clared open hoftility against civil government, to be confounded with the civil rights and liberties of the nation at large? Or, if prieftcraft had obtained, or if ignorance and bigotry had granted, immunities fo inconfiftent with the first principles of government, were fucceeding princes bound to continue them, till they should be voluntarily relinquished? It canot be difficult to perceive an effential difference between the claim of fuch a degree of liberty, as is not inconsistent with the ends of government, and that of an entire exemption from the autho rity of law. A more grofs perverfion of the meaning of terms can scarcely be conceived, than to dignify with the name of the liberties of the church, a fyftem of ecclefiaftical independence deftructive of all good order and public tranquillity.

Becket might be influenced in his public conduct, (for it is impoffible to speak with certainty of the principles and motives of men,) folely by religious zeal; and he might imagine that it was for the glory of God, that the ecclefiaftical and papal authority should obtain univerfal (upremacy: but, after all that Mr. Berington has advanced, we cannot but think, with Lord Lyttelton, that ambition had at least an equal fhare with piety in forming his character; and that, if he was a faint, he was, at the fame time, an imperious and arrogant prieft. On the moft favourable fuppofition, he is entitled to no other praife, than that which belongs to honeft, but ignorant and mifchiev ous, zeal; and the circumftances of his fudden tranfition, on his advancement to the fee of Canterbury, from exceffive freedom to exceffive rigour of manners, affords fome ground to question his title even to that praife. This circumftance the author endeavours, with his ufual ingenuity, to glofs over *: but to us it feems much more natural, to fuppose this sudden change to be the effect of an artful accommodation to a new fituation, than of an inftantaneous conviction of religious duty. We are of opinion, however, with Lord Lyttelton, that enthufiafm was, in the latter part of the life of Becket, a leading feature in his character; that he then fhewed fuch a fpirit, as conftitutes heroifm, when it exerts itself in a cause beneficial to mankind; and we entirely accede to the conclufion of that able, and we think not uncandid hiftorian: "Had Becket defended the established laws of his country, and the fundamental rules of civil juftice, with as much zeal and intrepidity as he opposed them, he would have deferved to be ranked among those great men, whofe virtues make one eafily forget the allay of fome natural imperfections: but unhappily, his good qua

lities were fo mifapplied, that they became no lefs hurtful to the public weal of the kingdom, than the worft of his vices."

On the whole, though we are difpofed to allow all due praife to Mr. Berington's talents as an hiftorian, we cannot think him poffeffed of the merit of perfect impartiality. If what he afferts of Lord Lyttelton, in his preface, be true, that the horror of popery, which in fome is a real malady, difordered his judgment, and difqualified him for difcuffing ecclefiaftical matters,' we must be allowed to fufpect, on the other fide, that a predilection for popery, which, in the extreme, may also become a real malady, has had fomewhat of a fimilar effect on the mind of Mr. Berington,

ART. III. The Hiftory of Greece.

IN

Vol. II.

By William Mitford, Efq.

[Article concluded from our laft Review.]

N the hiftory of the Peloponnefian war, which occupies about two-thirds of this volume, the author adheres clofely to the narrative of the judicious and impartial Thucydides. He interweaves, however, every thing of moment, which can be gathered from other fources, refpecting this period of the hiftory; and he makes the whole his own, by regularity of arrangement, and uniformity of ftyle. From this part of the work, one extract muft fuffice: this fhall be an account of the revolution at Athens, from a democracy to an oligarchy, brought about by Peifander:

• Peifander and his colleagues, returning to Samos from their unfuccessful negotiation with Tiffaphernes and Alcibiades, had the gratification to find, not only that their caufe had been gaining in the army, but that the oligarchal party among the Samians themfelves were both difpofed and able to effect a change in the government of their island. Thus incouraged they determined to pay no more attention to Alcibiades, but in proceeding in their original purpose of a change of government at Athens, to rely upon their own ftrength for the conduct of both the domestic affairs of the commonwealth, and the business of the war. A large fubfcription, for fupporting measures upon which not only their interest but their perfonal fafety now depended, was raifed by the party.

