1846.] The Trinity. 499 use of a book of Topics, to a pedantic, discursive and general style of remark, ill suited to the peculiar wants of his hearers; but he may also, if he be well educated and if he be judicious in the consultation of the book, derive from it a feeling of security that his mental processes have been correct, an enlargement and completeness of his views, and a general improvement of his mental character. Such a book will not supply natural deficiencies of talent, but may correct many faults arising from partial, one-sided conceptions of a particular subject, and an habitual contractedness and monotony of thought. Among modern treatises in this department, some of the most ingenious are found in C. F. Bahrdt's Versuch über die Beredsamkeit, and in Witting's Schrift über die Meditation eines Predigers; but the best is C. A. L. Kästner's Topik, oder Erfindungswissenschaft aufs neue erlaütert. ARTICLE III. THE TRINITY. [Translated by Rev. H. B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass., from the Theological Lectures of Dr. A. D. C. Twesten, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin.] INTRODUCTORY NOTE. [The following Article has been translated, not only on account of its intrinsic excellence, but also because it presents a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity upon somewhat different grounds from those ordinarily found in English and American systems of theology. Even if we do not agree with all the positions advanced nor think them conclusive, yet they may aid the mind to some new aspects of a doctrine which lies at the basis of the whole Christian scheme. This doctrine has always been discussed and illustrated differently by different minds, in different ages of the church; and that, too, without detriment to the general orthodoxy. Those who hold, and faithfully hold, to the same formula of doctrine will expound it differently, according to the influences under which their minds have been trained, to the objections made against their creed, and to the philosophical views prevailing around them. And such a discussion of this doctrine as is here presented, may lead us to a more thorough conviction that it is not a mere abstract formula, but a living truth; a truth, not merely derived by a set of proof-texts from the Scriptures, but intimately inwrought into the whole scheme of Christianity; which can not only be shown to be unassailable by the principles of a common-sense philosophy, but can also be maintained in its most orthodox form in the midst of the severest critical discussions of the Scriptures, and against all the pretensions even of pantheistic and transcendental speculations. Some parts of the discussion will be felt, in their full force, only by those somewhat acquainted with the later theological and philosophical systems of Germany. This is especially the case in the third and fourth sections, which exhibit the connection of this doctrine with the whole system of Christianity as experienced by the believer, or with the Christian consciousness; and in the attempts made to give a philosophical deduction of the Trinity. In both these portions of the Article the difficulty of translation has not been slight, and in many cases a free paraphrase has been thought absolutely necessary. But even with the most liberal translation, it may be doubted whether the exact sense of the original can be transferred into a language so different in its theological and philosophical phraseology, as is the English from the German. In the first section to which reference has just been made, for example, the phrase Christian consciousness frequently occurs; and it is a phrase of very distinct import in the school of Schleiermacher. It will not do to translate it by Christian experience, for that phrase is too subjective; it will not do to translate it by the whole scheme of Christianity, for that is too objective. A Christian believer is supposed to have new elements of consciousness, those viz. which are derived from the religion he has experienced. The word consciousness is here of course used in a somewhat broader sense than it bears in the English language. The phrase, a conscious experience of the Christian faith, may be a sufficiently accurate description of what is meant by Christian consciousness-it is the inward experience considered as embracing the whole of the objective revelation. The fourth section, which gives a philosophical deduction of the Trinity, may appear to many to be superfluous if not unintelligible. The analysis of mental states is so different from that given or attempted in our English philosophy, that it may seem to be mystical or even imaginary. Dr. Twesten, it will be seen, expresses himself with much reserve as to the conclusiveness of any such speculations. They may be liable to another charge, 1846.] Nature and Attributes of God. 501 that of overstepping the bounds of human knowledge. The attempt to explain a mystery may be hazardous; yet it may not be hazardous for us to read such attempts. And they may, possibly, open to our minds some other aspects of a doctrine which we may wholly believe, though we understand it only in part.-TR.] We know that God in his nature or essence is one; that there is in him an absolute oneness of being. Yet so soon as we come to reflect upon God as he is himself, and as he is in his relations to the world, we are led to make definitions and statements, whereby that which is in itself one, this oneness or unity, is resolved into a multiplicity. God is not only one, but is also manifold. Now that which is manifold we can represent to ourselves in one of three forms; either as comprising several and distinct subjects, or several attributes, or diverse acts and modes of action. God is one; yet we speak of his attributes as many; of his operations or modes of action as many; and these two points comprise the second and third of these forms of conceiving of what is manifold; and we do this without detriment to the divine unity. We conceive of God as one identical subject having different and distinct attributes and modes of action. May there not also be that in the divine nature, which requires us to represent it as consisting of several and distinct subjects or persons as well as attributes? Are we