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Interrogatories (y), the chances of a vessel escaping condemnation by suppression, or false statements, on the part of the master are exceedingly remote. It may, indeed, well happen that though the immediate grounds for the capture prove to be erroneous, other circumstances may, under the examination, appear by which condemnation may be justified; as, for example, if the capture be made under the erroneous belief that the ship carried contraband, or had falsified her papers, and it should come out that she had been guilty of violating a blockade.

To sail for a blockaded port with knowledge of the blockade, and with intent to violate it, warrants condemnation (); and the intent, failing sufficient evidence to the contrary, of which the onus of proof lies on the captured vessel, will be deduced from the sailing with knowledge. So that, in such case, the act of sailing will be held to constitute an attempted breach. And on proof of the sailing with intent, condemnation will be involved, notwithstanding that, at the moment of capture, the vessel may, owing to stress of weather, be out of the course for the blockaded port. But if the master Ishall be able to show to the satisfaction of the Court that he had voluntarily abandoned the voyage to such port (a), and had altered his original intention to attempt a violation. of the blockade, the vessel will no longer be subject to confiscation. A mere intention to commit the breach, unsupported by an overt act, such as starting for the blockaded port, will not, of itself, involve condemnation (6). But if false papers be used (c), or the papers be destroyed, or the

(y) 1 Spinks' Ec. & Ad. Rep., p. xiii, App.

(2) The Columbia, 1 Rob. 155, An. 1799; cf. The Monarch, p. 125, infra. (a) The Imina, 3 Rob. 169, and p. 184, infra; The John Gilpin, Blatchfd. 291. (b) Fitzsimmons v. Newport Insce. Co., 4 Cranch, 199; The John Gilpin, Blatchfd. 291; Yeaton v. Fry, 9 Cranch, 446.

(c) The Louisa Agnes, Blatchfd. Pr. Ca. 112; The Mentor, Edw. 207.

voyage be altered in order to avoid search, such circumstances will be deemed evidence of fraudulent intention (d). There are, however, certain cases in which the intentional bearing up for a blockaded port may be excused, as, for instance, if the cause be stress of weather, want of water or provisions, or some other imperative necessity (e); but in all such cases the burden of proof of unavoidable necessity and of good faith will be upon the vessel seized (f). Similarly, if the excuse for violating the blockade be that the master required to ascertain the land, the excuse will be subjected to severe criticism (g).

In The Neutralitet (h), the vessel, bound ostensibly from Bordeaux to Embden, went to Ostend, which was blockaded, under the pretence of procuring a pilot. The master anchored the vessel in such a position that at daylight he would have been under protection of the shore batteries. The Court, observing that a neutral vessel has no right to anchor in a spot where she may have an opportunity of slipping into the blockaded port without molestation, ordered the confiscation of ship and cargo.

Intoxication of the master will not be accepted as an excuse, as in such case it becomes the duty of his officers to dispossess him and to give a proper direction to the ship (1). If the master of the captured vessel have been previously master of a vessel which has been condemned, the Court will notice the

(d) The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Bargorry, ibid. 474; The Andromeda, ibid. 482; The Cornelius, 3 Wall. 214.

(e) The Fortuna, 6 Rob. 27; The Diana, 7 Wall. 369; The Major Barbour, Blatchfd. 167; The Forest King, ibid. 2; The Panaghia Rhomba, 12 Moo. P. C. 168.

(f) The Hurtige Hane, 2 Rob. 127; The Arthur, Edw. 263; The Charlotta, ibid. 232.

(g) The Adonis, 5 Rob. 256.

(h) 6 Rob. 30. See also The Charlotte Christina, ibid. 101, and The Gute Erwartung, ibid. 182.

(i) The Shepherdess, ibid. 262.

fact (j). If a port be once blockaded the prohibition against entry applies both to private vessels and, ordinarily, to neutral war-ships; and no private vessel, whether in ballast or laden, can, subject to the above exceptions, be allowed to attempt to enter without a special licence from the government of the blockading power. And any such licence will be strictly interpreted; so that a mere general licence to trade with the enemy will be held not to give admission to enter blockaded ports.(k).

