35. Husband and Wife Alienation of Affections. That the husband's health was poor, and was weakened by marital intercourse, is sufficient ground for his mother to believe he should live apart from his wife, to be a defense against the wife's action for alienation of affections. Wilson v. Wilson, Me., 98 Atl. 938.

36. Desert Land Laws. - Property acquired by the wife under Desert Land Laws of the United States is conclusively presumed in favor of incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration to be her separate property. -Lukins v. Traylor, N. M., 160 Pac. 339.

37. Joint Deposit. - Where certificates of deposit in a bank are payable to husband or wife, as well as where they are payable to husband and wife, it is a joint deposit with right of survivorship, being held in either case by entireties. - In re Sloan's Estate, Pa., 98 Atl. 966.

38. Insurance-Burglary. -A policy of burglary insurance, conditioned against liability except for loss by an "outside job," with visible marks of force in entrance or exit, does not cover a burglary where the culprits drugged the night watchman, entered through doors by keys, and left through an elevator, the door to which they opened in the usual way.- United Sponging Co. v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York, N. Y., 161 N. Y. Supp. 309.

and

39. Sole Ownership. - Unconditional sole ownership, which a fire policy requires insured to have, relates to the quality of his title, and not to the question of liens or incumbrances. Lloyd v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. of London & Edinburgh, N. Y., 161 Ν. Y. Supp. 271.

40. Intoxicating Liquors-Evidence. -Testimony of railroad and transfer agents that they received and delivered to defendants large quantities of intoxicating liquors consigned to defendants or to other persons for them was admissible.- Del Sasso v. State, Ark., 188 S. W.

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42. Larceny-Unexplained Possession. -In larceny trial, it was proper to refuse an instruction that "the mere unexplained possession of stolen property is not evidence of guilt," since, if referring to recent possession, it is incorrect, and, if not, it was abstract and calculated to mislead.- Thomas v. State, Ala., 72 So. 688.

43. Libel and Slander-Intent. - As regards truth of an assertion in alleged libel that plaintiff was accused of felony in altering a public record, intent with which plaintiff had the clerk strike out a satisfaction of judgment is, under Pen. Code §§ 113, 114, immaterial.-Newby v. Times-Mirror Co., Cal., 160 Pac. 233.

44. Lis Pendens-Necessity of Filing. When the action is brought in the county where the land is situated, it is not necessary to file a formal lis pendens; the filing of the complaint, describing the property and stating the purpose

of the action, and service of summons being sufficient.-Powell v. Dail, N. C., 90 S. E. 194.

45. Mandamus-Public Utilities Commission. -Under Laws 1911, c. 238, § 20, a controversy between a city and gas company as to repair and maintenance of service pipes must be submitted to the Public Utilities Commission before action of the gas company will be controlled by mandamus. City of Scammon v. American Gas Co., Kan., 160 Pac. 316.

46. County Auditor.-Where county auditor, following interpretation of committee appointed to construe registration law, as amended in 1915 to provide for permanent registration of voters (Acts 1915, с. 126), ordered complete registration for destruction of pollbooks of precinct, his decision was not so palpably wrong as to warrant interference by mandamus, especially where first invoked after registration period had ended.-Eviston v. State, Ind., 114 Ν. Ε. 1.

47. Medical Board. In mandamus against state board of pharmacy to compel it to issue a renewal certificate to a registered pharmacist, where petition showed positively that board refused to grant renewal on ground that pharmacist's certificate was found in possession of another, presumption is that board regarded him as otherwise entitled to a renewal.-People v. State Board of Pharmacy, Ill., 114 N. E. 22.

48. Special Fund.-Holder of interestbearing coupon warrant drawn upon special fund to be raised through assessment made for sewer improvement, may, by mandamus, compel city treasurer to proceed with collection of warrant by sale of delinquent property. - Stinson v. Godbe, Utah, 160 Pac. 280.

49. Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk. -In an action for death of plaintiff's son, killed in performance of a portion of his usual duties, in prying down a mass of rock and earth on a 45-degree incline, pursuant to the orders of defendant's foreman, held, that deceased assumed the risk. - Lukich v. Utah Const. Co., Utah, 160 Pac. 270.

50. Course of Employment.-Plaintiff's intestate, employed as a repairman on the "heavy side" of defendant's railroad yard, and killed on the "light side" while in search of supplies, held in the course of his employment.-Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Short's Adm'r, Ky., 188 S. W.

786.

company

was

51. Negligence. - In action against railroad, its freight agent, and two assistant agents, for damages from bite of cat allowed on railroad premises, where no delict of proved other than through agency of assistant agents, verdict for freight agent and against company alone could not stand. - Jones v. Southern Ry. Co., S. C., 90 S. E. 183.

52. Safety Appliance Act. - Violation of federal Safety Appliance Act may be established by proof that repeated efforts to work the lever of automatic coupler failed to lift the coupling pin. - Davis v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., Minn., 159 N. W. 802.

an

53. Mechanics' Liens-Arbitration. - Where a contract for labor and material provided that questions in dispute should be arbitrated, but did not provide that arbitration should precede an action thereon, an arbitration, unless re

seller, does not arise where, after it has fulfilled its express warranty, all other warranties being expressly excluded, it on complaint of the buyer sends experts to repair the engine sold. -International Harvester Co. of America v. Law, S. C., 90 S. E. 186.

72. Taxation-Estoppel. - Where taxpayers did not object that tax rate was fixed before assessment was complete for 15 months, having meantime paid part of the tax, they are estopped by laches from enjoining its collection. - Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Schmidt, Pa., 98 Atl. 964,

73. Hospital. - Within Const, art. 10, § 1, a hospital maintaining a nurses' training school which received free patients, but required those financially able to pay, held not used or leased out for profit and so exempt from taxation.Reynolds Memorial Hospital v. Marshall County Court, W. Va., 90 S. E. 238.

