lon of wash. In the year 1751, the duties were nearly doubled, the confequence was immediately felt, for in 1751, the quantity of low wines excifed was, In 1752, they were only

11,200,000 gallons. 7,000,000 ditto. In 1760, an additional duty was exacted; fince which time, if we are to truft the excife officers' books, there has never `been in any one year, 2,800,000 of proof spirits produced by the whole distillery in England; and, in Scotland, after the year 1760, when the additional duty was there also exacted, the quantities fell from 4 and 500,000 gallons, to 30, 40, and almoft to 50,000 gallons.'

Foreign Spirits form the next fubject of inquiry, and they afford fimilar conclufions. The fame may be faid of foreign wines, which is the only other article that the author examines. He concludes this chapter with the following pertinent cautionary remarks:

Though it is of great moment to know when an article is overtaxed, yet the decrease of the quantity which then takes place on the revenue books is, by no means, a correct measure of the extent of fmuggling, which may afterwards prevail in that article. It is alfo to be remembered, that, though too high a rate of duty always occafions fmuggling, and though this may be traced on the face of the revenue accounts when they are carefully attended to, yet the converfe of the propofition is not true, viz. that the falling of revenue amounts is an unequivocal proof of fmuggling. Revenue amounts may rife and fall from caufes altogether unconnected with taxes.'

The next chapter is appropriated to an examination of the means which the legislature have adopted, with a view to prevent, or to fupprefs fmuggling, with their confequences. This is an elaborate difquifition, and contains many pertinent obfervations, all tending to fhew the futility and pernicious confequences of attempting to fupprefs fmuggling and other frauds, when the profits that may refult from thefe practices. are confiderable:-but here we must refer to the work itself. As a fpecimen of the author's train of reafoning, we shall select his obfervations on the efficacy of oaths in these cases; as we have ever confidered the proftitution of oaths as one of the most reprehenfible errors of modern legislation; which, as it tends to unhinge the principles of found morality, and to render the lives and property of every member of the community infecure, cannot be too foon redreffed.-Concerning revenue oaths, the author reafons thus:

It seems scarce neceffary to fay much to perfuade us that oaths are a very improper manner of attempting to fecure duties. When they are fo employed, the legislature muft either altogether rest upon this evidence of the trader against himself, or accompany it with checks,

T 3

checks, to detect thofe traders who may be capable of giving a falfe oath. If they are altogether refted upon, they evidently give every advantage, in point of profit, to him who fwears falfely, over him who feareth an oath. If accompanied with checks, and the check is perfect, there is no ufe for the oath. If the check is imperfect, it will be no fecurity again ft falfe fwearing; and when detection. takes place, it becomes abfolutely neceffary for the trader, if he has any regard for character, to bribe the officer to connive at the fraud which has been committed under the fanction of an oath. Thus a fource of corruption is opened, different from, and even more powerful than the defire of evading duties; a circumftance which ftrongly tends to unftring the power of fifcal regulations. To make light of the awful fanction of an oath, is justly confidered as a high degree of depravity, preparing the mind for every enormity. Smugglers, it is probable, begin with the fecret commiffion of this crime, and end with its avowed practice. A cuftom-house oath with them, is not merely unattended with awe; it is an object of ridicule.'

How can it be otherwife? when the laws are fuch, that not only the fmuggler is tempted to take a falfe oath, for profit, but that even the honeft trader, in the fair courfe of bufinefs, when he has no intention of defrauding the revenue at all, is compelled every day to take oaths that not only may be falfe, but evidently must be fo, by the avowed acknowlegement both of the perfon who is, by law, compelled to adminifter it, and of him who, by his fituation and business, is obliged to take it. Yet fuch is the inattention (for, in this enlightened age, we cannot call it ignorance) of our legiflators, that they fcruple not to pass fuch abfurd laws without the smallest degree of hefitation.

