favor by courts of equity when the blamable party seeks their aid. Thus, the fact that a vendee may sustain loss by reason of the insolvency of the vendor is no ground for relief in a court of equity, in a case where the vendee has subjected himself to such loss by his own culpable laches or positive infidelity to his contract." And where a party had sold land and executed a bond for a deed, had received a portion of the purchase money and taken notes for the balance, and had placed the purchaser in possession, it was held that he could not ask for a rescission of the contract after having negligently allowed the notes to be outlawed."

§ 555. Parties in Pari Delicto.-Where the parties to a contract which is illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy are equally participants in the wrongful purpose or wrongful act which makes it invalid, and equally at fault, equity will not accord to either of them relief by rescission or cancellation, but will leave them where they stand, or remit them to such remedies as the law may be able to afford them."1 And the same rule applies to a contract which is in violation of a statute. Equity will not assist a plaintiff to obtain a rescission whose cause of action arises out of the transgression or inequitable evasion of a positive law." Nor will relief be granted to a complainant whose contract (as both parties well know) amounts to a breach of trust towards a third person, to whom he occupies a fiduciary relationship." And for the same reason, whatever grounds for rescission a complainant may allege, relief will be denied to him where it appears that the contract or conveyance in question was intended to effect a fraud upon the rights of others, and that the complainant participated

69 Durham v. Roberts, 33 Ga. Supp. 123. 70 Thornburgh v. Cole, 27 Kan. 490.

71 Brackenridge v. Dawson, 7 Ind. 383; Village of Cedar Springs v. Schlich, 81 Mich. 405, 45 N. W. 994, 8 L. R. A. 851; Lake v. Lake, 136 App. Div. 47, 119 N. Y. Supp. 686; Johnson v. Byler, 38 Tex. 606; Helsley v. Fultz, 76 Va. 671. And see, supra, § 313.

72 Perry v. Calvert, 22 Mo. 361; Barnum v. Barnum, 177 Mo. App. 68, 164 S. W. 129. And see, supra, § 318. But compare Blossom v. Van Amringe, 62 N. C. 133.

73 Clark v. Buffalo Hump Min. Co., 122 Fed. 243, 58 C. C. A. 607.

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in the fraudulent purpose or conspired with the other party to carry it into effect. For instance, in a case in Connecticut, it appeared that a man made an agreement with a woman, to whom he was engaged to be married, whereby, in consideration of a certain sum, she was to release her dower right in his estate. This agreement was made with the understanding that it was to be shown by him to his children, who were endeavoring to prevent the marriage, in order to induce them to cease their opposition, and that it was then to be destroyed. He showed it to them, and it accomplished its purpose, but, instead of destroying it, he delivered it to his son-in-law, in whose possession it was found after his death. It was held that the woman having been a party to the fraud practised on her husband's children, she could not maintain an action to cancel the contract as having been obtained by fraud." So, the maker of a note executed in pursuance of a fraudulent combination between himself and the payee to pretend that it was given for an actual sale of patent-right territory, in order to induce a third person to buy a right for other territory, cannot have the note canceled." Nor will equity grant relief where one of two parties to a fraudulent scheme to prevent bidding at a foreclosure sale violates his agreement with the other party." But where a company, for the purpose of selling its town lots, has made promises of certain improvements, which appear to have been one of the inducements to the purchase, and which have never been performed, the mere fact that a purchaser was also a stockholder or member of the company will not prevent him from maintaining a suit for the cancellation of his contract of purchase.78

74 King v. Lamborn, 186 Fed. 21, 108 C. C. A. 123; Fitzgerald v. Forristal, 48 Ill. 228; Wilson v. Watts, 9 Md. 356; Barnes v. Brown, 32 Mich. 146; Landis v. Landis, 41 N. J. Eq. 119, 2 Atl. 620; Jeffries v. Southwest Virginia Imp. Co., 88 Va. 862, 14 S. E. 661; Maurice v. Devol, 23 W. Va. 247.

