) cui oppunitur v. 46, (wń et v. 34, Bariλeía. .. Pharasæi, quoque et Esseni, existimabant, improbos αίδιον τιμωρίαν, τιμωρίας ádiáλeintovs, pœnas perpetuas expectare.-Apud Matth. xxv. 46." Commentaries on the New Testament, by Theophilus Kuinoël.

P. (page 383.)

"Everlasting destruction, ☎λepos, properly signifies that destruction of the animal life which is called death; but is nowhere used to denote the extinction of the thinking principle. When, therefore, the wicked are said to be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, it cannot from that expression be certainly inferred that they are to be annihilated.”—Macknight. 2 Thess. i. 9. He proceeds with a theory of his own as to the death of those who survive in the conflagration of the earth, and then subjoins: "The punishment of the wicked cast into the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, is called the second death, to intimate, that as the soul or thinking principle in men, is not destroyed in the first death or destruction of the body, so neither is it to be extinguished by the destruction of the body in the general conflagration; which, therefore, is fitly called the second death. And seeing the wicked shall never be delivered from this second death, by any new resurrection, it is properly termed everlasting destruction." His particular theory is self-contradictory. If they who are "alive and remain" are thus bodily destroyed, it is their “first death." But the "second death" follows the judgement, and is the sentence of endless alienation from "the joy of the Lord."

The Comment of Theophylact on the same passage may show how the Greek word was still understood far into mediæval times. “ Ποῦ τοίνυν Ωριγενιασται; κ.τ.λ. How then do the followers of Origen falsely place an end to punishment? Paul asserts it to be eternal. How can that be eternal which is temporary? alávios πρόσκαιρος;”

Q. (page 384.)

The following passage from President Edwards, though in his worst style of composition, places the question in a very strong light of analogy, and is most convincing as an illustration:

"That this is so, we may be convinced by this consideration, viz., that when we hear or read of some horrid instances of cruelty, it may be to some poor innocent child, or some holy martyr, and their cruel persecutors, having no regard to their shrieks and cries, only sported themselves with their misery, and would not vouchsafe even to put an end to their lives; we have a sense of the evil of them, and they make a deep impression on our minds. Hence it seems just, every way fit and suitable, that God should inflict a very terrible punishment on persons who have perpetrated such wickedness. It seems no way disagreeable to any perfection of the Judge of the world; we can think of it without being at all shocked. The reason is, that we have a sense of the evil of their conduct and a sense of the proportion there is between the evil and demerit and the punish

ment.

"Just So, if we saw a proportion between the evil of sin and eternal punishment, if we saw something in wicked men that should appear as hateful to us, as eternal misery appears dreadful; something that should as much stir up indignation and detestation, as eternal misery does terror, all objections against this doctrine would vanish at once. Though now it seems incredible, though when we hear of it and are so often told of it, we know not how to realise it; though when we hear of such a degree and duration of torments as are held forth in this doctrine, and think what eternity is, it is ready to seem impossible, that such torments should be inflicted on poor feeble creatures by a Creator of infinite mercy; yet this arises principally from these two causes (I.) It is so contrary to the depraved inclinations of mankind, that they hate to believe it, and cannot bear it should be true. (II.) They see not the suitableness of eternal punishment to the evil of sin; they see not that it is no more than proportionable to the demerit of sin."

R. (page 422.)

It may be only just to refer to extenuating criticisms respecting the descriptions of Judas. The first is that which our Lord thus emphatically gives : “ Οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ, δι ̓ οὗ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδιδοται καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ékeivos." This, it is claimed, ought to be rendered, "Woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed: good were for him if he had not been born that man." The collocation does not favour it, for the word governed generally precedes the word which governs it. Such we believe to be the present construction. The syntax, however, would be destroyed by the rendering: éyevvýbŋ has nothing to govern it except ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος. The personal verb would have admitted a nominative to follow, but yivopaι is not here a personal one. There is sense of creation, of generation, and not of simple existence. Were it not so, the construction must remain the same. Nor is it real extenuation of the terrible sentence. Where is the difference between, "good would it be that he who betrayed Christ should never have been born he," and "good would it for him that he should never be born ?" The sentence proceeds upon the irredeemable curse of such an existence: that the being imparted at birth would be only an evil in its issues. Were philological objection to be met on grounds of Christian truth, we should complain of the fatalistic view of the rendering. Almost all universalists, though divided by large disagreements, unite in necessarianism. The implication is, that there must be such a traitor, and good were it for him not to have been born to fulfil the character! We believe that to "be that man was Judas' sole doing and perfect choice. The common sense of the suggested translation is not more defensible: "Good were it for him who betrayeth Christ not to have been born the betrayer," not to have been born himself!

The second gloss is proposed for the conclusion of the prayer offered by the Apostles for Divine guidance in the choice of a successor to Judas: “ Λαβεῖν τὸν κλῆρον τῆς διακονίας ταῦτης καὶ ἀποστολῆς, ἐξ ἧς παρέβη Ἰούδας, πορευθῆναι εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν ἴδιον.” We should translate it thus: "That he draw the lot" (which was to be the sign of election) "of this service and apostolate, from which Judas

"a

"Acts i. 25.

fell, in order that he might go to his own place." The attempt is to represent "going to his own place," as spoken of the new candidate and not of the apostate: that "having drawn the lot, he might enter upon his proper office." We more than doubt whether Tорevonvaι can bear so slight a figurative allusion to motion, as we understand, by accession to a trust or duty. It implies absolute departure for another locality. We know not what canon can warrant the construction of the two infinitives, λαβεῖν, πορευθῆναι, if they refer to the same person: Taрéßn, however, may govern πορευθῆναι. The Codex Alexandrinus gives δίκαιον, instead of ἴδιον, evidently pointing out "the place," rórros, as that of retribution. We think that, on very satisfactory grounds, we may conclude that the signification is, Judas was no longer suffered by the Divine wrath, but in his transgression had so sinned, that he might be suddenly sent to his appropriate award. Ignatius, in his Epistle to the Magnesians, reads it in the same manner, applying it to every one who departs. Chap. ii. v. 1.

The

The question of his suicide concerns not our argument. affirmative may establish the certainty, but touches not the duration, of his doom. The criticism on anyέaro, to get rid of his selfmurder, seems to us accommodating and strained. If Ahithophel, who "hanged himself," shadowed him, such a catastrophe becomes the more probable. The Septuagint applies to the end of that wily intriguer this very word. Thucydides also warrants this sense. Relating the conduct of the Corcyræans towards their prisoners, he says of these latter: "Many of them laid violent hands upon themselves, some thrusting the arrows shot at them by the enemy into their own throats; others, tearing the cordage of their beds which they found there, or twisting such ties as they could form from their own garments, strangled themselves: amayxoμevou." Lib. 4 De Bell. Pelop. Ælian in his Various History, b. 5, chap. 8, uses the same sense: "Socrates being ridiculed in a comedy laughed: Πολίαγρος δὲ απήγξατο.”

Saurin has a masterly discourse upon this subject.