director and also labored in the shop, is not, as to his claim for compensation for services rendered as treasurer and director, entitled to priority over corporate creditors. In re Boston French Range Co., U. S. D. C., 235 Fed. 916. 16. Public Lands. Under Bankruptcy Act, §70a, subdivs. 1, 5, a desert entry, though not completed, is subject to sale by the trustee in bankruptcy, for it might be assigned, and the bankrupt had a right which will be protected by law. In re Evans, U. S. D. C., 235 Fed. 956. 17. Statutory Construction. The Bankruptcy Act should receive a construction which will effectuate its purpose, and not permit debtors to retain their property free from the claims of creditors. In re Evans, U. S. D. C., 235 Fed. 956. 18. Trustee. - Trustee in bankruptcy held entitled to recover money of payee of bankrupt's check in good faith given and deposited for collection before, but not paid till after, filing of petition in voluntary bankruptcy.-In Howe, U. S. D. C., 235 Fed. 908. re 19. Banks and Banking-Scope of Agency.Where cashier of a bank, who was president of a lumber company and authorized to draw checks for it, directed making of entries on the books of the bank covering sums taken from the lumber company's account, held, that he did not bind the lumber company, but bound the bank; no check being drawn. Citizens' Trust Co. v. Mullinix, U. S. C. C. A., 235 Fed. 875. 20. Bills and Notes- Burden of Proof. In an action on an unindorsed note, payable to a third person, defendants' answer that the note was executed in consideration of a conveyance of lands by plaintiff admitted plaintiff's ownership of the note, and no proof is necessary, though it was denied by the answer. -Choate v. Stander, Okla., 160 Pac. 737. a 21. Collateral. - Under the uniform negotiable instruments law, where a note was assigned as collateral security for note and indebtedness then made, the assignee became a holder for value of the assigned note, and it was thereby freed of any defenses existing as between maker and payee. - First Nat. Bank of Iowa City v. John McGrath & Sons Co., Miss., 72 So. 701. 22.-Indorsement. The purchaser of a negotiable note indorsed, "Payment guaranteed. Protest waived," held an "indorsee" within the rule protecting an innocent purchaser against defenses.-Mangold & Glandt Bank v. Utterback, Okla., 160 Pac. 713. 23. Recoupment.-Damages which might have been recouped by the maker of a note in an action by the original payee may be couped against assignee.- EmersonBrantingham Co. v. Brennan, N. D., 159 N. W. 710. a mere re 24. Boundaries-Meanders-Where the line traced by a surveyor can be fixed by reference to meander calls of a river which has since changed its course, the contention that a call of a subsequent survey must be determined by the present course of the river, cannot be sustained. Maddox v. Dayton Lumber Co., Tex., 188 S. W. 958. 25.--Monuments. - That a stone claimed by plaintiff to be corner of his property was one procured for the purpose and securely placed in the ground, as the corner called for in his deed at time land was surveyed, for purpose of making the deed, would give it such elements of identification and permanence as to constitute an artificial monument of boundary. Nelson v. Lineker, N. C., 90 S. E. 251. 26. Brokers-Commission. - Where defendant employed plaintiff to lease her realty, agreeing to pay $2,500 commission "along during the first year," and she refused to lease at all, and repudiated her liability for commission, plaintiff, having procured prospective lessees on acceptable terms, was entitled to recover full commission.-Merwin v. Shaffner, Cal., 160 Pac. 684. 27. Carriers of Goods-Conversion. Where fruit consigned to shipper, another to be notified, is rejected by the latter, the carrier is liable in conversion if it sells the fruit without notifying the consignor, if practicable; notice to the "notify party" not being sufficient under Rev. St. 1909, § 3113.-F. W. Brockman Commission Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., Mo., 188 S. W. 920. 28.-Lex Loci Contractus.-Law of the place where a contract for shipment of goods is made must, in absence of proof of contrary intention of parties, be looked to for creation of obligations imposed by and interpretation of any rights arising out of it. - Model Mill Co. v. Carolina, C. & O. Ry. Co., Tenn., 188 S. W. 936. 29.-Vis Mejor. - Where martial law was declared in a flood district and at the suggestion of the carrier a shipment of chickens was appropriated by the military authorities, the carrier, having caused appropriation, cannot defeat recovery by the shipper on the ground that there was a confiscation. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Collins Produce Co., U. S. C. C. A., 235 Fed. 857. a 32. Hospital. A hospital organized and maintained with funds donated, caring for all sick and injured persons brought to it, charging those who are able to pay and treating free of charge those who are not, operated under a board of trustees consisting of the Protestant Episcopal bishop and the rector and church wardens, is charitable institution.-Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, Wyo., 160 Pac. 385. 33. Commerce-Initial Carrier.-Icing a refrigerator car to receive fruit for another state is an initial movement after which, in switching, the car is engaged in interstate commerce, so as to permit an injured brakeman to recover under federal Employers' Liability Act. - Aldread v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Wash., 160 Pac. 429. 34. Interstate Commerce. Sale of goods by foreign corporation and its representatives through mail orders, temporary show rooms, etc., constituted interstate commerce not subject to Ky. St. § 571, imposing penalty for failure to designate office in state and agent thereat to accept process. - Larkin Co. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 189 S. W. 3. 35. Intoxicating Liquors. -Despite rulings under Wilson Act, held, that intoxicating liquors consigned to shipper with directions to notify another are subject to state laws where retained by carrier for an unreasonable time; a constructive delivery being presumed. - Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Gosnell, S. C., 90 S. E. 264. 36. Corporations-Assignment. - President and general manager of corporation engaged in mining and selling coal, in absence of any limitation on their authority, have power to assign an ordinary open account to a creditor of the corporation. - Kentucky Consumers' Oil Co. v. Continental Fuel Co., Ky., 188 S. W. 855. 37. Presumption. ----It will be presumed that corporate stock registered in the name of deceased belonged to him. Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal Co., Utah, 160 Pac. 444. 38. Respondeat Superior. - Corporation selling surgical and medical appliances and diagnosing and prescribing for persons suffering with injured or deformed feet or limbs held responsible for employe's indecent treatment of patient during his examination of her. - Stone v. William M. Eisen Co., N. Y., 114 N. E. 44, 219 Ν. Y. 205. 39. Curtesy-Initiate. - The birth of issue capable of inheriting as a requisite to an estate by curtesy is satisfied if the child is alive for only a moment of time; the word "alive" meaning that the child be alive and have an independent life of its own for some period after birth. Fleming v. Sexton, N. C., 90 S. E. 247. 40. Deed-Description of Property. - Where specific description of property did not convey land involved in an action, general description, following warranty, and referring to record of conveyances in grantor's chain of title covering the land involved, would be given effect and considered as a more particular description.Quelch v. Futch, N. C., 90 S. E. 259. 41. Evidence. An heir, after the grantor's death, may proceed on the ground of fraud, duress, or want of mental capacity to recover the granted land on the ground that the contract was such that while the land was in the hands of the grantee, the title never passed, and there is no necessity of revesting the title.Adkins v. Adkins, Ky., 188 S. W. 843. 42. Descent and Distribution-Assumption of Debt. Heirs who accepted unconditionally the succession of their mother without benefit of inventory assumed her obligations under an extension of a mineral lease entered into while she was the owner of one-half and usufructuary of the other half. - Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana, La., 72 So. 718. 43. 45. Gifts- Separate Property. - A married man may during his lifetime give away his separate property, and such gift will be valid against his widow, where she is not a creditor within the statute against fraudulent conveyance.-Garrison v. Spencer, Okla., 160 Pac. 493. 46. Highways-Negligence. - Where the driver of a motor-car was proceeding at a reckless rate of speed and though signaled did not slacken or stop, but drove so close to a wagon and team that he struck the teamster, who was walking beside his team to control them, the motorist was guilty of negligence, rendering him liable, particularly as he was violating one of the penal laws of the state. - Gardner v. Vance, Ind., 113 Ν. Ε. 1006. 47. Nuisance. - Erection of a gate across a public highway which the public must open and close is a nuisance, and no prescriptive right can be acquired to maintain such gate.-Hansen v. Green, III., 113 N. E. 982. 48. Unlicensed Driver. - Although plaintiff, owning a motor passenger truck operated for hire failed to register his machine, as required by Ky. St. § 2739, subsec. 2, and employed an unlicensed chauffeur in violation of subsection 24, such facts having no causal connection with a rear-end collision, he was not precluded from recovery for injuries received due to such collision. Moore v. Hart, Ky., 188 S. W. 861. 