75 Barnes v. Starr, 64 Conn. 136, 28 Atl. 980.

76 Overshiner v. Wisehart, 59 Ind. 135.

77 Corrothers v. Harris, 23 W. Va. 177.

78 Donelson v. Weakley, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 178.

§ 556. Same; Defrauding Creditors.-A conveyance of real estate or transfer of chattels, made and received for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the grantor, is nevertheless good between the parties, and equity will not relieve the fraudulent grantor by rescinding or cancelling the transaction or ordering a reconveyance, though he may have grounds for such relief which would have been available but for his fraud," as, for instance, that it was without consideration, that it was intended as a mortgage, or that the instrument was recorded without his consent. And so, a secret transfer of land by a debtor to a creditor, by a deed absolute on its face, to secure such creditor and certain other preferred creditors, though fraudulent and void as to general creditors, is binding on the parties, and equity will not interfere to relieve either of them.80 Nor will equity aid either of two litigants, though the title of one rests on a forgery, and that of the other on an authentic conveyance actually executed by the true owner for a valuable consideration, if it appears that both parties have been engaged in a systematic effort to defraud the owner of his property, and that the authentic conveyance was procured by fraudulent representations.81 But these rules are subject to certain exceptions and modifications. A conveyance of property to, and at the solicitation of, one occupying a fiduciary relation to the grantor may be set aside as against public policy, although both parties may have been in pari delicto, intending to defraud the grantor's creditors.82 So, where a wife has been induced by false representations made by her husband as to her liability for a debt, to transfer to him gratuitously certain property, the fact that she consented

79 Lawton v. Gordon, 34 Cal. 36, 91 Am. Dec. 670; Ybarra v. Lorenzana, 53 Cal. 197; Galt v. Jackson, 9 Ga. 151; Springer v. Drosch, 32 Ind. 486, 2 Am. Rep. 356; Brown v. Reilly, 72 Md. 489, 20 Atl. 239; Cushwa v. Cushwa, 5 Md. 44; Gage v. Gage, 36 Mich. 229; Ruckman v. Ruckman, 32 N. J. Eq. 259; Bolt v. Rogers, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 154; Jones v. Gorman, 42 N. C. 21; Jacobi v. Schloss, 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 385; McClenny v. Floyd, 10 Tex. 159; McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48.

80 Noble v. Noble, 26 Ark. 317.

81 Dunning v. Bathrick, 41 Ill. 425.

82 O'Conner v. Ward, 60 Miss. 1025.

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to the transfer with the understanding and belief that it would tend to hinder and delay the creditor and save the property constitutes no defense to an action to set aside the transfer.88 Again, relief will not be denied because the grantor executed the deed with intent to defraud his creditors, when in fact there were no creditors and no one was or could have been injured by the transfer. And where land was conveyed for the purpose of defrauding creditors, and by mistake of the grantor, and the fraud of the grantee, the former's homestead was included in the deed, it was held that, while the grantor could not recover the land intended to be fraudulently conveyed, he was entitled to a decree correcting the deed in accordance with such intention.85

§ 557. Same; Inequality of Turpitude. To justify the refusal of all relief on the ground that both the parties, complainant and defendant, are participants in a fraudulent or illegal transaction, it must not only appear that they shared in the wrongful purpose or wrongful act, but that they were equally blameworthy in doing so. For if the complainant can show that his turpitude was but slight in comparison with that of the defendant, he will not be denied relief. This is the case, for instance, where a grant or conveyance was intended to effect a fraud upon the rights of some third person or of creditors generally, but would not have been made except for fraud practised upon the grantor or false representations made to him by the grantee.86 And this rule is more especially applicable in cases where there were also circumstances of hardship, imposition, or betrayal of trust, as, where the grantor was old, feeble, weak-minded, or, on the other hand, very young and inexperienced, and the grantee was a near relative, or a trusted adviser, or any person having a predominant influence over the mind of the grantor, so that the transaction does not show an intelli

83 Boyd v. De La Montagnie, 73 N. Y. 498, 29 Am. Rep. 197.

84 Collins v. Schump, 16 N. M. 537, 120 Pac. 331.

85 Clemens v. Clemens, 28 Wis. 637, 9 Am. Rep. 520.

86 Luebke v. Salzwedel, 157 Wis. 601, 147 N. W. 831; Bunn v. Stuart, 183 Mo. 375, 81 S. W. 1091; Prewett v. Coopwood, 30 Miss.

gent, deliberate, and crafty purpose on the part of the grantor to perpetrate a fraud, but rather a supine acquiescence in the fraudulent schemes of another.87

87 Baehr v. Wolf, 59 Ill. 470; Williams v. Collins, 67 Iowa, 413, 25 N. W. 682; Harper v. Harper, 85 Ky. 160, 3 S. W. 5, 7 Am. St. Rep. 583; Anderson v. Merideth, 82 Ky. 564; Deatly v. Murphy, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 472; Long v. Long, 9 Md. 348; Barnes v. Brown, 32 Mich. 146; O'Conner v. Ward, 60 Miss. 1025; Poston v. Balch, 69 Mo. 115; Watkins v. Jones, 78 Hun, 496, 29 N. Y. Supp. 557; Rozell v. Vansyckle, 11 Wash. 79, 39 Pac. 270.

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