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DESPATCHES

OF THE

BRITISH GENERALS

DURING THE

CAMPAIGN ON THE SUTLEJ.

Having already given to the world, at a price unprecedentedly small,* a succinct narrative of the recent CAMPAIGN ON THE SUTLEJ, the publisher of that work deems it expedient to complete the details, by placing before the public, in a form equally convenient, the DESPATCHES OF THE BRITISH GENERALS, descriptive of those events; as these constitute, perhaps, the most satisfactory documents to which reference can be made. No better description of those momentous affairs could probably be afforded, the distinguished officers in command having, in the elegant words of the Premier, "Guided the pen with the same ability they wielded the sword."

The following are the despatches of Sir Henry (now Viscount) Hardinge and Sir Hugh (now Lord) Gough, announcing the

BATTLE OF MOODKEE.

These documents, when addressed to the Secret Committee of the East India Company, are only, it may be premised, in part published, the Directors assuming the power of suppressing what might be deemed prejudicial to their interest or the public service.

No. I.

[FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE, OF TUESDAY, FEB. 24, 1846.]

India Board, Feb. 23, 1846. A despatch, from which the following is an extract, has been this day received at the East India House :

FROM THE

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, DATED CAMP, FEROZEPORE, DEC. 31, 1845.

(Extract.)

The Sikh army, in large numbers, commenced crossing the Sutlej on the 11th, and, after investing Ferozepore on one side, took up an entrenched position at the village of Ferozeshah, about 10 miles in advance of Ferozepore, and about the same distance from the village of Moodkee.

In this camp the enemy had placed 108 pieces of cannon, some of large calibre, with a force exceeding 50,000 men, for the purpose of intercepting the

*Price only One Shilling.-London: Charles Edmonds, 154, Strand; W. Grapel, Liverpool; Abel Heywood, Manchester; Wrightson and Webb, Birmingham; W. Curry, Jun. & Co., Dublin; and M. Macphail, Edinburgh.

B

approach of the British force moving up from Umballa to the relief of Ferozepore, which had been thus treacherously attacked, without provocation or declaration of hostilities.

I had ordered, on the 8th instant, that portion of our army posted at Umballa for defensive purposes to move up on the 11th; and, after rapid march of 150 miles, it reached Moodkee on the 18th, where, on the evening of the same day, it repulsed an attack of the Sikh army, and captured seventeen guns. On the following day the army was concentrated at Moodkee, and on the 21st moved by its left on Ferozepore; and having on the march formed its junction at half-past one o'clock with 5,000 men and 21 guns, under Major-General Sir John Littler, which had moved from Ferozepore that morning, the Commander-inChief formed the army in order of battle, and attacked the enemy's entrenched camp, and on that evening and the following morning captured 70 pieces of artillery, taking possession of the enemy's camp, with large quantities of ammunition and warlike stores.

These successful and energetic operations have been followed by the retreat of the Sikh army to the other side of the Sutlej; the British army being now encamped between Ferozepore and the fords of the Sutlej.

You will not fail to observe that these important and brilliant successes had been achieved by that portion of our army posted at and in advance of Umballah for defensive purposes, and that our forces from Meerut and other stations from the rear, ordered to move up at the same time, are in reserve, and will reach this neighbourhood between the 5th and the 9th of January.

I have the honour to inclose two reports from the Commander-in-Chief, detailing the admirable manner in which these important duties have been performed; and I am convinced the Court of Directors of the East India Company, in concurrence with her Majesty's Government, will highly appreciate the eminent services rendered by the Commander-in-Chief, and by the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the Indian army.

The Commander-in-Chief has successfully accomplished every object I had direeted him to effect for the relief of Ferozepore, and the protection of these British states. No accident or failure has occurred during the complicated operations of a combined movement; and our army, whether for defence or attack, has shown, as heretofore, that its power is irresistible.

No. II.

FROM GENERAL SIR HUGH GOUGH, BART., G.C.B., THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE ARMY IN INDIA, TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Head-quarters, Army of the Sutlej, Camp,
Moodkee, Dec. 19, 1845.

RIGHT HON. SIR,-It would be a superfluous form in me to address to you a narrative of the compaign which has opened against the Sikhs, and the successful action of yesterday, since you have in person shared the fatigues and dangers of our army, and witnessed its efforts and privations, but that my position as its head renders this my duty; and it is necessary, from that position, I should place these events on record, for the information of all Europe as well as of all India.

You, Sir, know, but others have to be told, that the sudden and unprovoked aggression of the Sikhs, by crossing the Sutlej, with the great proportion of their army, with the avowed intention of attacking Ferozepore, in time of profound peace, rendered indispensable, on our side, a series of difficult combinations for the protection of our frontier station, so unjustifiably and so unexpectedly menaced.

From the advanced and salient situation of Ferozepore, and its vicinity to the

Sikh capital, its defence against a sudden attack became a difficult operation. It was always possible for the Sikh Government to throw a formidable force upon it before one sufficiently numerous could on our side be collected to support it; but when, upon the 11th instant, it became known at Umballah, where I had established my head-quarters, that this invasion had actually taken place, the efforts to repel it followed each other in quick succession; notwithstanding I had the fullest confidence in Major-General Sir John Littler, commanding at Ferozepore, and in the devotedness and gallantry of the troops occupying it.

The troops from the different stations in the Sirhind division were directed to move by forced marches upon Busseean, where, by a most judicious arrangement, you had directed supplies to be collected, within a wonderfully short space of time.

The main portion of the force at Loodiana was withrawn, and a garrison thrown into the little fortress there. From this central position, already alluded to, both Loodianah and Ferozepore could be supported, and the safety of both places might be considered to be brought, in some measure, within the scope of the contingencies of a general action to be fought for their relief. All this is soon related; but most harrassing have been the marches of the troops in completing this concentration. When their march had been further prolonged to this place, they had moved over a distance of upwards of 150 miles in six days, along roads of heavy sand, their perpetual labour allowing them scarcely time to cook their food, even when they received it, and hardly an hour for repose, before they were called upon for renewed exertion.

When our leading corps reached Wudnee, a small jaghire of the late Maharajahı Shere Singh, its garrison shut the gates of the fort against them; and, as our battering guns were far in the rear, it was determined to reserve it for future chastisement, and we remained content with compelling the village to furnish supplies (it could, however, provide little, except for our overworked cattle), under pain of enduring a cannonade and assault. This it did without the necessity of firing a shot.

When we reached Wudnee, it was evident that the force before Ferozepore felt the influence of our movements, as we heard that a very large portion of that force had been detached to oppose our further advance. Their feeling parties retired on the morning of the 18th before our cavalry picquets, near the village and fort of Moodkee.

Soon after mid-day the division under Major-General Sir Harry Smith, a brigade of that under Major-General Sir J. M'Caskill, and another of that under Major-General Gilbert, with five troops of Horse-Artillery, and two light field batteries, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, of the Horse Artillery (Brigadier in command of the Artillery force), and the Cavalry division, consisting of her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, the body guard, 4th and 5th Light Cavalry, and 9th Irregular Cavalry, took up their encamping ground in front of Moodkee.

The troops were in a state of great exhaustion, principally from the want of water, which was not procurable on the road, when, about three P.M., information was received that the Sikh army was advancing; and the troops had scarcely time to get under arms and move to their positions, when the fact was ascertained. I immediately pushed forward the Horse Artillery and Cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and forty guns. They evidently had either just taken up their position or were advancing in order of battle against us.

To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Maetier, rapidly to the front, in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by

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