49. Homestead-Partition. - Where a widow, owner of an undivided one-half interest in a lot, also had right of homestead therein, the homestead cannot be sold for partition, so as to require her to surrender possession without full payment of the amount of $500.- Grote v. Grote, 113 Ν. Ε. 967. 50. Remainderman.-A second husband, though living with his wife on the homestead acquired from her first husband, and though acquiring the remainder interests of the first husband's children, has no homestead right therein. -Kulbreth v. Drew County Timber Co., Ark., 188 S. W. 810. 51. Husband and Wife - Abandonment.-Misconduct of wife after abandonment affords no excuse for the abandonment, though misconduct after marriage and before abandonment would do so. Gobel v. State, Ala., 72 So. 756. 52. Public Policy.-Agreement between husband and wife while living together as such, in contemplation of separation, whereby husband agreed to pay wife certain amount per month in full satisfaction of her support and maintenance, with release from further liability therefor, was void-Winton v. Winton, N. Y., 161 N. Y. Supp. 405. Druggists-Indictment and Information. -An indictment under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 2494a, for illegal sale of cocaine, is not bad because not distinguishing between "cocaine alpha," and "beta cocaine," because such section following an error in punctuation in Acts 1913, с. 118, amending Acts 1911, c. 27, forbade the sale of "cocaine alpha, and beta cocaine;": ordinance. -Jones v. Carlton, Ga., 90 S. E. 278. 53. Injunction-Penal Ordinance. - A court having equitable jurisdiction will not, on petition for injunction, inquire into validity of penal 54. Insurance - Forfeiture.-A life policy without qualifying provisions is not a contract of insurance for a single year with a privilege of renewal from year to year, but is an indivisible continuous contract of insurance subject to forfeiture for nonpayment of premium.Friend v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., Okla., 160 Pac. 457. 55. Limitation of Time. - Where, under terms of death benefit certificate beneficiary had no right to sue until advised that insurer rejected her demand, the period limited by certificate within which she must bring suit did not begin to run until so advised. Simmons v. Modern Woodmen of America, Mo., 188 S. W. 932. 56. Intoxicating Liquors-Assisting Sale.-In prosecution under Acts 1915, p. 98, for selling liquor, defendant, if acting simply as intermediary to receive cash at place of sale and take to his sister would not be assisting in the sale, but if assisting in the business by checking up the accounts, etc., he would be assisting in sale. Marsh v. State, Ark., 188 S. W. 815. 57. Illegal Sales. - Evidence that money passed and whisky was delivered as a single transaction is sufficient to support a conviction of illegal sale of whisky. -Cowart v. State, Ga., 90 S. E. 286. Charge imputing hereditary predisposition to in- W. 867. 60. Licenses- Burden of Proof. -Ordinance imposing license fee of $1 for each telegraph pole in public streets would be presumed to be valid, and the burden was upon defendant telegraph company to allege and prove that it was unreasonable because providing for an excessive license fee, etc.- City of Peoria v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., III., 113 N. Ε. 968. 61. Lotteries- Evidence. - In prosecution for aiding and abetting a violation of lottery statute (Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 2464), evidence that accused sold certain cards that could be used for the operation of a lottery, but not showing that accused ever had part in a lottery operated by their use, or that any lottery was conducted by their use, was insufficient to convict.-McDaniels v. State, Ind., 113 N. Ε. 1004. 62. Master and Servant-Contributory Negligence. Where switchman, engaged in setting brakes on stationary car, was thrown therefrom by impact of three cars which he knew the foreman was about to push other cars against, railroad was not liable for his death unless the impact was so violent as to constitute negligence. Anderson v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., La., 72 So. 751. 63.-Illegitimate Child.-Where an illegitimate son, adopted by his mother and her husband, paid board of and supplied money to their child while boarding with strangers, and maintaining no household, during life of the father, she was not a member of his family within Workmen's Compensation Act, § 2, nor a dependent, and could not have compensation on his death. In re Cowden, Mass., 113 N. E. 1036. 64. Safety Appliance Act. Since federal Employers' Liability Act governs rights of the parties employed in interstate commerce, a servant so injured is entitled to benefit of a showing of the master's negligence without showing violation of federal Safety Appliance Act.