Refpe&ing permits, which have been adopted as another mode of preventing smuggling, the author obferves, that the revenue committee tell us, that at one place the excife officers' books exhibited only 3,000 tons of fpirits that had paid duty; when, from it, no less than 19,000 tons had been sent, under the protection of regular permits, in one year.

Were a ftranger,' (he continues,) to confult our revenue code; did he remark the regulations, reftrictions, and checks under which the distiller in this country is laid; did he observe the many confifcations, fines, imprisonments, and deaths, which refound. from one ftatute to another; he would furely conclude, that an English diftiller must be one of the poorest and most oppreffed men of the nation. But he has only to turn from the ftatute book, and look on the diftillers, to entertain very different fentiments. He may fee some of them fitting at their eafe, and defrauding the nation without fear. They not only defeat the numerous checks which have been put on them, but convert them into their fecurity. And they not only circulate the fpirits they have thus fmuggled, notwithstanding permits, but by means of that very inftrument by which the legislature meant to prevent their circulation.'

Let

Let us add, that, by means of the wealth which they thus accumulate, they not only fet at nought the laws that have been made to guard against the frauds which they commit, but even overawe the minifter himself, and influence the leaders of the legislative affembly to adopt a system of legislation which, though fraught with national evils of the moft pernicious kind, is well calculated to fecure the great object that they have in view private emolument.

In his concluding remarks on this chapter, the author, with his ufual judgment, obferves,

That practice must be bad indeed, which has infenfibly led the legiflature into a fyftem, ruinous in all its tendencies, whether we regard it in a moral, political, or fifcal view. It is only the last of thefe views of the fubject we are now taking; and enough has been faid to fhew, that high duties, rigorous laws, and increufe of fmuggling, have been hitherto infeparably connected, in the fiical hif tory of this country...... This is, and has been, the opinion of every fenfible man, who has had fufficient opportunities to underftand the fubject, and has really attended to it; and yet, by a kind of fatality, for which it is not eafy to account, the practice of every fucceffive minister and parliament has been the fame.'

From prudential motives, the writer does not judge it fit here to explain the caufe of this phenomenon; though from what has incidentally dropped from his pen, in feveral parts of this performance, we are inclined to believe, if he had chofen to inquire into this branch of the fubject, he would have found it as little enveloped in myfticifm, as many other particulars which he has explained in a very clear and fatisfactory

manner.

In the third chapter, however, the ingenious author thinks it proper to inquire into the cause of those erroneous opinions which have given rife to the over-tax fyftem ;-and here he confiders the following heads feparately, viz. ft, Price as related to the fubject - 2d, of merchant and manufacturer-30, of the partial fmuggler-4th, of the revenue officers, when articles are overtaxed-under this head, the following pertinent obfervations occur:

It is common, in the fyftem hitherto purfued, to encourage the revenue officer to fupprefs fmuggling, not by rendering him independent of it, but by rewarding him for detecting frauds and making feizures. Thefe encouragements are fuppofed neceffary, to ftimulate his activity, and to fecure his integrity; and in many fituations, his moiety of fines and feizures conítitutes his chief emolument. But as this emolument is always proportioned to the goods feized, or to the frauds difcovered, it is as much the interest of the officer that there should be goods to feize, and frauds to difcover, as that they should be feized or difcovered; and though it is his inte

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reit

reft to make feizures, it is equally fo that fmuggling, the fource of these seizures, should not altogether be cut off. But this would be done by the reduction of duties, which therefore he would never advife, if he understood his intereft, and was willing to promote it, at the expence of his country.'