Breach or attempted breach of blockade is primâ facie ground for confiscation of both ship and cargo, the presumption being that the breach was intended to benefit both of these interests (1). The presumption of complicity may, however, be rebutted in favour of the cargo if the documents found. on board at the time of capture should exonerate it. There may indeed be cases in which the presumption is in favour of the innocence of the cargo-owners: as, for instance, if the blockade shall have been declared after sailing of the vessel (m). In such event, in order to affect the cargo-owners with complicity, it would be necessary to prove that the act of the master personally bound them. In The Panaghia Rhomba (n) it was laid down that when at the time of shipment the blockade is or might be known to cargo-owners, their privity to the intended violation must be assumed as an irresistible inference of law, and is not capable of rebutment by evidence. In The Juffrow Maria Schrader (o), the ship was released and the cargo condemned, on the exceptional ground that,

(j) The Diana, 7 Wall. 360; The Wm. H. Northrop, Blatchfd. 235. (k) The Byfield, Edw. 188.

(1) The Alexander, 4 Rob. 93; The Shepherdess, 5 Rob. 262.

(m) The Mercurius, 1 Rob. 80; The Adonis, 5 Rob. 262.

(n) 12 Moo. P. C. C. 168.

(0) 3 Rob. 147.

whereas the vessel had a licence to enter the blockaded port with a cargo, and consequently to come out again, presumably also with a cargo, no such licence existed in favour of the cargo taken on board in the blockaded port.

If the master of a ship deviate into a blockaded port contrary to his duty to his owners, the latter are nevertheless not allowed to plead this as against condemnation. The decision in the case in which this principle was laid down (p) deals especially with the owners' plea of barratry of the master. But in such cases the master is regarded as the servant of the shipowners, who are responsible for his illegal acts, a reasoning which does not necessarily hold good in the case of the cargo. Unless, therefore, the master be agent for the cargo-owner (or his servant, if the ship and cargo be both under the same ownership), or the cargo-owner be held privy to the intended breach, the cargo will not be subjected to the fate of the ship if she be condemned (q).

In The Crenshaw (r), the vessel, leaving a blockaded port for England, was captured by the United States Government and condemned, the cargo sharing the fate of the ship, except a portion belonging to British consignees who could have had no knowledge of the blockade, and could not consequently be presumed to have instructed or authorized the master to sail in violation of it.

So long as a blockade continues, the penalty for its breach, either by ingress or egress, remains in force, and may be exacted until completion of the return voyage (s). The end of the voyage is the only natural termination of the offence;

(p) The Adonis, 5 Rob. 256.

(9) The Alexander; The Imina, supra. See also The Vrouw Judith, 1 Rob. 150; The Rosalie and Betty, 2 Rob. 343, 351; The Elsebe, 5 Rob. 173.

(r) Blatch. Pr. Ca., 1861-5, p. 30.

(s) Welvaart van Pillau, 2 Rob. 128; The Christiansberg, 6 Rob. 376; The General Hamilton, ibid. 61.

consequently a successful evasion of the blockading squadron does not purge the offence. And this position will not be affected by the circumstance that a vessel which has evaded the blockade has subsequently put into an intermediate port or has been driven into such port by stress of weather. If, however, the blockade should have been raised before capture for the breach, the offence will be deemed to have been purged, and the vessel ipso facto will cease to remain in delicto (t). "The blockade being gone," said Sir W. Scott, in The Lisette, "the necessity of applying the penalty to prevent future transgression cannot continue." The case of The General Hamilton, supra, affords an exception to the rule that termination of voyage purges offence. This vessel, being blockaded in the port of Rotterdam, was enabled to sail in virtue of an indulgence allowing neutral vessels to sail out if bound to a neutral port. The vessel sailed apparently for the neutral port of Smyrna, but, putting into Alicante ostensibly for repairs, she sold her cargo there and took on board a cargo for Copenhagen. On returning towards Copenhagen she was captured by a British cruiser, and, with her cargo, condemned, Sir W. Scott observing that the permission to go to a neutral port implied a contract that that destination would be bonâ fide pursued, and that the evasion of this obligation was an act of perfidy.

Pacific Blockade, a measure short of actual hostilities, is occasionally resorted to as a means of reprisal or of extorting redress or concession. Thus in 1827 England, France, and Russia blockaded the coasts of Greece with the view of coercing Turkey, and similar measures were threatened but not executed against the same State in 1880. In 1884 the

(t) The Lisette, 6 Rob. 387.

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