reasoning includes a petitio principii in the bosom of it; and that, in supporting his argument, he must have recourse to distinctions, where, even himself being judge, there is no difference.

pended by the magnetical attraction; which means no more than that, in this instance, gravity proves a less powerful attraction than magnetism. In other instances, magnetism may be the weaker of the two. A loadstone, which will raise from the ground a piece of iron weighing an ounce, will produce no sensible effect upon one of a pound weight. But it is evident that, in a more enlarged view, the laws of nature undergo no suspension in either case, in as much as one, who is well acquainted with the attraction both of the magnet and of the earth, can, in any proposed experiment, tell for certain beforehand which will prevail. Thus, when we speak of miracles as suspensions of the laws of nature, the expression is admitted rather in apology for ignorance, than as what ought to be accounted philosophical or strictly proper. The intervention of superior agents, the comparative powers of these agents, and their operations, may be, and probably are, regulated by the immutable laws of the universe, as much as whatever concerns the terraqueous globe, and the motions of the heavenly bodies. This will serve further to explain my retort upon Mr Hume in the preceding paragraph, in relation to the freezing of water, which see.

SECTION III.

Mr Hume himself gives up his favourite argu

ment.

MR HUME himself,' methinks I hear my reader repeating with astonishment, gives up his favourite argument! To prove this point is indeed a very bold attempt.' Yet that this attempt is not altogether so arduous as, at first hearing, he will possibly imagine, I hope, if favoured a while with his attention, fully to convince him. If to acknowledge, after all, that there may be miracles, which admit of proof from human testimony; if to acknowledge, that such miracles ought to be received, not as probable only, but as absolutely certain; or, in other words, that the proof from human testimony may be such, as that all the contrary uniform experience should not only be overbalanced, but, to use the author's expression, should be annihilated; if such acknowledgments as these are subversive of his own principles; if, by making them, he abandons his darling argument; this strange part the essayist evidently acts.

E

I own,' these are his words, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit a proof from 'human testimony, though perhaps' (in this he is modest enough, he avers nothing; perhaps) 'it will be impossible to find any such in all the records 'of history.' To this declaration he subjoins the following supposition: Suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the 1st of January 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth 'for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people; that all travellers, who return, from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the 6 same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: It is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting of that fact, ought to "receive it for certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived *?

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Could one imagine that the person who had made the above acknowledgment, a person too who is justly allowed, by all who are acquainted with his writings, to possess uncommon penetration and philosophical abilities, that this were the same individual, who had so short while before affirmed, that ⚫ a miracle,' or a violation of the usual course of nature, supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument t;'

#

Page 203. in the note.

+ Page 194.

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who had insisted, that it is not requisite, in order to reject the fact, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood; that such an 'evidence carries falsehood on the very face of it *;' that we need but oppose, even to a cloud of witnesses, the absolute impossibility, or,' which is all one, 'miraculous nature of the events, which they relate; ⚫ that this, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will ' alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation † ;' and who, finally to put an end to all altercation on the subject, had pronounced this oracle. No TESTIMONY FOR ANY KIND OF MIRACLE CAN

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< EVER POSSIBLY AMOUNT TO A PROBABILITY, MUCH LESS TO A PROOF .' Was there ever a more glaring contradiction?

YET for the event supposed by the essayist, the testimony, in his judgment, would amount to a probability; nay, to more than a probability, to a proof; let not the reader be astonished, or if he cannot fail to be astonished, let him not be incredulous, when I add, to more than a proof, more than a full, entire, and direct proof; for even this I hope to make evident from the author's principles and reasoning. And even supposing,' says he, that is,

* Page 194.

+ Page 196, &c. Page 202. There is a small alteration made on this sentence in the edition of the Essays in 1767, which is pos terior to the 2d edition of this dissertation. See Preface, page 3.

granting for argument's sake, that the testimony

for a miracle amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish*. Here is then, by his own reasoning, proof against proof, from which there could result no belief or opinion, unless the one is conceived to be in some degree superior to the other. · Of ' which proofs,' says he, the strongest must pre

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vail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist t.'

Before

sup

the author could believe such a miracle as he poses, he must at least be satisfied that the proof of it from testimony is stronger than the proof against it from experience. That we may form an accurate judgment of the strength he here ascribes it to testimony, let us consider what, by his own account, is the strength of the opposite proof from experience. A miracle is a violation of the laws

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' of nature; and as a firm and unalterable expe⚫rience has established these laws, the proof against ⚫ a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as • entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined ‡. Again, As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle §.'

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The