5th, Of the mere fmuggler-6th, an apology for financiers-7th, of the fifcal information to be derived from the revenue accounts of over-taxed articles. This is an elaborate difquifition, clearly proving that we must not rely on these accounts, taken by themfelves. The following are his concluding obfervations on this fubject:

Is it fo then, that fmuggling often prevails moft, where the revenue accounts are higheft? Do we find the reafonings of revenue officers inconclufive and uncertain? Are we liable to be milled by the plaufible reafonings of the manufacturer or merchant? Are revenue accounts incompetent to give us folid information? Do amounts rife, after additional duties have been impofed? And do they fometimes fall, after duties have been lowered, perhaps with the intention of raifing them? And amidst all these jarring and contradictory circumstances, do we find men of the first talents, not even attempting to explain them, but paffing them over with little obfervation, and ftill perfevering in prejudices which have been long established? In fuch a fituation, we need not wonder, that we have neither clear ideas, nor decided opinions: that overcome by the force of example; preffed by the neceffities of the ftate, and feeing no other plan by which it could act, the legiflature fhould adhere to the old fyftem, though pregnant with confequences, pernicious to the manners of the people; repugnant to all good government; and which threatens the deftruction of that very revenue, which it is its object to fecure.'

To remove this confufion, the writer proceeds to inquire into other caufes that have contributed to mislead the public opinion on this fubject, and to establish the pernicious fyftem of taxation which he reprobates. With this view, he finds it neceflary to examine, 8th, what are the ends of taxing.Thefe he thinks may be three-fold, viz. 1ft, To restrain the ufe of a commodity, and in this cafe he would denominate them' political taxes.2d, To give one commodity the advantage over another in point of price, fuch he calls commercial taxes— or, 3d, To raife a revenue, which he calls revenue taxes. Each of thefe he confiders feparately in their order, which we must pafs over, only obferving that the general conclufion from the whole is, that every confideration fhould give way to this fingle point,-what rate of duty is the commodity capable of bearing to obtain an answer to which question will be the object of his future inquiries.

+ Revenue committee's first report.

The

The fecond book is appropriated to the difcuffion of several queftions that require to be elucidated, before the fyftem which the author propofes to introduce, can be fully understood. These he investigates under the modeft title of Inquiries, which he arranges under three heads.

The first inquiry relates to the manner in which a state ought to encrease its revenue, in proportion to the growing wealth of its fubjects. In this difcuffion, the writer first endeavours, from facts already established, to discover the effect of lowering duties, when they are confeffedly too high; and then, on more general principles, attempts to fhew, that, fuppofing the duties. were moderate, the encrease of revenue ought to be regulated by the fame general laws, which influence individual traders in the management of their private concerns.

In regard to the first part of this inquiry, the following facts are ftrongly illuftrative of the effects of lowering the duties when too high: (p. 91.)

When we confider how general and deep-rooted the belief is, "that a reduction of the rate of duties would be attended with a proportional decrease of revenue," it feems ftill proper to afcertain, if this is a real, or only an imaginary objection, to reducing the rates of many of our taxes.

It has appeared, that for two periods, ending 1773 and 1782, there never was above 800,000 gallons of foreign fpirits legally imported into this country in a year.

This quantity, at 7s. 3d. per gallon, (which is nearly the average rate of the excife duties for these two periods,) would yield a grofs yearly amount of 290,000l.

If we charge 6 per cent. for collecting, the net revenue arifing from foreign fpirits would not exceed 270,6001.

The quantity of foreign fpirits fmuggled during these periods was, yearly,

Add the quantity legally imported,

4,300,000 gallons. 800,000 gallons.

5,100,000 galions,

which the inhabitants of this country will have, and with which, while we have too high a tax, the fmuggler chiefly will fapply them, notwithstanding all the exertions which government can make to prevent him.

Let us fuppofe the duty on foreign fpirits to be reduced from 75. 3d. to 2s. 6d. per gallon, and that this duty was a moderate tax: this on 5,100,000 gallons, would yield a grofs revenue of £.637,500 And, if fmuggling did not prevail, this fum could eafily be collected for lefs than 5 per cent. Hence, deduct for expence of collecting,

So that with about one-third part of the rate of duty, we should have of net revenue,

32,000

L. 605,000

free from fmuggling and corruption, instead of only 272,6c0l. accompanied with all the mischiefs of over-taxing.'

The