not obliged to conceive of this complex of attributes and actions, or at least of attributes, in which our idea of the divine nature is fully expressed, in such a mauner, or to reduce it to such statements, as involve the division of it into different and distinct subjects or persons? In treating of the different relations and works and attributes of God, we are obliged to use great precaution in making our statements and definitions, lest the unity of the divine existence should seem to be infringed upon by the multiplicity and variety of these relations and attributes. These attributes are not indeed mere names; yet in God Himself they are not to be considered as wholly distinct either from one another or from the divine essence. They express the different relations in which the infinite God stands to what is finite, or rather in which finite existences stand to God; and they must always be so defined as to be consistent with the idea of the divine Unity.. Yet we should 1 Relationes divinae ab essentia divina nullatenus realiter sed ratione tantum distinguuntur, nec tamen distinctione rationis ratiocinantis, sed rationis ratisci have only an imperfect conception of the true nature of this unity or simplicity of the divine existence, if, in comparison with it, we should think that the plurality of the divine works and attributes were of minor importance. Now, these precautions, which we are obliged to observe when treating of the divine attributes, are additionally necessary when we come to treat of the different subjects or persons in the Godhead; for here we seem to be threatened by a suspicious approximation to polytheism. But yet, as has been well remarked, we ought not to forget that there may be in polytheism an element of truth, something which is right and sound, although disfigured and misunderstood. On this account John of Damascus made his boast of Christianity, that it stood as it were in the centre between the abstract monotheism of the Jews and the idolatrous polytheism of the Greeks; that it completed what was wanting and corrected what was deficient in both. In his own words: "By the doctrine of the unity of the divine nature, the polytheism of the Greeks is clearly abolished; by the admission of the Logos and of the Spirit, the doctrine of the Jews is purified. That which is profitable in each conception remains. From the doctrine of the Jews we have the oneness of nature; from the Greeks the distinction in Hypostases alone.1 The Christian religion, then, we say, teaches us to adore One God in three persons; one and the same divine essence, or the totality of the same divine attributes, in three subjects, in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. This doctrine forms, as it were the key-stone of the Christian doctrine respecting God. § 1. An Inadequate Conception of the Trinity. Before proceeding to our main discussion it may be well to notice one inadequate view of this doctrine which is adopted by some of our theologians, especially by De Wette in his Doctrinal Theology of the Lutheran Church.2 Our conception of God, he says, must necessarily be threefold; and this was the primitive Christian view. We must consider him as the highest and absolutely independent being (the Father), as manifested or renatae, ubi occasio distinguendi et fundamentum aliquod distinctionis in re ipsa invenitur.-Quenstedt. 1 Jo. Damasc. de orthod. fide. Conf. Basil M. Homil. XXIV. Opp. T. II. p. 189; Gregor. Nazianz. orat. XXXVII. p. 601. orat. XXIX. p. 400; Ambros. de fide i. 5; and others. 2 De Wette, Dogmatik der Lutherischen Kirche § 41. 1846.] Threefold Relation of God. 503 vealed in the world (the Son), and as ever acting in nature (the Spirit). But this view of the Godhead is one that exists only in our minds, and only serves to express the different relations which God sustains. The Church, however, under the influence of the mythological spirit which prevailed in ancient times, and in consequence of the limitation of human knowledge, has personified what was only a threefold conception of the Godhead, and affirms that it exists objectively in the divine nature itself; that it is not only a threefold way of regarding God, but that it designates real distinctions of subjects or persons in the very Godhead. The philosophical basis of this threefold way of conceiving of God may be given in some such statement as this. There are three modes in which, from the nature of our intellects, we may and are obliged to look at every object of knowledge. We may consider the object itself as a whole; we may consider the form which unites together the different parts of this whole; or we may consider the matter which is thus united, of which this whole is made up.1 Thus the whole idea of God is expressed in this threefold relation. We conceive of him, in the first place, as the absolutely independent substance, the pure ideal of the reason; secondly, in relation to the world, we conceive of him as the being through whom the world exists, who has given to it existence and laws and form; and, in the third place, in relation to nature, (that is to the powers which are held together by this form, and to the phenomena which are caused by these laws,) we think of God as the source of all light and life. Thus we have a threefold view of the Godhead which contains all that is true in the doctrine of the Trinity. God as the absolutely independent substance is the Father; God as the author of the world and its laws is the Son; God as giving life to nature, as the living source of its manifold phenomena, is the Holy Ghost.2 And the doctrine of the Trinity, as it exists in the church, is only a misapprehension or misapplication of this necessary and philosophical view of the Godhead. To this statement we make three objections. In the first place, the distinction between the second and third mode of view. ing the divine nature cannot be shown to be necessary or philo 1 These distinctions are expressed by Fries (whom De Wette follows), in his philosophy, under the term, transcendental, formal and material appercep tion. 2 These distinctions may be expressed in another way. God as the absolute substance, ens extramundanum; as the author of the world, ens supramundum ; as the immanent ground of all existence, ens intramundum. |