-Aldread v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Wash., 160 Pac, 429. 65. Safe Place to Work. A railroad is not liable for death of its engineer due to ice on right of way where he stopped to repair the engine, on the theory of failure to provide a safe place to work, since he and not the railroad chose the place for work.-Judd's Adm'x v. Southern Ry. Co., Ky., 188 S. W. 880. 66. Workmen's Compensation Acts. - Under Workmen's Compensation Act, held that original application for compensation for death of a servant, which complied with form prescribed by commissioner save as to signature, together with subsequent application by servant's dependent, which because of dependent's foreign residence was not filed within the six months fixed, constitute valid application. -Culurides v. Ott, W. Va., 90 S. E. 270. 67.-Workmen's Compensation Act.-A salesman of a manufacturer of machinery, whose duty includes inspecting machinery set up, in doing which he is injured by it, held employed in "manufacture" of machinery, classified by Workmen's Compensation Law under section 2, group 20, as hazardous employment. - Benton v. Fraser, N. Y., 114 N. E. 43, 219 N. Y. 210. 68. Workmen's Compensation Act. - Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 24, an original claim for compensation before any payments have been made need not be in writing. -Suburban Ice Co. v. Industrial Board, III., 113 N. E. 979. 69. Workmen's Compensation Act. - The requirement of section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913 that claims for compensation thereunder be presented within six months is mandatory, and mistake as to the true employer is no excuse for failure to conform to it. -Haiselden v. Industrial Board of Illinois, Ill., 113 N. E. 877. 70.-Workmen's Compensation Act. Under. Workmen's Compensation Act, §§ 24, 31, failure to give notice of an accident to the principal contractor does not defeat its liability to an employe of the subcontractor if its foreman and general superintendent had knowledge of the accident.-Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, III., 113 N. Ε. 976. 71. Workmen's Compensation Act.-Workmen's Compensation Act, § 31, makes a contractor liable for compensation to the employe of a subcontractor if he either fails to require security of the subcontractor or enters into a fraudulent scheme to avoid liability for compensation.-Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial, Board, III., 113 N. E. 976. 72. Municipal Corporations-Discretion. - An ordinance requiring two water mains in a street which will probably be used for a street car line cannot be said to be so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion by the council or an arbitrary imposition of an unjust burden upon the owners of property. - City of Chicago v. Hirschl, III., 113 Ν. Ε. 899. 73. Evidence. That defendants, sued for driving into a person, were on the wrong side of the street because of an excavation, and desired to deliver to house there, is not new or affirmative matter required to be alleged in the answer, but is admissible under the general issue.-White v. Shipley, Utah, 160 Pac. 441. 74. Jitney Busses. Provision in New Orleans ordinance, requiring operators of jitney busses and street cars to furnish surety bond the grantee should accept the contract, the only condition for acceptance being merchantable title, it was a contract of sale and not an option.-Bowling v. Bowling, Ky., 188 S. W. 1070. 88. Rescission. A vendor's contract guaranteeing construction of a street car line in the addition within two years is not a future collateral promise, but a warranty, and the purchaser may rescind for breach thereof.-Aurand v. Perry Town Lot & Improvement Co., Iowa, 159 N. W. 779. 89. Weapons-Unlawful Carrying. A pistol behind the front cushion of a jitney driver's automobile on which he sat to drive his car was carried "about the person" within the statute.Wagner v. State, Tex., 188 S. W. 1001. 90. Wills- Devise. - A devise of "what money I have in the bank" does not include proceeds of a policy of life insurance in which testator had a vested interest. - Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Spohn, Ky., 188 S. W. 1078. 91. Identifying Beneficiary. - Though a devise did not name the beneficiary, it is not necessarily void, and it is proper to direct the administrator to make necessary investigations to ascertain the name of the beneficiary, where there is description by which he may be identified. Hills v. Atlanta Art Ass'n., Ga., 89 S. E. 1084. 92. Intent. While the words "in the distribution of my estate" indicate a disposition of personalty, the language is not controlling as to the testator's intent, particularly where in a prior reference the real property was indicated. -Albright v. Albright, N. C., 90 S. E. 303. 