ever inflamed and exaggerated his political notions may have been, was, as a philosophical grammarian, not only subtle, but learned, cautious, and deliberate; his philological researches, as he informs us, were not published till thirty years after their plan was sketched out, and their foundation established. His account of the word "right" is, substantially, as follows.

"Right is no other than rectum (regitum) the past participle of the Latin verb regere. Whence in Italian you have ritto; and from dirigere, diritto: whence the French have their antient droict, and their modern droit. Italian dritto and the French droit being no other than the past participle directum."

The

"Thus, when a man demands his right, he asks only that which it is ordered he shall have:-to have right in one's favour is, to have in one's favour that which is ordered:" but, he adds, "the same thing may be commanded to be done by one authority, and commanded not to be done by another authority:-and therefore, as a short method of determining disputes between well-meaning men, concerning questions of right, we should at once refer to the order, or to the authority which ordered."

"In the same manner," he says, "our English word just is the past participle of the Latin verb jubere; and law is merely the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Leczan ponere, and means any thing laid down, as a rule of conduct." And see the 2nd section of the Introduction to these Commentaries, p. 38, where a similar definition is given by Blackstone. (See also, Fortescue, p. 4, n. (a), and 2 Swanst. 579). So, the grammarian Festus informs us, the antient Roman writers, instead of jura, always used the

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Hence, Horne Tooke infers, that "it is improper to say, God has a right; or that, God is just. For nothing is ordered, directed, or commanded concerning God." These expressions he considers 'inapplicable to the Deity; though they are common, and those who use them have the best intentions. They are applicable," he contends, "only to men; to whom alone language belongs, and of whose sensations only words are the representatives; to men, who are by nature the subjects of orders and commands, and whose chief merit is obedience."

He further says, "I follow the law of God, (what is laid down by him for the rule of my conduct), when I follow the laws of human nature; which, without any human testimony, we know must proceed from God; (see the second note to Vol. 2); and upon these are founded the rights of man, or what is ordered for man. I revere the constitution and constitutional laws of England; because they are in conformity with the laws of God and nature; and upon these are founded the rational rights of Englishmen." But, he vehemently adds, "If princes or ministers, or the corrupted sham representatives of a people, order, command, or lay down any thing contrary to that which is ordered, commanded, or laid down by God, human nature, or the constitution of

this government, I will still hold fast by the higher authority. (See post, Vol. 4, pp. 3 and 28). If the meaner authorities are offended, they can only destroy the body of the individual; but can never destroy the right, or that which is ordered by their superiors." (See post, pp. 41, 43, 2 Barn. & Cres. 470, and 3 Dowl. & Ryl. 720).

Grotius (in the 10th section of his 1st book) says, "natural right is the rule and dictate of reason, shewing whether an act is forbidden or commanded by God."

Upon the strength of general principles and reasoning, Paley, in his "Moral Philosophy," seems to have come, pretty closely, to that conclusion which Horne Tooke reached by aid of etymology. "Right," says Paley,

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means no more than the rule we go by, whatever that rule may be." And again he says, "right only means consistency with the will of God." (See Vol. 2, note 2, ad finem). Yet, whilst resting his whole doctrine upon the position, that "it is the divine will which determines the distinction of right and wrong," he follows Heineccius, (book 1, c. 3, s. 65), and his commentator, Turnbull, (though he does not think it necessary to cite them), in an attempt to palliate, perhaps without entirely removing, the objection to the use of the word right, and its correlative wrong, when speaking of the actions of God. Paley says, the terms are "intelligible and significant," when so used; but he does not affirm, that such an application of those words is proper; on the contrary, he seems, virtually, to concede, that it is inaccurate and unobservant so to speak. For, he puts the case thus: "By virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right and

wrong, we arrive at certain conclusions; which conclusions become rules; and we soon learn to pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any further; and when the habit is once established of stopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with these rules even the Divine conduct itself; and yet it may be true, (only not observed by us at the time), that the rules themselves are deduced from the Divine will."

Upon the whole result, no difference of opinion appears to exist between Horne Tooke and Paley, respecting the primary and proper sense of the word "right" their definitions vary in expression, but the formula of one may be easily, and perhaps advantageously, consolidated with that of the other; and we may safely rest in the conclusion, that right, properly speaking, is the rule we go by, whatever that rule may be; but that every rule imposed by human authority should be consistent with the Divine will, to which, as the ultimate source of all dominion, every question of right must be finally referred.

Rights, then, may be divided into three classes:

1st. Rules expressly given by God himself, constitute rights, admitting no debate. 2ndly. Rules which, though not expressly laid down by God, are necessary deductions from that which is so ruled, are rights equally peremptory; (see, ante, p. 54, n. 22); unless the rules be of such a nature as to allow those in whose favour they are inferred to wave the benefit of them; this is the case with respect to many of those rules which are commonly called "natural" rights; and these, as is shewn in the note to p. 8, Vol. 2, may, by express or implied compact,

be modified. (And see post, pp. 125 and 129). 3rdly. Rules which have not been expressly given by God, and are not evident deductions from what has been so ruled, constitute rights which, when declared by competent human authority, cannot be infringed without crime, (see post, p. 42), provided there be nothing in such rules inconsistent with the will of God. (See ante, p. 43, and Vol. 4, p. 3).

To one of these three classes of rules, all rights, properly so predicated, may be referred; and, though the obligations imposed by rules belonging to the last class are to be postponed, whenever they are clearly in opposition to rules of higher authority; it behoves every one, before he presumes to violate any rule, as conceiving it of subordinate force, dispassionately to examine whether by the same act of disobedience which would render him amenable to human laws, he may not also incur the divine displeasure.

No one should forget, that the Evangelist (1 Ep. John, iii. 4) places all sin in avoμta, i. e. in the transgression of a law; and see Rom. iv. 15; and even if it were certain the inspired writers, when they penned the passages just cited, had principally in contemplation the divine law, it is at least as certain, that the Scriptures abound in passages plainly inculcating the duty of submission (unless in extreme cases) to the ordinances of all constituted authorities;

but this submission need not be either slavish, unreasoning, or unremonstrating.

(2) The meaning of this phrase cannot be ambiguous to any one who has read the paragraph immediately preceding, or the first sentence of the second volume; in which places our author tells us he means "those rights which a man may acquire over, in, and to such external objects as are unconnected with his person." Whether the expression "rights of things," there. fore, be or be not (what Mr. Christian has declared it is) a solecism, and contrary to English idiom, is of no very serious importance.

(3) The distinction between private wrongs and public wrongs is more intelligible, and more accurately limited by the nature of the subjects, than the distinction between the rights of things, and the rights of persons; for all rights whatever must be the rights of certain persons to certain things. Every right is annexed to a certain character or relation, which each individual bears in society. The rights of kings, lords, judges, husbands, fathers, heirs, purchasers, and occupants, are all dependent upon the respective characters of the claimants. These rights might again be divided into rights to possess certain things, and the rights to do certain actions. This latter class of rights constitute powers and authority. The distinction intended by the learned