moral duties; and of that third, but imperfectly. We see likewise, how, by the peculiar influence of its nature, it enlargeth the duty of the citizen, at the same time that it lessens his natural ability to perform it.

II. We see further, which is a thing of far greater consequence, that society totally wants one of those two powers which are owned by all to be the necessary hinges on which government turns, and without which it cannot be supported.

To supply these wants and imperfections, some other coactive power must be added, that hath its influence on the mind of man, to keep society from running back into confusion. But there is no other than the power of RELIGION; which teaching a governing Providence, who hath given laws for the perfecting of Man's nature, and so becomes the rewarder of good men, and the punisher of ill, this religion can oblige to the Duties of imperfect obligation, which human laws overlook: and teaching, also, that this Providence is omniscient, that it sees the most secret. actions and intentions of men, will oblige to those duties of perfect obligation, which human laws cannot reach, or sufficiently enforce.

Thus we have explained, in general, the mutual aid which religion and civil policy lend to one another: not unlike what two parties in the same cause, and engaged in the same encounter, may reciprocally receive and give against a common enemy: While one party is closely pressed, the other comes up to its relief; disengages the first; gives it time to rally, and repair its force: By this time the assisting party is pushed in its turn, and needs the aid of that which is relieved; which is now at hand to repay the obligation.

23

gation. From henceforward, the two parties ever act in ALLIANCE; and, by that means, keep the common enemy at a stand.

THIS USE OF RELIGION TO THE STATE was seen by the learned, and felt by all men of every age and nation. The ancient world particularly was so firinly convinced of this truth, that their greatest secret of the sublime art of legislation consisted in this, how religion might be best applied to the service of society. The particular methods they employed, and the several artful detours they contrived to arrive at this end, are in the second book of The Divine Legation of Moses explained at large.

Religion being thus proved necessary to society, that it should be so used and applied, in the best way, and to most advantage, needs no proof. For it is as instinctive in our nature to improve a good, as to discover or investigate it. And with regard to the improvement of this particular good, there is a special reason why it should be studied. For the experience of every place and age informs us, that the coactivity of civil laws and religion is but just enough to keep men from running into disorder and mutual violence. But this improvement is the effect of art and contrivance. For all natural good, every thing constitutionally beneficial to man, needs man's industry to enable him to reap that benefit. We receive it all at the provident hand of heaven, rather with a capacity of being applied to our use, than immediately fit for our service. We receive it, indeed, ⚫ in full measure, but rude and unprepared. The efficient cause of this, in natural goods, is the intractability and innate stubbornness of matter; and in moral goods, the malice and perversity of man. The final cause seems to be, that man, of all God's creatures

the most incapable of a state of inactivity and idleness, may be set to work; and by this means made to cultivate, what would else lye fallow, the faculties both of his mind and body.

Now concerning this technical improvement of moral good, it is, in artificial bodies, as in natural : Two may be so essentially constituted as to be greatly able to adorn and strengthen each other. But then, as in the one case a mere juxta-position of the parts is not sufficient, so neither is it in the other; some union, some coalition, some artful insertion into each other will be necessary. But now again, as in natural bodies, the artist is unable to set about the proper operation, till he hath acquired a reasonable knowledge of the nature of those bodies which are the subject of his skill; so neither can we know in what manner religion may be best applied to the service of the state, till we have learned the real and essential natures both of a state and a religion. The obvious qualities of both sufficiently shew that they must needs have a good effect on each other, when properly applied*; as our artist, by his knowledge of the obvious qualities of two natural bodies, we suppose discerns as much; though he hath not yet gotten sufficient acquaintance with their nature, to make a proper application.

*Non natura, sed hominum vitio factum, ut ambæ illæ potestates, quæ amico fœdere conjungi debuerant, in dedecus Christiani nominis aliquando divellantur ab invicem. Marca, Epistola ad Cardinalem de Richelieu. F. T.

CHA P. IV.

OF THE NATURE AND END OF CIVIL SOCIETY: AND THE CAUSES OF THE COMMON MISTAKES CONCERNING IT, DISCOVERED AND EXPLAINED.

IT behoves us, therefore, in the next place, to examine the nature of CIVIL SOCIETY and RELIGION more at large. Of whose natures to be truly informed, the way is to find out their ends. And this will be the more necessary on account of the wonderful extravagances that the several sects amongst us have run into, concerning one and the other society; while some strike at the administration, some at the nature, and some at the very being of both. The PAPIST makes the state a creature of the church; the ERASTIAN makes the church a creature of the state: the PRESBYTERIAN would regulate the state on church ideas; the HOBBEIST, the church, on reasons of state: And, to compleat the farce, the QUAKER abolishes the very being of a church; and the MENNONITE suppresses the office of the civil magistrate.

But to begin with Civil Society. It was instituted either with the purpose of attaining all the good of every kind, it was even accidentally capable of producing; or only of some certain good, which the institutors, unconcerned with, and unattentive to, any other, had in view. To suppose its end the vague purpose of acquiring all possible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere solecism; as hath been sufficiently shewn by the writers on this question. And how

*

untrue

* See Locke's Defence of his Letters of Toleration. This appears to have been Aristotle's opinion from these words-púon

μὲν

untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what we have said above, of the Origin of Society. Civil Government then, I suppose, will be allowed to have been invented for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But, again, amongst all those things which are apt to obtrude, or have in fact obtruded, upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is but one difference in their properties, as ends; which is this, That one of these is attainable by civil society only; and all the rest are easily attained without it. The thing then, with that singular property, must needs be the genuine end of civil society. And that is no other than SECURITY

TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF

MAN. For this end, as we have shewn, civil society was invented; and this, civil society alone is able to procure. The great, but spurious rival of this end, THE SALVATION OF SOULS, or the security of man's future happiness, belongs, therefore, to the other division. For this, not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the body and goods do, may be as well attained in a state of nature, as in civil society; and therefore, on the principles here delivered, cannot be one of the causes of the institution of civil government; nor consequently one of the ends thereof *.

But if so, the promotion of it comes not within

the

μὲν ἐν διώρισαι τὸ θῆλυ, καὶ τὸ δέλον· ἐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιέτον, οἷον χαλκούποι τὴν [Δελφικὴν] μάχαιραν, πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ ̓ ἣν πρὸς ἕν δε. Polit. I. i. c. 1.

See note [B] at the end of this Book.