93. Latent Ambiguity. Where at time of making will testator owned 20 shares of stock, par $2,000, actual $5,000, and the devise read, "I bequeath my stock amounting to $1,000," extrinsic facts were admissible to remove the latent ambiguity. - Hertford v. Harned, Ind., 113 Ν. Ε. 727. 94.-Seal.-Affixing colored seal, with initials of testator and the word "Seal" written thereon, intended by the testator as a signature, held a sufficient compliance with the statute of wills.In re Severance's Will, N. Y., 161 N. Y. Supp. 452. 95. Undue Influence. - Findings by the jury that testatrix was enfeebled by old age and sickness and partial paralysis at the time of execution of will, but did not act under influence amounting to coercion, and understood the business in which she was engaged, authorized a judgment sustaining the will. Hladky Hladky, Kan., 160 Pac. 992. V. 96.-Vested Interest.-Will bequeathing estate in trust to testator's daughter for life. then to her children and the issue of such children, held to pass a vested interest to a child of the daughter living at testator's death to which the daughter succeeded under intestate laws, on the child's dying without issue before her. In re Rau's Estate, Pa., 98 Atl. 1068. 97. Witnesses - Competency. - Where a wife and mother died, leaving a husband and children of the marriage, and the husband sued to quiet his title to land, which at the time of her death was vested in the wife, children of the marriage are competent to testify against the father. Shipley v. Shipley, III., 113 Ν. Ε. 906. 98. Cross-Examination. - Where accused has put his character in issue, it is permissible on cross-examination to inquire of his witnesses if they had not heard of reports in the community of the defendant's residence, before the alleged criminal act, derogatory to his good character. Stout v. State, Ala., 72 So. 762. 99. Impeachment. In action on assigned claim for commissions for selling phonographs, where salesman's honesty and veracity were sharply in issue and of controlling importance, refusal to permit defendant to impeach him on cross-examination, by asking whether he had failed to turn over money collected in previous employment, held erroneous. - Harris v. Landay Bros., N. Y., 161 N. Y. Supp. 27. 100.Interest. _ Where defendant claimed an estate by curtesy, the defendant and a nurse present at alleged birth of issue were not disqualified to testify by interest, which goes to weight of evidence and not to competency of witnesses. Fleming v. Sexton, N. C., 90 S. E. of $5,000 per vehicle, held not invalid as discriminatory in favor of street cars. -Lutz v. City of New Orleans, U. S. D. C., 235 Fed. 978. 75. Temporary Use. A city can temporarily use as a garage a portion of the property acquired for a market, but not then needed. Neil v. Kansas City, Mo., 188 S. W. 919. 76. Railroads- Evidence. - Though railroad company's servants positively testified the bell was rung for the crossing, testimony by plaintiff that his hearing was good and that he did not hear the bell, raises question for jury; credibility of witnesses being for jury. - Callison v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co., S. C., 90 S. E. 260. 77. Pedestrians. - Rule permitting train to be run in country at high speed without imputation of negligence does not obtain when operated through populous cities and over muchtraveled crossings, but railroad owes to pedestrians duty of ordinary care. Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Biddinger, Ind., 113 N. E. 1027. 78. Respondeat Superior. -A watchman employed to arrest any depredator in railroad yards, negligently mistaking for such an innocent and rightful traveler, and assaulting him, was acting within his employment, rendering the employer liable. - Baker v. Ives, Tex., 188 S. W. 950. 79. Sales-Fraud. - Representations by a sewing machine agent to purchaser that an order contained certain agreements which were not included therein, though the cause moving the purchaser to sign the contract, do not constitute fraud in its procurement.-White Sewing Mach. Co. v. McCarty Furniture Co., Okla., 160 Pac. 495. 80. Sample.-Purchaser of goods by sample has the right to inspect them on arrival and before payment of the seller's draft, and without production of the bill of lading, to ascertain whether they correspond to sample, and, if not, to refuse to take them.-Model Mill Co. v. Carolina, C. & O. Ry. Co., Tenn., 188 S. W. 936. 81. Specific Performance-Right of Action.Vice-president of rubber company, active in its reorganization, who had contract of employment for five years as general sales agent, held not to have special property interest in business entitling him to specific performance of contract of employment by injunction restraining company and other officers from breaking it.Auerbach v. Northland Rubber Co., N. Y., 161 N. Y. Supp. 396. 