Having established this ground-work for future proceedings, it was then determined, that Peifander, with five of the other commiffioners, fhould return to Athens to manage the concerns of the party there, and that the other five fhould pafs round the allied and fubject ftates, and endeavour to bring all under an oligarchal form of government. Diotrephes was appointed to the fuperintendency of the affairs of Thrace. In his way thither he stopped at Thafus, and fucceeded in at once abolishing the fovereignty of the

people

people there. The confequence, however, was not what Peifander and his colleagues intended. Some principal Thafians of the oligarchal party, who had been banished by the Athenians, had taken refuge, with the Peloponnefian armament on the Afiatic coast. They maintained a correfpondence with their friends remaining in the island, and had been importunately urging revolt. Diotrephes did for them the molt difficult part of their bufinefs, much better than they would have done it for themselves. Oligarchy being eftablished, the Thafians in poffeffion made no longer any difficulty of preferring the Lacedæmonian to the Athenian connection; the exiles were reftored, and Thafus became a member of the Peloponnefian confederacy. Meanwhile Peifander, and the five who accompanied him, wherever they touched in their way to Athens, feem to have found as little difficulty in effecting the change of government they defired, as Diotrephes at Thafus; but the confequence in most of the towns (fo Thucydides fays, without naming them) was the fame; they revolted to Lacedæmon.

We are not informed by what means a few citizens of Athens, with felf affumed authority, thus almoft inftantaneously overturned the conftitutions of fo many Grecian republics. The means by which the oligarchal party in Athens itself had in the meantime advanced far in their purpose, do no honor either to the Athenian government or the Athenian character. The principal was affaffination, and it seems to have been chiefly managed by the young men of the best families. Androcles, a man of mean origin, who had acquired fuch influence among the lower people, that the condemnation of Alcibiades had been not a little owing to him, and who had ever fince been the most forward champion of democracy, was among the firft taken off. Others of the most obnoxious to the friends of Alcibiades and of oligarchy fhared the fame fate; for, at Athens, the causes of Alcibiades and of oligarchy were not yet diftinguished. Inquiry concerning thefe murders was fmothered or deterred, and the friends of democracy became afraid to fhew them felves; for fome, who had been thought among the firmeft in the democratical intereft, being discovered to have joined the other party, fufpicion fpread, fo that no man dared truft his neighbour.

The oligarchal party thus finding themfelves ftrong, ventured to declare openly the kind of change which they propofed to make in the conftitution, in which fome confideration was had for the antient prejudices of the Athenian people, as well as for an appearance of public virtue. There was to be still an affembly of the people, but in fome degree fele&: it was to be confined to a body of five thousand, to be chofen among thofe most qualified by property and perfonal ability to ferve the commonwealth; and public pay was to be allowed to none but those actually ferving in the fleet or army. This, fays the cotemporary hiftorian, was fomething specious and alluring; being not only congenial to the fpirit of the antient conftitution, but even to modern practice; fince fo large a number as five thousand citizens fcarcely ever met in one affembly; and at the fame time it held out to every one the hope that, if he would

Dd 4

concur

oncur in the meafures propofed, he might be a member of the for vereign body.

Meanwhile the general affemblies were regularly held according to ancient form, and the council of five hundred retained its functions: but affaffination was continued; and with fo little referve, and fuch impoffibility of obtaining juftice against the perpetrators, that political oppofition was deterred. None spoke, either in the affembly or council, but thofe of the party, and they not without previous communication with the chiefs. The friends of democracy meanwhile, without equal union among themselves, ignorant of the numbers of the oligarchal party, and fuppofing them much greater than they really were, fcarcely dared complain of enormities practifed; every one thinking himself fortunate if, with the utmost caution to avoid offending, he avoided fuffering. To this depreffion of the democratical party nothing fo much contributed as the treachery among its reputed friends; for fome of those fartheft from previous fufpicion having joined the oligarchal party, no one knew any longer in whom he might confide. Thus affaffinations continued to pafs without inquiry; and even where proof could be obtained against the perpretator, nobody ventured to profecute.