74. Inheritance Tax. - Under Laws 1909, с. 438, §§ 9, 10, where the testator left an annuity to widow during widowhood, for her own use and the maintenance and education of children, the balance of the estate to go to the children, the inheritance tax on the interest of the children in the annuity will be paid out of the income of the remainder left to the children, or from the principal if necessary. In re Baugham's Estate, N. C., 90 S. E. 203.

Tender-Evidence. - In action on an account for goods sold, defendant's mailing of a check for the amount to plaintiff, its return, defendant's statement to plaintiff's attorney that the account had been paid, and the check itself, etc., were admissible, and their exclusion was reversible error. - Hirsch v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., Utah, 160 Pac. 283.

between the side lines of his land on the shore and the center line of the stream. - Calkins v. Hart, N. Y., 118 N. Ε. 785.

80. Riparian Rights. - Where for 20 years prior to the commencement of an action to determine riparian rights each of the parties diverted from a creek and used upon their respective tracts of land certain proportionate amounts of water, their continued use of water, by mutual consent, ripened into a binding agreement determinative of the rights of the parties. -Villa v. Keylor, Wash., 160 Pac. 297.

81.

Wills- Bequest. -A will leaving to testator's niece "a good outfit to start housekeeping when she get married before I die," does not entitle her to an outfit in case of her marriage after his death. In re Schwartz's Estate, Pa., 98 Atl. 780.

82. Construction. A will drawn by a layman is to be construed much as a layman would construe it. - In re Catlin, N. Y., 160 N. Y. Supp. 1034.

83. Construction. - If the same words occur more than once in a will, they are presumed always to be used in the same sense, unless a contrary intention appears from the contents.-Abrahams v. Sanders, I11., 113 N. E.

737.

84. Devolution of Interest. - Where testators' will established trust for ten years for benefit of widow and three children, making no disposition of interest after termination of trust, such interest devolved upon widow and children by operation of law upon termination of the trust. - Smith v. Smith, Mo., 188 S. W. 1111.

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85. Identifying Beneficiary. Though devise did not name the beneficiary, it is not necessarily void, and it is proper to direct the administrator to make necessary investigations to ascertain theme of the beneficiary, where there is descripti by which he may be identified. Hills v. A ita Art Ass'n, Ga., 89 S. E. 1084.

86. Investn. Directed. - A testamentary trust, directing Investment in "first-class interest-bearing real estate mortgage securities," held to confine investment to the purchase of undivided mortgage indebtedness, and not in bonds secured by frust deed. - In re Mendel's Will, Wis., 159 N. W. 806.

87. Latent Ambiguity. - Where at time of making will testator owned 20 shares of stock, par $2,000, actual $5,000, and the devise read, "I bequeath my stock amounting to $1,000," extrinsic facts were admissible to remove the latent ambiguity.-Hertford v. Harned, Ind., 113

Ν. Ε. 727.

88. Remainderman. - Where testatrix made a devise over to three grandchildren should her granddaughter, the primary devisee, die without lawful heirs, and one remainderman predeceased testatrix, the share of such deceased passed as intestate property. - Bizzell v. Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n, N. C., 90 S. E. 142.

89. Revocation. - Where the testator, by express words in his last codicil, revoked charitable bequests valid under Decedent Estate Law, $ 19, and made new bequests, invalid thereunder, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation did not apply, so that the earlier bequests did not revive. - Ely v. Megie, N. Y., 113 Ν. Ε. 800.

C

WILL THE SENATE ALLOW THE COURTS TO BE SAVED?

The people of this country in no uncertain manner demand simplification, expedition and economy in the operation of the courts. It is a just demand and the failure to respond will jeopardize the peace, if not the very foundation of the republic. No sensible man will deny that a weakening of the courts means a weakening of the government; and a loss of faith in the courts means the destruction of the government. When men desert the courts, nothing is left but force in the protection of property rights and civil liberty.

It is hardly conceivable that a person is to be found, and certainly not a lawyer, who would trifle with such a solemn governmental condition or allow his personal views to block the necessary legislation. Yet, there are a few big men in the Senate of the United States, learned in the profession, enjoying the respect of their fellows and their constituents, who are justifying their oppo

sition to the unanimous voice of the great American Bar Association, forty-five State Bar Associations, all the national civic and commercial organizations and the deans of the law schools, because their personal ideas of the manner in which judicial procedure should be reformed do not conform to that of the thousands of practical, working lawyers and judges who have magnanimously and patriotically sunk all pride of opinion. It is the first time in the history of the civilized world that the organized lawyers have agreed upon a program for the reform of the procedure of the courts. Ought not that to mean something to these senators?

Have these senators the right to prevent the lawyers and judges from responding to a just demand of the people to "make courts of justice out of courts of law," as aptly described in one of President Wilson's pre-election addresses? Is it not a moment when that high patriotism and broad statesmanship which gave us the constitution, should sink the personal equation in the interest of the public good? Has any senator, or any four senators, the right, morally or officially, on personal grounds, to stand in the way of such a needed reform or to set their present official power against the will of the people, and the unselfish effort of their lawyers and judges?

But, above and beyond these considerations, have they the right to act the part of "the dog in the manger?" If, as measured by their personal views, they believe to be wrong the unanimous opinion of the great American Bar Association; that of forty-five State Bar Associations and that of the deans of the law schools of this country there devolves upon them a sacred duty, forthwith, to propose a better plan of their own. The lawyers and the judges, in the interest of the general welfare, will come to these few senators, if they are sincere, if these few senators will not come to them.

As we stated editorially last week, the American Bar Association's bill for simpli