82. Street Railroads-Evidence. In an action for injuries received by a woman who was attempting to pass through a turnstile leading from the tracks of the defendant electric railroad company, evidence that about a week after the accident it was found that the turnstile had sunk, so that it would not revolve, held inadmissible despite objections of remoteness.Tacoma Ry. & Power Co. v. Cothary, U. S. C. C. A., 235 Fed. 872. 83. Telegraphs and Telephones - Public Utility. A farmers' mutual telephone company, operating in connection with a commercial telephone company, and ready to serve any citizens wishing to construct lines to its exchange, was a public utility, and subject to the control of the Public Utilities Commission, under Public Utilities Act, § 10. State Public Utilities Commission v. Noble, Ill., 113 N. E. 910. 84. Trusts-Resulting Trust.-A trust will not result to one who pays a part only of the purchase money of land conveyed to another, unless it be some definite part of the whole consideration, and can only arise from the original transaction.-Briscoe v. Price, Ill., 113 N. E. 881. 85. Vendor and Purchaser - Constructive Notice. Record of mortgage, certificate of acknowledgment of which fails to name acknowledging party, where reference is made in certificate to executing party, is sufficient to impart constructive notice to subsequent purchaser.Coates v. Smith, Ore., 160 Pac. 517. 86. Lien. The right to enforce a vendor's lien for partial failure of consideration, resulting from vendor's reliance on false representations of the vendee, may exist contemporaneously with a right to recover at law. --McTernan v. Mason, Mo., 188 S. W. 923. 87. Option. - Where an instrument asserted by plaintiffs to be an option, and by defendants to be a contract of sale, contained a clause excepting timber over 14 inches in diameter if 247. エー Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., FEBRUARY 2, 1917. IS ALL ERROR PRESUMPTIVELY PREJU- The Missouri Supreme Court seems to be making extraordinary efforts to maintain the distinction of keeping in the forefront of the rapidly diminishing group of state appellate tribunals who insist on preserving inviolate the doctrine that all error is presumptively prejudicial. In the recent case of State v. Pfeifer, 267 Mo. 23, that court held that a statute which permitted a defendant to testify in his own behalf and "to be liable to cross-examination, as to any matter referred to in his examination in chief," and "to be contradicted and impeached as any other witness in the case," did not justify a question on cross-examination requesting the defendant to tell the names of his associates on the night when the crime was committed, in a case where defendant's testimony in chief consisted solely of a denial of the crime itself. With somewhat bad grace the court was constrained to admit its declaration in the case of State v. Foley, 247 Mo. 1. c. 638, that under such a statute "the State need not categorically follow what was said in defendant's chief examination," but held that such cross-examination could not go so far as to compel the defendant to corroborate many of the state's witnesses with respect to his associates on the night of the crime and thus give evidence against himself. a failure to observe that statute, unless the The case is made clearer in this respect There is no doubt that the sentiments expressed by Judge Faris in the Pfeifer case will find both support and criticism in the minds of many attorneys. The question was sharply debated at the last meeting of the American Bar Association in passing on a committee recommendation to urge upon Congress the passage of a law requiring the Supreme Court to affirm all appealed cases, unless the errors assigned are believed by the court to have affected the result. In answer to the very challenge expressed by Judge Faris in the instant case, President Elihu Root relinquished the chair and in a burst of indignation that carried the whole convention with him, declared that the courts had no right thus to ignore public sentiment and cling to wornout theories of procedure that had no justification at the present time; that appellate courts had no right, in the face of the public protest and the commands of the legislature to refuse to assume the burden of finding affirmatively that error committed had in fact affected the result and thus throw back for a new trial and delay the Conceding, however, that the state had overstepped the limits of proper cross-examination, yet it did not appear that the error was prejudicial. But the court, as so many courts have done, refused to accept the burden imposed on them by the harmless error statute and declared that "where a plain statute forbids such cross-examination, hurtful error is to be presumed, from | determination of cases wherein they believe - |