Already things were in this fituation, when Peifander returned to Athens. Before his departure a decree had been made, declaring, in general terms, that the government should be changed; it remained to be decided how. An affembly of the people was convened to determine that important queftion. The oligarchal party had fuch a decided fuperiority, that they might propofe, with a certainty of carrying, in the moment, almost any thing; but it was not what might be in the moment carried in the affembly at Athens, that would decide the future conflitution of the commonwealth, or their own future fate. Not only turns in the popular mind must be provided again, but great confideration must be had for that large portion of the commonwealth ferving in the armament on the other fide of the Agean. It was therefore moved, that the confideration of the business should be referred to a committee of ten mẹn, whọ fhould make their report on an appointed day; and a decree was made to that effect. The day being come, the people were fammoned to affemble on the hill of Colonus, a little more than a mile from the city. The ten then came forward with the fimple propofal of a law, whofe aim was nothing more than to obviate illegality in the future measures of the party. It ftated, that every Athenian fhould be free to declare any opinion in the affembly upon political topics; and it inflicted heavy penalties upon thofe who should endeavour to abridge this liberty, whether by legal profecution according to the antient law, or in any other manner. This being carried, and what before would have been treason thus made legal, fome of the party declared their opinion, that the form of adminiftration of the commonwealth ought to be changed, and that pay and remuneration should no more be iffued from the treafury, for any but thofe employed for the commonwealth on foreign fervice. This alfo being patiently heard,

heard, Peifander then ventured to propofe the form of government to be established: "That five prefidents fhould be chofen by the people that thefe fhould elect a hundred, and that each of the hundred fhould elect three: that the council of four hundred thus formed, fhould be vested with full power to direct the executive go, vernment: that the fupreme authority in the last refort fhould refide in a body of five thousand citizens, to be affembled at the difcretion of the council."

In this manner it was endeavoured, by the ableft politician, in the judgement of Thucydides, at that time in Greece, to remedy the evils of the Athenian democracy: for Peifander, though himself able, was but the inftrument in the hands of Antiphon, a man, fays the hiftorian, in virtue inferior to no Athenian of his age, and in abilities, whether for the clofet or the affembly, fuperior to all. This very fuperiority, exciting jealoufy among the people, had prevented the exertion of his talents for the public benefit; a circumstance not uncommon among the antient democracies, and which probably contributed to inhance the enmity of Antiphon toward that form of government: but in any private caufe, whether in the inferior courts of judicature, or before the affembled people, ro man was equally capable of ferving his friends, either by his advice or by his eloquence. The fecond place among the opponents of democracy feems to have been held by Theramenes fon of Agnon; a man alfo of fuperior powers, both of thought and elocution, and moreover of confiderable military experience. But, befide thofe originally of the oligarchal party, there were fome eminent men who had paffed over to it from the democratical; and, of these, Phrynichus, the late commander on the Afiatic coaft, was the chief. Of a fearless temper, but an unprincipled mind, Phrynichus dreaded, beyond any perfonal danger, the restoration of Alcibiades to the commonwealth and to power. As foon therefore as the oligarchal party broke with Alcibiades, Phrynichus joined the oligarchal party; and, after the common manner of renegades, exceeded in zeal the moft zealous of the original members. A number of fuperior men, fays the cotemporary hiftorian, being thus united in the conduct of the business, it is no great wonder that it fucceeded; though to deprive the Athenian people of liberty, for that is his expreffion, a hundred years after the recovery of it by the expulfion of the tyrants, during above fifty of which they had been accustomed, not only to obey none, but to command many, was indeed an arduous undertaking.

The decree directing the new conflitution having paffed the affembly of the people, the party managed among themselves the appointment of the new council. But the council of five hundred, in whom the old conflitution vefted the executive power, had not been confulted concerning any of the meafures taken or propofed : they were ftill in poffeflion of the prytaneium or state-house, in which a part of them, the prytanes, ufually refided, and it was ap prehended they might not peaceably refign it. Meafures were therefore with much forethought taken to obviate oppofition, which might poffibly give rise to a dangerous tumult, when the new coun